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Abstract. In a recent paper [29], Herbelin developed dPAω, a calculus in which construc-
tive proofs for the axioms of countable and dependent choices could be derived via the
memoization of choice functions. However, the property of normalization (and therefore
the one of soundness) was only conjectured. The difficulty for the proof of normalization
is due to the simultaneous presence of dependent types (for the constructive part of the
choice), of control operators (for classical logic), of coinductive objects (to encode func-
tions of type N → A into streams (a0, a1, . . .)) and of lazy evaluation with sharing (for
memoizing these coinductive objects).
Elaborating on previous works, we introduce in this paper a variant of dPAω presented
as a sequent calculus. On the one hand, we take advantage of a variant of Krivine classical
realizability that we developed to prove the normalization of classical call-by-need [55].
On the other hand, we benefit from dLtˆp, a classical sequent calculus with dependent
types in which type safety is ensured by using delimited continuations together with a
syntactic restriction [54]. By combining the techniques developed in these papers, we
manage to define a realizability interpretation a` la Krivine of our calculus that allows us
to prove normalization and soundness. This paper goes over the whole process, starting
from Herbelin’s calculus dPAω until our introduction of its sequent calculus counterpart
dLPAω.
1. Introduction
1.1. The axiom of choice. The axiom of choice is certainly one of the most intriguing
pieces of the foundations of mathematics. Understanding the axiomatization of a theory as
an intent to give a formal and truthful representation of a given world or structure, as long
as this structure only deals with finite objects it is easier to agree on what it “is” or “should
be”. However, as soon as the theory involves infinite objects, this question quickly turns
out to be much trickier. In particular, some undeniable properties of finite objects become
much more questionable in the case of infinite sets. The axiom of choice is precisely one of
these properties. Consider for instance the following problem, as presented by Russell [64,
pp.125-127]:
[Imagine a] millionaire who bought a pair of socks whenever he bought a pair
of boots, and never at any other time, and who had such a passion for buying
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both that at last he had ℵ0 pairs of boots and ℵ0 pairs of socks. The problem
is: How many boots had he, and how many socks?
The cardinal ℵ0 defines exactly the infinite quantity of natural numbers, and in particular,
since there is a bijection from N × N to N, ℵ0 is not increased by doubling. Hence, as
suggested by Russell:
One would naturally suppose that he had twice as many boots and twice as
many socks as he had pairs of each, and that therefore he had ℵ0 of each
[...].
To prove this claim, it is thus necessary and sufficient to give an enumeration of the million-
aire’s boots and socks. Yet, if it is easy to enumerate the boots—take each pair one after
the other, consider the left boot first then the right one— this is not possible a priori in
the case of socks without assuming the possibility of making an infinite number of arbitrary
choices: for each pair, one has to decide which sock to pick first.
Formally, the possibility of making these choices is expressed by the axiom of choice,
which was first introduced by Zermelo in the realm of set theory [72]. Among its different
formulations, its relational variant is given by:
AC , (∀x ∈ A.∃y ∈ B.P (x, y))→ (∃f ∈ BA.∀x ∈ A.P (x, f(x)))
which stipulates the existence of a choice function1. This axiom was shown to be independent
of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF)2.
While it might be tempting to consider the axiom of choice as natural, it leads to
very surprising consequences. The most striking example is certainly the Banach-Tarski
paradox [6], which shows that the unit ball:
B := {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x2 + y2 + z2 = 1}
in three dimensions can be disassembled into a finite number of pieces, which can then be
reassembled (after translating and rotating each of the pieces) to form two disjoint copies
of the ball B. Nonetheless, many standard mathematical results require the axiom of choice
(e.g., every vector space has a basis, the product of compact topological spaces is compact,
every field has an algebraic closure) or one of its restricted variants (e.g., the axiom of
dependent choice for Bolzano-Weierstrass’ theorem, countable choice to prove that every
infinite set is Dedekind-infinite). Especially, many proofs in analysis relies on the definition
of an adequate converging sequence, whose existence itself relies on the axiom of dependent
choice.
1.2. Constructive interpretation of AC. Russell’s presentation of his paradox leads us
to wonder how the millionaire should perform the choices necessary to obtain the enumer-
ation. Regarding the axiom of choice as expressed above, this amounts to wonder how to
compute the choice function whose existence is stated by the axiom.
This point of view is in line with a constructive vision of mathematics such as the one
given by the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation [69]. In that settings, a proof of
A → B is defined as a function that, given a proof of A constructs a proof of B; a proof
of ∀x ∈ A.B(x) is a function that turns any a ∈ A into a proof of B(a) while a proof of
1If we define the predicate P (x, y) as y ∈ x, it exactly says that if all the sets x ∈ A are non-empty, there
exists a choice function: (∀x ∈ A.x 6= ∅)→ ∃f ∈ (∪A)A.∀x ∈ A.f(x) ∈ x.
2Go¨del proved that the theory ZF + AC is consistent, and Cohen proved the same for the theory ZF +
¬AC [35].
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∃x ∈ A.B(x) is a pair (a, b) where a ∈ A and b is a proof of B(a). Therefore, a proof of the
premise of the relational axiom of choice (for a given relation R) has to be a function which,
for any a ∈ A, constructs a proof (ba, rab) of ∃y ∈ B.R(a, y). The function f : a 7→ ba then
defines a valid choice function, and the axiom is easily satisfied.
While the concepts of “proof” and “function” above can be interpreted in different
ways3 and as such remains meta-notions, the same idea is internalized within Martin-Lo¨f’s
type theory. To this end, one of the key features of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory is the concept
of dependent types, which allows formulas to refer to terms [48]. Notably, the existential
quantification rule is defined so that a proof term of type ∃xA.B is a pair (t, p) where t—the
witness—is of type A, while p—the proof—is of type B[t/x]. Dually, the theory enjoys two
elimination rules: one with a destructor wit to extract the witness, the second one with a
destructor prf to extract the proof. This allows for a simple and constructive proof of the
full axiom of choice [48]:
ACA := λH.(λx. wit (Hx), λx. prf (Hx))
: (∀xA.∃yB.P (x, y))→ ∃fA→B.∀xA.P (x, f(x))
This term is nothing more that an implementation of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolomogoroff (BHK)
interpretation of the axiom of choice: given a proof H of ∀xA.∃yB.P (x, y), it constructs a
choice function which simply maps any x to the witness of Hx, while the proof that this
function is sound w.r.t. P returns the corresponding certificate.
1.3. Incompatibility with classical logic. Unsurprisingly, this proof does not scale to
classical logic. Imagine indeed that we could dispose, in a type theoretic (or BHK interpre-
tation, realizability) fashion, of a classical framework including a proof term t for the axiom
of choice:
⊢ t : ∀x ∈ A.∃y ∈ B.P (x, y)→ ∃f ∈ BA.∀x ∈ A.P (x, f(x))
Consider now any undecidable predicate U(x) over a domain X. Taking advantage of the
exceluded middle, we can strengthen the formula U(x)∨¬U(x) (which is true for any x ∈ X)
into:
∀x ∈ X.∃y ∈ {0, 1}.(U(x) ∧ y = 1) ∨ (¬U(x) ∧ y = 0)
which is provable as well in a classical framework and thus should have a proof term u. Now,
this has the shape of the hypothesis of the axiom of choice, so that by application of t to u,
we should obtain a term:
⊢ t u : ∃f ∈ {0, 1}X .∀x ∈ X.(U(x) ∧ f(x) = 1) ∨ (¬U(x) ∧ f(x) = 0)
In particular, the term wit (t u) would be a function which, for any x ∈ X, outputs 1 if U(x)
is true, and 0 otherwise. This is absurd, since U is undecidable. This informal explanation
gives us a metamathematical argument on the impossibility of having a proof system which
is classical as a logic, entails the axiom of choice and where proofs fully compute. Since the
existence of consistent classical theories with the axiom of choice (like set theory) has been
proven, the incompatibility is to be found within the constructive character of proofs.
3For instance, Kleene realizability corresponds to the case where “proofs” are natural numbers and
“functions” are taken as being computable functions [36].
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1.4. The computational content of classical logic. In 1990, Griffin discovered that the
control operator call/cc (for call with current continuation) of the Scheme programming
language could be typed by Peirce’s law ((A → B) → A) → A). As Peirce’s law is known
to imply, in an intuitionistic framework, all the other forms of classical reasoning (excluded
middle, reductio ad absurdum, double negation elimination, etc.), this discovery opened the
way for a direct computational interpretation of classical proofs, using control operators
and their ability to backtrack. Several calculi were born from this idea, such as Parigot’s λµ-
calculus [61], Barbanera and Berardi’s symmetric λ-calculus [7], Krivine’s λc-calculus [40]
or Curien and Herbelin’s λ¯µµ˜-calculus [15].
Notably, in order to address the incompatibility of intuitionistic realizability with classi-
cal logic, Krivine used the λc-calculus to develop in the middle of the 90s the theory of classi-
cal realizability [40]. Krvine realizability is a complete reformulation4 of the very principles
of realizability to make them compatible with classical reasoning. Although it was initially
introduced to interpret the proofs of classical second-order arithmetic (PA2), the theory of
classical realizability can be scaled to more expressive theories such as Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory [38] or the calculus of constructions with universes [49]. Krivine realizability has
shown in the past twenty years to be a very powerful framework, both as a way to build
new models of set theory [42, 43, 45] and as a tool to analyze programs [33, 25, 23]; we shall
use it several times in this paper to prove the correctness of different calculi.
Last but not least, Griffin’s discovery led to an important paradigmatic shift from the
point of view of logic. Instead of trying to get an axiom by means of logical translations
(e.g. Go¨del’s negative translation for classical reasoning), and then transfer this translation
to program along the Curry-Howard correspondence (e.g. continuation-passing style for
negative translation), one can rather try to directly add an operator whose computational
behavior is adequate with the expected axiom. Several works over the past twenty years have
emphasized the fact that adding new programming primitives (and in particular side effects)
to a calculus may bring new reasoning principles [39, 34, 51, 28, 32]. The present work is
totally in line with this philosophy: we will show how to use a form of memoization to give a
computational content to the axioms of dependent and countable choices in a framework that
is compatible with classical logic. That is, we will take advantage of several computational
features (namely: control operators, dependent types, streams, lazy evaluation and shared
memory) to build proof terms for these axioms.
1.5. Realizing ACN and DC in presence of classical logic. As we explained earlier,
the full axiom of choice and computational classical logic are a priori incompatible. In
particular, extending Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with control operators leads to an inconsis-
tent theory. This was observed by Herbelin [27]: starting from a sound minimal language
with dependent types, he showed that the further addition of control operators allows to
derive a proof of false. The main idea behind Herbelin’s paradox, which we will detail in
Section 5.1, is that control operators allows to define a proof p of type ∃xN.x = 1 that will
first give a wrong witness for x (say 0) together with a certificate which, if it is evaluated,
will backtrack to furnish the appropriate witness (i.e. 1) and the usual equality proof refl
for the equality 1 = 1. Yet, extracting the witness from this proof with wit p returns 0,
while extracting the certificate with prf p reduces to the usual proof of equality refl (after
4As observed in several articles [60, 50], classical realizability can in fact be seen as a reformulation of
Kleene’s realizability through Friedman’s A-translation [22].
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backtracking). The paradox arises from the fact that prf p is of type wit p = 1, while
wit p is convertible to 0.
The bottom line of this example is that the same proof p is behaving differently in
different contexts thanks to control operators, causing inconsistencies between the witness
and its certificate. In 2012, Herbelin proposed a way of scaling up Martin-Lo¨f’s proof to
classical logic while preventing the previous paradox to occur. The first idea is to restrict
dependent types to the fragment of negative-elimination-free proofs (nef) which, intuitively,
only contains constructive proofs behaving as values5. The second idea is to share the
computation of the choice function, in order to avoid inconsistencies coming from classical
proofs behaving differently in different places. To this purpose, Herbelin considered the cases
of choice functions whose domain is the set of natural numbers (i.e., the axioms of countable
and dependent choices) and proposed to memoize their computations. While the presence
of control operators induces the possibility for a proof of type ∀x ∈ N.∃y ∈ B.R(x, y) to
furnish different y for a same n ∈ N depending on the evaluation context, the memoization
ensures that it will be computed at most once. Technically, the key is to encode functions of
type N→ B by streams (b0, b1, . . . ) that are lazily evaluated, that is to say infinite sequences
represented coinductively and whose components are evaluated only if necessary.
This allows us to internalize into a formal system the realizability approach [9, 19] as a
direct proofs-as-programs interpretation. The resulting calculus, called dPAω, thus contains
dependent types (for the constructive part of choices), control operators (for classical logic),
coinductive objects (to define streams) and a lazy evaluation strategy with shared memory
for these objects.
1.6. Normalization of dPAω. In [29], the property of normalization (on which relies
the one of consistency) was only conjectured, and the proof sketch that was given turned
out to be difficult to formalize properly. Our first attempt to prove the normalization
of dPAω was to derive a continuation-passing style translation (CPS)6, but translations
appeared to be hard to obtain for dPAω as such. In addition to the difficulties caused by
control operators and co-fixpoints, dPAω reduction system is defined in a natural deduction
fashion, with contextual rules involving meta-contexts of arbitrary depth. This kind of rules
are particularly difficult to faithfully translate through a CPS.
Rather than directly proving the normalization of dPAω, we choose to first give an
alternative presentation of the system under the shape of a sequent calculus, which we
call dLPAω. Indeed, sequent calculus presentations of a calculus usually provides good
intermediate steps for CPS translations [56, 57, 18] since they enforce a decomposition of
the reduction system into finer-grained rules. To this aim, we first handled separately the
difficulties peculiar to the definition of such a calculus: on the one hand, we proved with
Herbelin the normalization of a calculus with control operators and lazy evaluation [55];
on the other hand, we defined a classical sequent calculus with dependent types [54]. By
combining the techniques developed in these frameworks, we finally managed to define
dLPAω, which we present here and prove to be sound and normalizing.
5For instance, in the previous example p is not nef, and the restriction thus precludes us from writing
prf p or wit p.
6Indeed, removing the control part of dPAω (which CPS translations do through an encoding) would
leave us with an intuitionistic system whose normalization would be easier to prove (in particular, it would
be a subsystem of the Calculus of Inductive Constructions).
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In each case, we were guided by a methodology first described by Danvy, who high-
lighted what he called the unity of semantic artifacts [16]: for a given notion of operational
semantics, there is a calculus, an abstract machine, and a continuation-passing style trans-
lation that correspond exactly with one another. Therefore, from any one of these semantic
artifacts, the others may be systematically derived. We extend this observation by showing
how it can be used to ease the definition of a realizability interpretation a` la Krivine, which
we actually do in each case to prove the normalization and consistency of the considered
calculi.
1.7. Outline of the paper. In this paper, we describe the complete path from Herbelin’s
conjecture [29] to the normalization proof of dLPAω in [53] (of which this paper is an
extended version). This article will thus cover and summarize a significant amount of
different papers authored by Herbelin and myself during the whole process [29, 3, 54, 55, 53].
In details, we will start in Section 2.2 by presenting the main ingredients of Herbelin’s
dPAω calculus, and the intuitions underlying the proof terms for the axioms of countable and
dependent choices. In Section 3, we will recap the main ideas of the Curien-Herbelin’s λµµ˜-
calculus [15], the sequent calculus on which we will base all the calculi developed afterwards,
and in particular dLPAω. We shall also take advantage of this section to illustrate Danvy’s
λµµ˜-calculus
+ sequent calculus
λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus
+ sequent calculus
+ sharing & lazyness
dLtˆp
+ sequent calculus
+ dependent types
dLPAω
+ sequent calculus
+ dependent types
+ co-fixpoints
+ sharing & lazyness
Sec. 3
Sec. 4
Sec. 5
Sec. 6
methodology on the call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus in or-
der to obtain a continuation-passing style translation
and a Krivine realizability interpretation. We then
present in Section 4 the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, a lazy clas-
sical sequent calculus, which was originally defined
by Ariola et al. using Danvy’s method of semantic
artifacts [3]. After summarizing the successive steps
leading to the definition of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, we
will recall the type system and realizability interpre-
tation we developed together with Herbelin in order
to prove its normalization [55]. In Section 5, we will
present dLtˆp, a classical sequent calculus with depen-
dent types [54]. In particular, we will explain how
the seek of a dependently typed continuation-passing
style unveiled the need for using delimited continua-
tions and the restriction to the nef fragment. Fi-
nally, we shall gather these two systems to define dLPAω in Section 6, whose normalization
is proved by means of a realizability interpretation combining the interpretations for dLtˆp
and the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus.
Along the way, we will use the unity of semantic artifacts for each of the calculi afore-
mentioned. While we would like to avoid boring the reader stiff with recalling the full
process each time, we still intend to outline it in each case. Indeed, we believe that the
core ideas used in our realizability interpretation for dLPAω directly stem from the sub-
cases of λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus and dLtˆp, and that they are easier to understand in these specific
contexts which only contains the core ingredients. We hope that this will help the reader
to understand the different technicalities induced by the expressiveness of dLPAω before its
introduction in Section 6.
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2. A proof of dependent choice compatible with classical logic
We shall begin by presenting dPAω, the proof system that was introduced by Herbelin as a
mean to give a computational content to the axiom of choice in a classical setting [29]. As
explained in the introduction, the calculus is a fine adaptation of Martin-Lo¨f proof which
circumvents the different difficulties caused by classical logic. Rather than restating dPAω
in full details, for which we refer the reader to [29], let us describe informally the rationale
guiding its definition and the properties that it verifies. We shall then dwell on the missing
piece in the puzzle that led us to this work, namely the normalization property, and outline
our approach to prove it.
2.1. A constructive proof of dependent choices compatible with classical logic.
The dependent sum type of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory provides a strong existential elimina-
tion, which allows us to prove the full axiom of choice. The proof is simple and constructive:
ACA := λH.(λx. wit (Hx), λx. prf (Hx))
: ∀xA.∃yB .P (x, y)→ ∃fA→B.∀xA.P (x, f(x))
To scale up this proof to classical logic, the first idea in Herbelin’s work [29] is to restrict
the dependent sum type to a fragment of his system which is called negative-elimination-free
(nef). This fragment contains slightly more proofs than just values, but is still computation-
ally compatible with classical logic. We shall see in Section 5.3 how this restriction naturally
appears when trying to define a dependently-typed continuation-passing style translation.
The second idea is to represent a countable universal quantification as an infinite con-
junction. This allows us to internalize into a formal system the realizability approach of
Berardi, Bezem and Coquand or Escardi and Oliva [9, 19] as a direct proofs-as-programs
interpretation. Informally, let us imagine that given a proof H : ∀xN.∃yB.P (x, y), we could
create the sequence H∞ = (H0,H1, . . . ,Hn, . . .) and select its n
th-element with some func-
tion nth. Then one might wish that:
λH.(λn. wit (nth n H∞), λn. prf (nth n H∞))
could stand for a proof for ACN.
However, even if we were effectively able to build such a term, H∞ might still contain
some classical proofs. Therefore, two copies of H n might end up behaving differently
according to the contexts in which they are executed, and then return two different witnesses.
This problem could be fixed by using a shared version of H∞, say:
λH. leta = H∞ in (λn. wit (nth n a), λn. prf (nth n a)) .
It only remains to formalize the intuition of H∞. This is done by means of a coinductive
fixpoint operator. We write cofixtbx[p] for the co-fixpoint operator binding the variables b
and x, where p is a proof and t a term. Intuitively, such an operator is intended to reduce
according to the rule:
cofixtbx[p] → p[t/x][λy.cofix
y
bx[p]/b]
This is to be compared with the usual inductive fixpoint operator which we write fixtbx[p0 | pS ]
(which binds the variables b and x) and which reduces as follows:
fix0bx[p0 | pS ] → p0 fix
S(t)
bx [p0 | pS ] → pS [t/x][fix
t
bx[p0 | pS ]/b]
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The presence of coinductive fixpoints allows us to consider the term cofix0bn[(Hn, b(S(n)))],
which implements a stream eventually producing the (informal) infinite sequence H∞. In-
deed, this proof term reduces as follows:
cofix0bn[(Hn, b(S(n)))] → (H 0, cofix
1
bn[(Hn, b(S(n)))])
→ (H 0, (H 1, cofix2bn[(Hn, b(S(n))))])
→ . . .
This allows for the following definition of a proof term for the axiom of countable choice:
ACN := λH. let a = cofix
0
bn[(Hn, b(S(n)))] in (λn. wit (nth n a), λn. prf (nth n a))
: ∀xN.∃yB .P (x, y)→ ∃fN→B.∀xA.P (x, f(x))
Whereas the construction leta = . . . in . . . suggests a call-by-value discipline, we cannot
afford to pre-evaluate each component of the stream. In turn, this imposes a lazy call-by-
value evaluation discipline for coinductive objects. However, this still might be responsible
for some non-terminating reductions, all the more as classical proofs may backtrack.
If we analyze what this construction does at the level of types7, in first approximation
it turns a proof (H) of the formula ∀xN.A(x) (with A(x) = ∃y.P (x, y) in that case) into
a proof (the stream H∞) of the (informal) infinite conjunction A(0) ∧ A(1) ∧ A(2) ∧ . . . .
Formally, a proof cofixtbx[p] is an inhabitant of a coinductive formula, written ν
t
XxA (where
t is a term and which binds the variables X and x). The typing rule is given by:
Γ ⊢ t : T Γ, x : T, b : ∀yT.Xy ⊢ p : A
Γ ⊢ cofixtbx[p] : ν
t
XxA
(cofix)
with the side condition that X can only occurs in positive position in A. Coinductive
formulas are defined with a reduction rules which is very similar to the rule for the co-
fixpoint:
νtXxA ⊲ A[t/x][ν
t
XyA/Xy]
In particular, the term cofix0bn[(Hn, b(S(n))] is thus an inhabitant of a coinductively de-
fined (infinite) conjunction, written ν0Xn(A(n) ∧ X(S(n))). This formula indeed reduces
accordingly to the reduction of the stream:
ν0Xn(A(n) ∧X(S(n))) ⊲ A(0) ∧ [ν
1
Xn(A(n) ∧X(S(n)))]
⊲ A(0) ∧ (A(1) ∧ [ν2Xn(A(n) ∧X(S(n)))])
⊲ . . .
More generally, at the level of formulas, the key is to identify the formula A(x) and a
suitable law g : N→ T to turn a proof of ∀xT.A(x) into the conjunction A(g(0))∧A(g(1))∧
A(g(2)) ∧ . . . . In the case of the axiom of countable choice, this law is simply this identity.
As for the axiom of dependent choice, the law g we are looking for is precisely the choice
function. We can thus use the same trick to define a proof term for the axiom of dependent
choice:
DC , ∀xT .∃yT .P (x, y)→ ∀xT0.∃f ∈ T
N.(f(0) = x0 ∧ ∀n
N.P (f(n), f(S(n))))
7We delay the formal introduction of a type system and the given of the typing derivation for ACN to
Section 6.5.
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The stream we actually construct corresponds again to a coinductive formula, defined here
by νx0Xn[∃y
N.(P (x, y) ∧X(y))] and which ultimately unfolds into8:
νx0Xn[∃y.(P (x, y) ∧X(y))] ⊲ ∃x
N
1.(P (x0, x1) ∧ ν
x1
Xn[∃y.(P (x, y) ∧X(y))])
⊲ ∃xN1.(P (x0, x1) ∧ ∃x
N
2.(P (x1, x2) ∧ ν
x2
Xn[∃y.(P (x, y) ∧X(y))])))
⊲ . . .
Given a proof H : ∀x.∃y.P (x, y) and a term x0 , we can define a stream corresponding
to this coinductive formula by str x0 := cofix
x0
bn[dest H n as ((y, c)) in (y, (c, (b y))]. This
term reduces as expected:
(x0, str x0) → (x0, (x1, (p1, str x1))) → (x0, (x1, (p1, (x2, (p2, str x2))))) → . . .
where pi : P (xi−1, xi). From there, it is almost direct to extract the choice function f
(which maps any n ∈ N to xn) and the corresponding certificate that (f(0) = x0 ∧ ∀n ∈
N.P (f(n), f(S(n)))). In practice, it essentially amounts to define the adequate nth function.
We will give a complete definition of the proof term for the axiom of dependent choice in
Theorem 6.8.
2.2. An overview of dPAω. Formally, the calculus dPAω is a proof system for the lan-
guage of classical arithmetic in finites types (abbreviated PAω), where the ‘d’ stands for
“dependent”. It adopts a stratified presentation of dependent types, by syntactically distin-
guishing terms— that represent mathematical objects—from proof terms—that represent
mathematical proofs. In other words, we syntactically separate the categories correspond-
ing to witnesses and proofs in dependent sum types. Finite types and formulas are thus
separated as well, corresponding to the following syntax:
Types T,U ::= N | T → U
Formulas A,B ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | t = u | A ∧B | A ∨B | ∃xT .A | ∀xT .A | Πa : A.B | νtx,fA
Terms, denoted by t, u, ... are meant to represent arithmetical objects, their syntax thus
includes:
• a term 0 and a successor S;
• an operator rectxy[t0 | tS ] for recursion, which binds the variables x and y: where t
is the term on which the recursion is performed, t0 is the term for the case t = 0
ans tS is the term for case t = S(t
′);
• λ-abstraction λx.t to define functions and terms application t u;
• a wit constructor to extract the witness of a dependent sum.
As for proofs, denoted by p, q, ..., they contain:
• a proof term refl which is the proof of atomic equalities t = t;
• subst p q which eliminates an equality proof p : t = u to get a proof of B[u] from a
proof q : B[t];
• pairs (p, q) to prove logical conjunctions and destructors of pairs split p as (a1, a2) in q
(which binds the variables a1 and a2 in q);
• injections ιi(p) for the logical disjunction and pattern-matching case p of [a1.p1 | a2.p2]
which binds the variables a1 in p1 and a2 in p2;
• pairs (t, p) where t is a term and p a proof for the dependent sum type;
8As we shall explain afterwards, dest p as (x, a) in q is a non-dependent eliminator for the existential
type, it destructs a proof p of ∃x.A(x) as (x, a) in q and reduces as follows: dest (t, p) as (x, a) in q →
q[t/x, p/a].
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• prf p which allows us to extract the certificate of a dependent pair;
• non-dependent destructors dest p as (x, a) in q which binds the variables x and a
in q;
• abstractions over terms λx.p for the universal quantification and applications p t;
• (possibly) dependent abstractions over proofs λa.p and applications p q;
• a construction leta = p in q, which binds the variable a in q and which allows for
sharing;
• operators fixtax[p0 | pS ] and cofix
t
bx[p] that we already described for inductive and
coinductive reasoning;
• control operators catchα p (which binds the variable α in p) and throw α p (where
α is a variable and p a proof)
• exfalso p where p is intended to be a proof of false.
This results in the following syntax:
Terms t, u ::= x | 0 | S(t) | rectxy[t0 | tS ] | λx.t | t u | wit p
Proofs p, q ::= a | refl | subst p q | ιi(p) | case p of [a1.p1 | a2.p2]
| (p, q) | split p as (a1, a2) in q
| (t, p) | prf p | dest p as (x, a) in q | λx.p | p t
| λa.p | p q | let a = p in q | fixtax[p0 | pS ] | cofix
t
bx[p]
| exfalso p | catchα p | throw αp
The problem of degeneracy caused by the conjoint presence of classical proofs and depen-
dent types is solved by enforcing a compartmentalization between them. Dependent types
are restricted to the set of negative-elimination-free proofs (nef), which are a generalization
of values preventing backtracking evaluations from occuring by excluding expressions of the
form p q, p t, exfalso p, catchα p or throw αp which are outside the body of a λx or λa.
Syntactically, they are defined by:
Values V1, V2 ::= a | ιi(V ) | (V1, V2) | (t, V ) | λx.p | λa.p | refl
NEF N1, N2 ::= a | refl | subst N1N2 | ιi(N) | case p of [a1.N1 | a2.N2]
| (N1, N2) | split N1 as (a1, a2) in N2
| (t,N) | prf N | dest N1 as (x, a) in N2 | λx.p
| λa.p | leta = N1 inN2 | fix
t
ax[N0 |NS ] | cofix
t
bx[N ]
This allows us to restrict typing rules involving dependencies, notably the rules for prf or
leta = . . . in . . . :
Γ ⊢ p : ∃xT .A(x) p ∈ nef
Γ ⊢ prf p : A(wit p)
(prf )
Γ ⊢ p : A Γ, a : A ⊢ q : B a /∈ FV (B) if p /∈ nef
Γ ⊢ let a = p in q : B[p/a]
(Cut)
About reductions, let us simply highlight the fact that they globally follow a call-by-
value discipline, for instance in this sample:
(λa.p) q → leta = q in p
let a = (p1, p2) in p → leta1 = p1 in leta2 = p2 in p[(a1, a2)/a]
let a = V in p → p[V/a]
except for co-fixpoints which are lazily evaluated:
F [let a = cofixtbx[q] in p] → leta = cofix
t
bx[q] inF [p]
leta = cofixtbx[q] inD[a] → leta = q[λy.cofix
y
bx[q]/b][t/x] inD[a]
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In the previous rules, the first one expresses the fact that evaluation of co-fixpoints under
contexts F [ ] are momentarily delayed. The second rules precisely corresponds to a context
where the co-fixpoint is linked to a variable a whose value is needed, a step of unfolding is
then performed. The full type system, as well as the complete set of reduction rules, are
given in [29], and will be restated with a different presentation in Section 6. In the same
paper, some important properties of the calculus are given. In particular, dPAω verifies the
property of subject reduction, and provided it is normalizing, there is no proof of false.
Theorem 2.1 (Subject reduction). If Γ ⊢ p : A and p→ q, then Γ ⊢ q : A.
Proof (sketch). By induction on the derivation of p→ q, see [29].
Theorem 2.2 (Conservativity). Provided dPAω is normalizing, if A is →-ν-wit -∀-free,
and ⊢dPAω p : A, there is a value V such that ⊢HAω V : A.
Proof (sketch). Considering a closed proof p of A, p can be reduced. By analysis of the
different possible cases, it can be found a closed value of type A. Then using the fact that
A is a →-ν-wit -∀-free formula, V does not contain any subexpression of the form λx.p
or λa.p, by extension it does not contain either any occurrence of exfalso p, catchα p or
throw α p and is thus a proof of A already in HAω.
Theorem 2.3 (Consistency). Provided dPAω is normalizing, it is consistent, that is: 0dPAω
p : ⊥.
Proof. The formula ⊥ is a particular case of →-ν-wit -∀-free formula, thus the existence
of a proof of false in dPAω would imply the existence of a contradiction already in HAω,
which is absurd.
The last two results rely on the property of normalization. Unfortunately, the proof
sketch that is given in [29] to support the claim that dPAω normalizes turns out to be hard
to formalize properly. Since, moreover, dPAω contains both control operators (allowing for
backtrack) and co-fixpoints (allowing infinite objects, like streams), which can be combined
and interleaved, we should be very suspicious a priori about this property. Anyhow, the
proof sketch from [29] relies on metamathematical arguments while we are rather interested
in a fine analysis of the interactions between the different computational features of dPAω.
Indeed, our goal is not limited to adding an axiom to the theory or to finding a way to
realize it. In turns, we are looking for an adapted calculus with an appropriate operational
semantics: such an approach mixing syntax and semantics let us hope to develop a better
calculus (from a programming point of view) and to get a better understanding of the proof
arguments (from the point of view of logic). The proposal of Herbelin is already in line
with this philosophy: as we saw, the proofs terms for ACN and DC in dPA
ω are build using
usual programming primitives rather than one monolithic extra-instruction.
2.3. Toward a proof of normalization for dPAω. This paper recounts a long process
devoted to the search for a proof of normalization for dPAω by means of a realizability
interpretation or by a continuation-passing-style translation. Aside from the very result
of normalization, such an approach is of interest in itself in that, as advocated earlier, it
requires and provides us with a fine understanding of the computational features of dPAω.
In particular, the difficulty in obtaining a continuation-passing style translation directly for
dPAω highlights several problems. The first one is the simultaneous presence of control
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operators and of lazily evaluated streams, thus allowing to define programs that may back-
track and require the evaluation of of potentially infinit object. program that The second is
the presence of dependent types. Indeed, dependent types (and in particular the dependent
sum) are known to be incompatible with a continuation-passing style translation [8]. Last,
the reduction system is defined in a natural-deduction style with contextual rules (as in the
rule to reduce proofs of the shape leta = cofixtbx[p] inD[a]) where the contexts involved
can be of arbitrary depth. This kind of rules are, in general and especially in this case, very
difficult to translate faithfully through a continuation-passing style translation.
All in all, there are several difficulties in getting a direct proof of normalization for dPAω.
Hence, we shall study them separately before combining the solutions to each subproblem
in order to attack the main problem. Roughly, our strategy consists of two steps:
(1) reduce dPAω to an equivalent presentation in a sequent calculus fashion,
(2) use the methodology of semantic artifacts to define a CPS or a realizability inter-
pretation.
Defining a sequent calculus presentation of a calculus is indeed known to be a good inter-
mediate step for the definition of continuation-passing style translations [56, 57, 18]. In our
case it forces to us to rephrase the contextual rules into abstract-machine like reduction
rules which only depend of the top-level command, thus solving the last difficulty evoked
above. This presentation should of course verify at least the property of subject reduction
and its reduction system should mimic the one of dPAω. Schematically, this corresponds
to the following roadmap where question marks indicate what is to be done:
dPAω [Herbelin’12]:
+ control operators
+ dependent types
+ co-fixpoints
+ sharing & lazyness
dLPAω ?
+ sequent calculus
+ dependent types
+ co-fixpoints
+ sharing & lazyness
Realizability
interpretation
?
Target language?
Subject reduction X Subject reduction ? Normalization X
CPS?
To be fair, this approach is idealistic. In particular, we will not formally define an embed-
ding for the first arrow, since we are not interested in dPAω for itself, but rather in the
computational content of the proofs for countable and dependent choice. Hence, we will
content ourself with a sequent calculus presentation of dPAω which allows for similar proof
terms, which we call dLPAω, without bothering to prove that the reduction systems are
strictly equivalent (see Section 6.5). As for the second arrow, as we shall explain in the
next sections, the search for a continuation-passing style translation or a realizability inter-
pretation can coincide for a large part. We shall thus apply the methodology of semantic
artifacts and in the end, choose the easiest possibility (in that case, defining a realizability
interpretation).
From this roadmap actually arises two different subproblems that are already of interest
in themselves. Forgetting about the general context of dPAω, we shall first wonder whether
these easier questions have an answer:
(1) Can we prove the normalization of a call-by-need calculus with control operators?
Can we define a Krivine realizability interpretation of such a calculus?
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(2) Is it possible to define a (classical) sequent calculus with a form of dependent types?
If so, would it be compatible with a typed continuation-passing style translation?
We shall treat the first question in Section 4 and the second one in Section 5, before combin-
ing the ideas of both systems to define dLPAω in Section 6. As explained in Section 1.7, in
each case we will define variants of Curien-Herbelin’s λµµ˜-calculus, so that we shall begin
with presenting the latter. We will take advantage of this introduction to illustrate our
global methodology (that is, refining the system into an abstract-machine like calculus in
order to get a continuation-passing style translation or a realizability interpretation that
allows us t o prove normalization and soundness).
3. The λµµ˜-calculus and Danvy’s semantics artifacts
3.1. Continuation-passing style translation and Danvy’s methodology. The termi-
nology of continuation-passing style (CPS) was first introduced in 1975 by Sussman and
Steele in a technical report about the Scheme programming language [68]. In this report,
after giving the usual recursive definition of the factorial, they explained how the same
computation could be driven differently:
“It is always possible, if we are willing to specify explicitly what to do with
the answer, to perform any calculation in this way: rather than reducing to
its value, it reduces to an application of a continuation to its value. That is,
in this continuation-passing programming style, a function always “returns”
its result by “sending” it to another function. This is the key idea.”
Interestingly, by making explicit the order in which reduction steps are computed, continuation-
passing style translations indirectly specify an operational semantics for the translated cal-
culus. In particular, different evaluation strategies for a calculus correspond to different
continuation-passing style translations. This was for instance studied by Plotkin for the
call-by-name and call-by-value strategies within the λ-calculus [62].
Continuations and their computational benefits have been deeply studied since then,
and there exists a wide literature on continuation-passing style translations. Among other
things, these translations have been used to ease the definitions of compilers [2, 21], one
of their interests being that they make explicit the flow of control. As such, continuation-
passing style translations de facto provide us with an operational semantics for control
operators, as observed in [20] for the C operator. Continuation-passing style translations
therefore bring an indirect computational interpretation of classical logic. This observation
can be strengthened on a purely logical aspect by considering the logical translations they
induce at the level of types: the translation of types through a CPS mostly amounts to a
negative translation allowing to embed classical logic into intuitionistic logic [24, 58].
In addition to the operational semantics, continuation-passing style translations allow
to benefit from properties already proved for the target calculus. For instance, we will see
how to define a translation p 7→ JpK from the simply-typed call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus to
the simply-typed λ-calculus along which the properties of normalization and soundness can
be transfered. In details, these translations will preserve reduction, in that a reduction step
in the source language gives rise to a step (or more) in the target language:
c 1−→ c′ ⇒ JcK +−→β Jc
′K (3.1)
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We say that a translation is typed when it comes with a translation A 7→ JAK from types of
the source language to types of the target language, such that a typed proof in the source
language is translated into a typed proof of the target language:
Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ ⇒ JΓK, J∆K ⊢ JpK : JAK (3.2)
Last, we are interested in translations mapping the type ⊥ into a type J⊥K which is not
inhabited:
0 p : J⊥K (3.3)
Assuming that the previous properties hold, one automatically gets:
Proposition 3.1 (Benefits of the translation). If the target language of the translation is
sound and normalizing, and if besides the equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) hold, then:
(1) If JpK normalizes, then p normalizes
(2) If p is typed, then p normalizes
(3) The source language is sound, i.e. there is no proof ⊢ p : ⊥
Proof. (1) By contrapositive, if p does not normalizes, then according to equation (3.1)
neither does JpK.
(2) If p is typed, then JpK is also typed by(3.2), and thus normalizes. Using the first
item, p normalizes.
(3) By reductio ad absurdum, direct consequence of (3.3).
Continuation-passing style translations are thus a powerful tool both on the computa-
tional and the logical facets of the proofs-as-programs correspondence. We shall illustrate
afterwards its use to prove normalization and soundness of the call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus.
Rather than giving directly the appropriate definitions, we would like to insist on a conve-
nient methodology to obtain CPS translations as well as realizability interpretations (which
are deeply connected). This methodology is directly inspired from Danvy et al. method to
derive hygienic semantics artifacts for a call-by-need calculus [17]. Reframed in our setting,
it essentially consists in the successive definitions of:
(1) an operational semantics,
(2) a small-step calculus or abstract machine,
(3) a continuation-passing style translation,
(3’) a realizability model.
The first step is nothing more than the usual definition of a reduction system. The sec-
ond step consists in refining the reduction system to obtain small-step reduction rules (as
opposed to big-step ones), that are finer-grained reduction steps. These steps should be
as atomic as possible, and in particular, they should correspond to an abstract machine
in which the sole analysis of the term (or the context) should determine the reduction to
perform. Such a machine is called in context-free form [17]. If so, the definition of a CPS
translation is almost straightforward, as well as the realizability interpretation. Let us now
illustrate this methodology on the call-by-name λµµ˜-calculi.
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Proofs p ::= a | λa.p | µα.c 〈p||µ˜a.c〉 → c[p/a] p ∈ V
Contexts e ::= α | p · e | µ˜a.c 〈µα.c||e〉 → c[e/α] e ∈ E
Commands c ::= 〈p||e〉 〈λa.p||u · e〉 → 〈u||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉
(a) Syntax (b) Reduction rules
Γ ⊢ t :A | ∆ Γ | e : A ⊢ ∆
〈t||e〉 : (Γ ⊢ ∆)
(Cut)
(a : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ a : A | ∆
(Axr)
Γ, a : A ⊢ p : B | ∆
Γ ⊢ λa.p : A→ B | ∆
(→r)
c : (Γ ⊢ ∆, α : A)
Γ ⊢ µα.c : A | ∆
(µ)
(α : A) ∈ ∆
Γ | α : A ⊢ ∆
(Axl)
Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ Γ | e : B ⊢ ∆
Γ | p · e : A→ B ⊢ ∆
(→l)
c : (Γ, a : A ⊢ ∆)
Γ | µ˜a.c : A ⊢ ∆
(µ˜)
(c) Typing rules
Figure 1. The λµµ˜-calculus
3.2. A short primer to the λµµ˜-calculus. We recall here the spirit of the λµµ˜-calculus,
for further details and references please refer to the original article [15]. The key notion of
the λµµ˜-calculus is the notion of command. A command 〈p||e〉 can be understood as a state
of an abstract machine, representing the evaluation of a proof p (the program) against a
co-proof e (the stack) that we call context. The syntax and reduction rules (parameterized
over a subset of proofs V and a subset of evaluation contexts E) are given in Figure 1,
where µ˜a.c can be read as a context leta = [ ] in c. The µ operator comes from Parigot’s
λµ-calculus [61], µα binds a context to a context variable α in the same way that µ˜a binds
a proof to some proof variable a.
The λµµ˜-calculus can be seen as a proof-as-program correspondence between sequent
calculus and abstract machines. Right introduction rules correspond to typing rules for
proofs, while left introduction are seen as typing rules for evaluation contexts. In contrast
with Gentzen’s original presentation of sequent calculus, the type system of the λµµ˜-calculus
explicitly identifies at any time which formula is being worked on. In a nutshell, this
presentation distinguishes between three kinds of sequents:
(1) sequents of the form Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ for typing proofs, where the focus is put on the
(right) formula A;
(2) sequents of the form Γ | e : A ⊢ ∆ for typing contexts, where the focus is put on the
(left) formula A;
(3) sequents of the form c : (Γ ⊢ ∆) for typing commands, where no focus is set.
In a right (resp. left) sequent Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆, the singled out formula9 A reads as the
conclusion “where the proof shall continue” (resp. hypothesis “where it happened before”).
9This formula is often referred to as the formula in the stoup, a terminology due to Girard.
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For example, the left introduction rule of implication can be seen as a typing rule for
pushing an element q on a stack e leading to the new stack q · e:
Γ ⊢ q : A | ∆ Γ | e : B ⊢ ∆
Γ | q · e : A→ B ⊢ ∆
→l
As for the reduction rules, we can see that there is a critical pair if V and E are not
restricted enough:
c[µ˜x.c′/α] ←− 〈µα.c||µ˜x.c′〉 −→ c′[µα.c/x].
The difference between call-by-name and call-by-value can be characterized by how this
critical pair10 is solved, by defining V and E such that the two rules do not overlap. Defining
the subcategories of values V ⊂ p and co-values E ⊂ e by:
(Values) V ::= a | λa.p (Co-values) E ::= α | q · e
the call-by-name evaluation strategy amounts to the case where V , Proofs and E , Co-
values, while call-by-value corresponds to V , Values and E , Contexts. Both strategies
can also be characterized through different CPS translations [15, Section 8].
Remark 3.2 (Application). The reader unfamiliar with the λµµ˜-calculus might be puzzled
by the absence of a syntactic construction for the application of proof terms. Intuitively, the
usual application p q of the λ-calculus is recovered by considering the command it reduces
to in an abstract machine, that is, given an evaluation context e, the application of the
proof p to the stack of the shape q · e11:
〈p q||e〉 → 〈p||q · e〉
The usual application can thus be obtained by solving the previous equation, that is through
the following shorthand:
p q , µα.〈p||q · α〉
Finally, it is worth noting that the µ binder is a control operator, since it allows for
catching evaluation contexts and backtracking further in the execution. This is the key
ingredient that makes the λµµ˜-calculus a proof system for classical logic. To illustrate this,
let us draw the analogy with the call/cc operator of Krivine’s λc-calculus [40]. Let us
define the following proof terms:
call/cc , λa.µα.〈a||kα · α〉 ke , λa
′.µβ.〈a′||e〉
The proof ke can be understood as a proof term where the context e has been encapsulated.
As expected, call/cc is a proof for Peirce’s law (see Figure 2), which is known to imply
other forms of classical reasoning (e.g., the law of excluded middle, the double negation
elimination).
10Observe that this critical pair can be also interpreted in terms of non-determinism. Indeed, we can
define a fork instruction by ⋔ , λab.µα.〈µ 〈a||α〉||µ˜ .〈b||α〉〉, which verifies indeed that 〈⋔||p0 · p1 · e〉 → 〈p0||e〉
and 〈⋔||p0 · p1 · e〉 → 〈p1||e〉.
11To pursue the analogy with the λ-calculus, the rest of the stack e can be viewed as a context Ce[ ]
surrounding the application p q, the command 〈p||q · e〉 thus being identified with the term Ce[p q]. Similarly,
the whole stack can be seen as the context Cq·e[ ] = Ce[[ ]q], whence the terminology.
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a : (A→ B)→ A ⊢ a : (A→ B)→ A | •
(Axr)
•, a′ : A ⊢ a′ : A | •
(Axr)
• | α : A ⊢ α : A, •
(Axl)
〈a′||α〉 : (•, a′ : A ⊢ α : A, β : B)
(Cut)
•, a′ : A ⊢ µβ.〈a′||α〉 : B | α : A
(µ)
• ⊢ λa′.µβ.〈a′||α〉 : A→ B | α : A
(→r)
| α : A ⊢ α : A
(Axl)
• | λa′.µβ.〈a′||α〉 · α : (A→ B)→ A ⊢ α : A
(→l)
〈a||λa′.µβ.〈a′||α〉 · α〉 : (a : (A→ B)→ A ⊢ α : A)
(Cut)
a : (A→ B)→ A ⊢ µα.〈a||λa′.µβ.〈a′||α〉 · α〉 : A |
(µ)
⊢ λa.µα.〈a||λa′.µβ.〈a′||α〉 · α〉 : ((A→ B)→ A)→ A |
(→r)
(where • is used to shorten useless parts of typing contexts.)
Figure 2. Proof term for Peirce’s law
Let us observe the behavior of call/cc (in call-by-name evaluation strategy, as in
Krivine λc-calculus): in front of a context of the shape q · e with e of type A, it will catch
the context e thanks to the µα binder and reduce as follows:
〈λa.µα.〈a||kα · α〉||q · e〉 → 〈q||µ˜a.〈µα.〈a||kα · α〉||e〉〉 → 〈µα.〈q||kα · α〉||e〉 → 〈q||ke · e〉
We notice that the proof term ke = λa
′.µβ.〈a′||e〉 on top of the stack (which, if e was of
type A, is of type A → B, see Figure 2) contains a second binder µβ. In front of a stack
q′ · e′, this binder will now catch the context e′ and replace it by the former context e:
〈λa′.µβ.〈a′||e〉||q′ · e′〉 → 〈q′||µ˜a′.〈µβ.〈a′||e〉||e′〉〉 → 〈µβ.〈q′||e〉||e′〉 → 〈q′||e〉
This computational behavior corresponds exactly to the usual reduction rule for call/cc
in the Krivine machine [40]:
call/cc ⋆ t · π ≻ t ⋆ kπ · π
kπ ⋆ t · π
′ ≻ t ⋆ π
3.3. Small-step abstract machine. Following Danvy’s methodology, the next step to-
wards the definition of continuation-passing style translation consists in refining the reduc-
tion rules to obtain context-free reduction rules. We recall here the (big-step) reduction
rules of the call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus, where the µ˜ operator gets the priority over the µ
operator:
〈p||µ˜a.c〉 → c[p/a]
〈µα.c||E〉 → c[E/α]
〈λa.p||q · e〉 → 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉
As such, these rules define an abstract machine which is not in context-free since to reduce
a command one need to analyze simultaneously the term and the context.
To alleviate this ambiguity, we refine the reduction system into small-step rules always
specifying which part of the command is being analyzed. If we examine the big-step rules,
the only case where the knowledge of only one side suffices is when the context is of the form
µ˜a.c, which has the absolute priority. Therefore, we can start our analysis of a command
by looking at its left-hand side. If it is a µ˜a.c, we reduce it, otherwise, we can look at the
right-hand side. Now, if the term is of the shape µα.c, it should be reduced, otherwise, we
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can analyze the left-hand side again. The only case left is when the context is a stack q · e
and the term is a function λa.p, in which case the command reduces.
The former case suggests two things: first, that the reduction should proceed by alter-
nating examination of the left-hand and the right-hand side of commands. Second, that
there is a descent in the syntax from the most general level (context e) to the most specific
one (values12 V ), passing by p and E in the middle:
Terms p ::= µα.c | a | V
Values V ::= λa.p
Contexts e ::= µ˜a.c | E
Co-values E ::= α | p · e
So as to stick to this intuition, we denote commands with the level of syntax we are ex-
amining (ce, ct, cE , cV ), and define a new set of reduction rules which are of two kinds:
computational steps, which reflect the former reduction steps, and administrative steps,
which organize the descent in the syntax. For each level in the syntax, we define one rule
for each possible construction. For instance, at level e, there is one rule if the context is of
the shape µ˜a.c, and one rule if it is of shape E. This results in the following set of small-step
reduction rules:
〈p||µ˜a.c〉e  ce[p/a]
〈p||E〉e  〈p||E〉p
〈µα.c||E〉p  ce[E/α]
〈V ||E〉p  〈V ||E〉E
〈V ||q · e〉E  〈V ||q · e〉V
〈λa.p||q · e〉V  〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉e
e
p
E
V
where the last two rules could be compressed in one rule:
〈λa.p||q · e〉E  〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉e
Note that there is no rule for variables and co-variables, since they block the reduction. It
is obvious that theses rules are indeed a decomposition of the previous ones, in the sense
that if c, c′ are two commands such that c 1→ c′, then there exists n > 1 such that c n c′.
The previous subdivision of the syntax and reductions also suggests a fine-grained type
system, where sequents are annotated with the adequate syntactic categories (see Figure 3).
While this does not bring any benefit when building typing derivations (when collapsed at
level e and p, this type system is exactly the original one), it has the advantage of splitting
the rules in more atomic ones which are closer from the reduction system. Hence it will be
easier to prove that the CPS translation is typed using these rules as induction bricks.
3.4. Continuation-passing style translation.
12Observe that values usually include variables, but here we rather consider them in the category p.
This is due to the fact that the operator µ˜ catches proofs at level p and variables are hence intended to
be substituted by proofs at this level. Through the CPS, we will see that we actually need values to be
considered at level p as they are indeed substituted by proofs translated at this level.
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Γ ⊢V V : A | ∆
Γ ⊢p V : A | ∆
(V )
(a : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢p a : A | ∆
(Axr)
c : (Γ ⊢c ∆, α : A)
Γ ⊢p µα.c : A | ∆
(µ)
Γ, a : A ⊢p p : B | ∆
Γ ⊢V λa.p : A→ B | ∆
(→r)
Γ | E : A ⊢E ∆
Γ | E : A ⊢e ∆
(E)
c : (Γ, a : A ⊢c ∆)
Γ | µ˜a.c : A ⊢e ∆
(µ˜)
(α : A) ∈ ∆
Γ | α : A ⊢E ∆
(Axl)
Γ ⊢p p : A | ∆ Γ | e : B ⊢e ∆
Γ | p · e : A→ B ⊢E ∆
(→l)
Figure 3. Refined call-by-name type system
3.4.1. Translation of terms. Once we have an abstract-machine in context-free form at
hands, the corresponding continuation-passing style translation is straightforward. It suf-
fices to start from the higher level in the descent (here e) and to define a translation for each
level which, for each element of the syntax, simply describe the corresponding small-step
rule. In the current case, this leads to the following definition:
e
p
Jµ˜a.cKe p , (λa.JcKc) p
JEKe p , p JEKE
Jµα.cKpE , (λα.JcKc)E
JaKp , a
JV KpE , E JV KV
Jq · eKE V , V JqKp JeKe
JαKE , α
Jλa.pKV q e , (λa.e JpKp) q
p
E
V
where administrative reductions peculiar to the translation (like continuation-passing) are
compressed, and where J〈p||e〉Kc , JeKe JpKp. The expanded version is simply:
Jµ˜a.cKe , λa.JcKc
JEKe , λp.p JEKE
Jµα.cKp , λα.JcKc
JaKp , a
JV Kp , λE.E JV KV
Jq · eKE , λV.V JqKp JeKe
JαKE , α
Jλa.pKV , λqe.(λa.e JpKp) q
This induces a translation of commands at each level of the translation:
J〈p||e〉Kec , JeKe JpKp J〈V ||E〉K
E
c , JEKE JV KV
J〈p||E〉Kpc , JpKp JEKE J〈V ||q · e〉K
V
c , JV KV JqKp JeKe
which is easy to prove correct with respect to computation, since the translation is defined
from the reduction rules. We first prove that substitution is sound through the translation,
and then prove that the whole translation preserves the reduction.
Lemma 3.3. For any variable a (co-variable α) and any proof q (co-value E), the following
holds for any command c:
Jc[q/a]Kc = JcKc[JqKp/a] Jc[E/α]Kc = JcKc[JEKE/α]
The same holds for substitution within proofs and contexts.
Proof. Easy induction on the syntax of commands, proofs and contexts, the key cases
corresponding to (co-)variables:
JαKe[JEKE/α] = (λp.p α)[JEKE/α] = λp.p JEKE = JEKe = Jα[E/α]Ke
20 E´TIENNE MIQUEY
Proposition 3.4. For all levels ι, o of e, p,E, and any commands c, c′, if cι 1 c
′
o, then
JcKιc
+−→β Jc
′Koc.
Proof. The proof is an easy induction on the reduction  . Administrative reductions are
trivial, the cases for µ and µ˜ correspond to the previous lemma, which leaves us with the
case for λ:
J〈λa.p||q · e〉KVc = (λqe.(λa.e JpKp) q) JqKp JeKe
2−→β (λa.JeKe JpKp) JqKp = J〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉K
e
c
3.4.2. Translation of types. The computational translation naturally induces a translation
on types, which follows the same descent in the syntax:
JAKe , JAKp → ⊥
JAKp , JAKE → ⊥
JAKE , JAKV → ⊥
JA→ BKV , JAKp → JBKe → ⊥
JXKV , X (X variable)
and where we take ⊥ as return type for continuations. This extends naturally to typing
contexts, where the translation of Γ is defined at level p while ∆ is translated at level E:
JΓ, a : AKp , JΓKp, a : JAKp J∆, α : AKE , J∆KE, α : JAKE
As we did not include any constant of atomic types, the choice for the translation of atomic
types is somehow arbitrary, and corresponds to the idea that a constant c would be trans-
lated into λk.k c. We could also have translated atomic types at level p, with constants
translated as themselves. In any case, the translation of proofs, contexts and commands is
well-typed:
Proposition 3.5. For any contexts Γ and ∆, we have
(1) if Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ then JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ JpKp : JAKp
(2) if Γ | e : A ⊢ ∆ then JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ JeKe : JAKe
(3) if c : Γ ⊢ ∆ then JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ JcKc : ⊥
Proof. The proof is done by induction over the typing derivation. We can refine the state-
ment by using the type system presented in Figure 3, and proving two additional statements:
if Γ ⊢V V : A | ∆ then JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ JV KV : JAKp (and similarly for E). We only give two
cases, other cases are easier or very similar.
• Case c. If c = 〈p||e〉 is a command typed under the hypotheses Γ,∆:
Γ ⊢p p : A | ∆ Γ | e : A ⊢e ∆
〈p||e〉 : Γ ⊢c ∆
(Cut)
then by induction hypotheses for e and p, we have that JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ JeKe : JAKp → ⊥ and
that JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ JpKp : JAKp, thus we deduce that JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ JeKe JpKp : ⊥.
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• Case V . If λa.p has type A→ B:
Γ, a : A ⊢p p : B | ∆
Γ ⊢V λa.p : A→ B | ∆
(→r)
then by induction hypothesis, we get that JΓKp, J∆KE, a : JAKp ⊢ JpKp : JBKp. By definition,
we have Jλa.pKV = λqe.(λa.e JpKp) q, which we can type:
e : JBKe ⊢ e : JBKp → ⊥
(Ax)
JΓKp, J∆KE, a : JAKp ⊢ JpKp : JBKp
JΓKp, J∆KE, e : JBKe, a : JAKp ⊢ e JpKp : ⊥
(→E)
JΓKp, J∆KE, e : JBKe ⊢ λa.e JpKp : JAKp → ⊥
(→I )
q : JAKp ⊢ q : JAKp
(Ax)
JΓKp, J∆KE, q : JAKp, e : JBKe ⊢ (λa.e JpKp) q : ⊥
(→E)
JΓKp, J∆KE ⊢ λqe.(λa.e JpKp) q : JAKp → JBKe → ⊥
(→I)
Up to this point, we already proved enough to obtain the normalization of the λµµ˜-
calculus for the operational semantics considered:
Theorem 3.6 (Normalization). Typed commands of the simply typed call-by-name λµµ˜-
calculus are normalizing.
Proof. By applying the generic result for translations (Proposition 3.1) since the required
conditions are satisfied: the simply-typed λ-calculus is normalizing and Propositions 3.4
and 3.5 correspond exactly to Equations (5.1) and (5.2).
It only remains to prove that there is no term of the type J⊥Kp to ensure the soundness
of the λµµ˜-calculus.
Proposition 3.7. There is no term t in the simply typed λ-calculus such that ⊢ t : J⊥Kp.
Proof. By definition, J⊥Kp = (⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥. Since λx.x is of type ⊥ → ⊥, if there was such
a term t, then we would obtain ⊢ t λx.x : ⊥, which is absurd.
Theorem 3.8. There is no proof p (in the simply typed call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus) such
that ⊢ p : ⊥ | .
Proof. Simple application of Proposition 3.1.
3.5. Krivine classical realizability. We shall present in this section a realizability inter-
pretation a` la Krivine for the call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus. In a nutshell13, Krivine realizabil-
ity associates to each type A a set |A| of terms whose execution is guided by the structure
of A. These terms are the ones usually called realizers in Krivine’s classical realizability.
Their definition is in fact indirect, that is from a set ‖A‖ of execution contexts that are
intended to challenge the truth of A. Intuitively, the set ‖A‖—which we shall call the
falsity value of A—can be understood as the set of all possible counter-arguments to the
formula A. In this framework, a program realizes the formula A—i.e. belongs to the truth
value |A|—if and only if it is able to defeat all the attempts to refute A using a context
in ‖A‖. Realizability interpretations are thus parameterized by a set of “correct” computa-
tions, called a pole. The choice of this set is central when studying the models induced by
13For a more detailed introduction to the topic, we refer the reader to Krivine introductory paper [40] or
Rieg’s Ph.D. thesis [63].
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classical realizability, but in what follows we will mainly pay attention to the particular pole
of terminating computations14. The central piece of the interpretation, called the adequacy
lemma, consists in proving that typed terms belong to the corresponding sets of realizers,
and are thus normalizing.
3.5.1. Extension to second-order. As Krivine classical realizability is naturally suited for a
second-order setting, we shall first extend the type system to second-order logic. As we
will see, the adequacy of the typing rules for universal quantification almost comes for free.
However, we could also have sticked to the simple-typed setting, whose interpretation would
have required to explicitly interpret each atomic type by a falsity value. We give the usual
typing rules a` la Curry for first- and second-order universal quantifications in the framework
of the λµµ˜-calculus. Note that in the call-by-name setting, these rules are not restricted
and defined at the highest levels of the hierarchy (e for context, p for proofs).
Γ | e : A[n/x] ⊢ ∆
Γ | e : ∀x.A ⊢ ∆
(∀1
l
)
Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ x /∈ FV (Γ,∆)
Γ ⊢ p : ∀x.A | ∆
(∀1r )
Γ | e : A[B/X] ⊢ ∆
Γ | e : ∀X.A ⊢ ∆
(∀2
l
)
Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ X /∈ FV (Γ,∆)
Γ ⊢ p : ∀X.A | ∆
(∀2r )
3.5.2. Realizability interpretation. We shall now present the realizability interpretation for
the call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus15. Rather than directly stating the definition of the inter-
pretation, we wish to attract the reader attention to the fact that this definition is again
a consequence of the small-steps operational semantics. Indeed, we are intuitively looking
for sets of proofs (truth values) and set of contexts (falsity values) which are “well-behaved”
against their respective opponents. That is, given a formula A, we are looking for players
for A which compute “correctly” in front of any contexts opposed to A. If we take a closer
look at the definition of the context-free abstract machine (cf. Section 3.3), we see that
the four levels e, p, E, V are precisely defined as sets of objects computing “correctly”
in front of any object in the previous category: for instance, proofs in p are defined to-
gether with their reductions in front of any context in E. This was already reflected in
the continuation-passing style translation. This suggests a four-level definition of the realiz-
ability interpretation, which we compact in three levels as the lowest level V can easily be
inlined at level p (this was already the case in the small-step operational semantics and we
could have done it also for the CPS).
As is usual in Krivine realizability, the interpretation uses the standard model N for
the interpretation of first-order expressions and is parameterized by a pole ⊥⊥:
Definition 3.9 (Pole). A pole is any subset ⊥⊥ of commands which is closed by anti-
reduction, that is for all commands c, c′, if c ∈ ⊥⊥ and c→ c′, then c ∈ ⊥⊥.
14As such, the proof of normalization that this interpretation provides is also very close to a proof by
reducibility (see for instance the proof of normalization for system D presented in [37, 3.2]).
15As shown in Section 3.2, the call-by-name evaluation strategy allows to fully embed the λc-calculus.
It is no surprise that the respective realizability interpretations for these calculi are very close. The major
difference lies in the presence of the µ˜ operator which has no equivalent in the λc-calculus, and which will
force us to add a level in the interpretation.
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We try to stick as much as possible to the notations and definitions of Krivine realizabil-
ity [40]. In particular, we define Π (the base set for falsity values) as the set of all co-values:
Π , E. In order to interpret second-order variables that occur in a given formula A, it is
convenient to enrich the language of PA2 with a new predicate symbol F˙ of arity k for every
falsity value function F of arity k, that is, for every function F : Nk → P(Π) that associates
a falsity value F (n1, . . . , nk) ⊆ Π to every k-tuple (n1, . . . , nk) ∈ N
k. A formula of the
language enriched with the predicate symbols F˙ is then called a formula with parameters.
Formally, this corresponds to the formulas defined by:
A,B ::= X(e1, . . . , ek) | A→ B | ∀x.A | ∀X.A | F˙ (e1, . . . , ek) X ∈ V2, F ∈ P(Π)
Nk
where e1, . . . , ek are first-order expressions which we will interpret in the standard model N.
The interpretation of formulas with parameters is defined by induction on the structure
of formulas:
‖F˙ (e1, . . . , ek)‖E , F (Je1K, . . . , JekK)
‖A→ B‖E , {p · e : p ∈ |A|p ∧ e ∈ ‖B‖e}
‖∀x.A‖E ,
⋃
n∈N
‖A[n/x]‖E
‖∀X.A‖E ,
⋃
F :Nk→P(Π)
‖A[F˙ /X]‖E
|A|p , ‖A‖
⊥⊥
E = {p : ∀e ∈ ‖A‖E , 〈p||e〉 ∈ ⊥⊥}
‖A‖e , |A|
⊥⊥
p = {e : ∀e ∈ ‖A‖E , 〈p||e〉 ∈ ⊥⊥}
This definition exactly matches Krivine’s interpretation for the λc-calculus, considering that
the “extra” level of interpretation ‖A‖e is hidden in the latter, since all stacks are co-values.
The expected monotonicity properties are satisfied:
Proposition 3.10 (Monotonicity). For any formula A, the following hold:
(1) ‖A‖E ⊆ ‖A‖e
(2) |A|⊥⊥⊥⊥p = |A|p
(3) |∀x.A|p =
⋂
n∈N |A[n/x]|p
(4) |∀X.A|p =
⋂
F :Nk→P(Π) |A[F˙ /X]|p
(5) ‖∀x.A‖e ⊇
⋃
n∈N ‖A[n/x]‖e
(6) ‖∀X.A‖e ⊇
⋃
F :Nk→P(Π) ‖A[F˙ /X]‖e
Proof. These properties actually hold for arbitrary sets A and orthogonality relation ⊥.
Facts 1 and 2 are simply the usual properties of bi-orthogonal sets: A ⊆ A⊥⊥ and A⊥⊥⊥ =
A⊥. Facts 3 and 4 are the usual equality (
⋃
A∈AA)
⊥ =
⋂
A∈AA
⊥. Facts 5 and 6 are the
inclusion (
⋂
A∈AA)
⊥ ⊇
⋃
A∈AA
⊥.
In order to state the central lemma, we need to introduce a few more technical concepts.
A valuation is defined as a function ρ which associates a natural number ρ(x) ∈ N to every
first-order variable x and a falsity value function ρ(X) : Nk → P(Π) to every second-order
variable X of arity k. A substitution, written σ, is a function mapping variables to closed
proofs (written σ, a := p) and co-variables to co-values (written σ, α := E). We denote by
A[ρ] (resp. p[σ], e[σ, ...) the closed formula (resp. proofs, context,...) where all variables are
substituted by their values through ρ.
Given two closed left and right contexts Γ,∆, we say that a substitution σ realizes
Γ ∪∆, which we write σ  Γ, if for any (a : A) ∈ Γ, σ(a) ∈ |A|p and if for any α : A ∈ ∆,
σ(α) ∈ ‖A‖E . We are now equipped to prove the adequacy of the typing rules for the
(call-by-name) λµµ˜-calculus with respect to the realizability interpretation we defined.
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Proposition 3.11 (Adequacy). Let Γ,∆ be typing contexts, ρ be any valuation and σ be a
substitution such that σ  (Γ ∪∆)[ρ], then
(1) if Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆, then p[σ] ∈ |A[ρ]|p
(2) if Γ | e : A ⊢ ∆, then e[σ] ∈ ‖A[ρ]‖e
(3) if c : Γ ⊢ ∆, then c[σ] ∈ ⊥⊥
Proof. By mutual induction over the typing derivation.
• Case (Cut). We are in the following situation:
Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ Γ | e : A ⊢ ∆
〈p||e〉 : Γ ⊢ ∆
(Cut)
By induction, we have p[σ] ∈ |A[ρ]|p and e[σ] ∈ ‖A[ρ]‖e, thus 〈p[σ]||e[σ]〉 ∈ ⊥⊥.
• Case (Axr). We are in the following situation:
(a : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ a : A | ∆
(Axr)
Since σ  Γ[ρ], we deduce that σ(a) ∈ |A|p ⊂ |A[ρ]|.
• Case (Axl). We are in the following situation:
(α : A) ∈ ∆
Γ | α : A ⊢ ∆
(Axl)
Since σ  ∆[ρ], we deduce that σ(α) ∈ ‖A[ρ]‖.
• Case (µ). We are in the following situation:
c : (Γ ⊢ ∆, α : A)
Γ ⊢ µα.c : A | ∆
(µ)
Let E be any context in ‖A[ρ]‖E , then (σ, α := E)  (Γ ∪ (∆, α : A))[ρ]. By induction, we
can deduce that c[σ, α := E] = (c[σ])[E/α] ∈ ⊥⊥. By definition,
〈(µα.c)[σ]||E〉 = 〈µα.c[σ]||E〉 → c[σ][E/α] ∈ ⊥⊥
thus we can conclude by anti-reduction.
• Case (µ˜). We are in the following situation:
c : (Γ, a : A  ∆)
Γ | µ˜a.c : A ⊢ ∆
(µ˜)
Let p be a proof in |A[ρ]|p, by assumption we have (σ, a := p)  ((Γ, a : A) ∪∆)[ρ]. As a
consequence, we deduce from the induction hypothesis that c[σ, a := p] = (c[σ])[p/a] ∈ ⊥⊥.
By definition, we have:
〈p||(µ˜a.c)[σ]〉 = 〈p||µ˜a.c[σ]〉 → (c[σ])[p/a] ∈ ⊥⊥
so that we can conclude by anti-reduction.
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• Case (→r). We are in the following situation:
Γ, a : A ⊢ p : B | ∆
Γ ⊢ λa.p : A→ B | ∆
(→r)
Let q · e be a stack in ‖(A → B)[ρ]‖E , that is to say that q ∈ |A[ρ]|p and e ∈ ‖B[ρ]‖e.
By definition, since q ∈ |A[ρ]|p, we have (σ, a := q)  ((Γ, a : A) ∪ ∆)[ρ]. By induction
hypothesis, this implies in particular that p[σ, a := q] ∈ |B[ρ]|p and thus 〈p[σ, a := q]||e〉 ∈ ⊥⊥.
We can now use the closure by anti-reduction to get the expected result:
〈λa.p[σ]||q · e〉 → 〈q||µ˜a.〈p[σ]||e〉〉 → 〈p[σ, a := q]||e〉 ∈ ⊥⊥
• Case (→l). We are in the following situation:
Γ ⊢ q : A | ∆ Γ | e : B ⊢ ∆
Γ | q · e : A→ B ⊢ ∆
→E
By induction hypothesis, we obtain that q[σ] ∈ |A[ρ]|p and e[σ] ∈ ‖B[ρ]‖e. By definition,
we thus have that (q · e)[σ] ∈ ‖A→ B‖E ⊆ ‖A→ B‖e.
• Case (∀1r ). We are in the following situation:
Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ x /∈ FV (Γ,∆)
Γ ⊢ p : ∀x.A | ∆
(∀1r )
By induction hypothesis, since x /∈ FV (Γ,∆), we have (Γ ∪ ∆)[ρ, x ← n] = (Γ ∪ ∆)[ρ]
for any n ∈ N and thus σ  (Γ ∪ ∆)[ρ, x ← n]. We obtain by induction hypothesis that
p[σ] ∈ |A[ρ, x ← n]|p for any n ∈ N, i.e. that p[σ] ∈
⋂
n∈N |A[ρ, x ← n]|p = |∀x.A[ρ]|p. The
case (∀2r ) is identical to this one.
• Case (∀1l ). We have that
Γ | e : A[n/x] ⊢ ∆
Γ | e : ∀x.A ⊢ ∆
(∀1
l
)
thus by induction hypothesis we get that e[σ] ∈ ‖(A[n/x])[ρ]‖e. Therefore we have in
particular that e[σ] ∈
⋃
n∈N ‖(A[n/x])[ρ]‖e ⊆ ‖∀x.A[ρ]‖e (Proposition 3.10). The case (∀
2
r )
is identical to this one.
Once the adequacy is proved, normalization and soundness almost come for free. The
normalization is a direct corollary of the following observation, whose proof is the same as
for Proposition 4.8:
Proposition 3.12. The set ⊥⊥⇓ , {c : c normalizes} of normalizing commands defines a
valid pole.
Proof. We only have to check that ⊥⊥⇓ is closed under antireduction, which is indeed the
case: if cτ → c′τ ′ and c′τ ′ normalizes, then cτ normalizes too.
Theorem 3.13 (Normalization). For any contexts Γ,∆ and any command c, if c : Γ ⊢ ∆,
then c normalizes.
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Proof. By adequacy, any typed command c belongs to the pole ⊥⊥⇓ modulo the closure
under a substitution σ realizing the typing contexts. It suffices to observe that to obtain
a closed term, any free variable a of type A in c can be substituted by an inert constant
a which will realize its type (since it forms a normalizing command in front of any E in
‖A‖E). Thus c[a/a, b/b, . . . ] normalizes and so does c.
Similarly, the soundness is an easy consequence of adequacy, since the existence of a
proof p of type ⊥ = ∀X.X would imply that p ∈ |⊥|p for any pole ⊥⊥. For any consistent
pole (say the empty pole), this is absurd.
Theorem 3.14 (Soundness). There is no proof p (in the second-order call-by-name λµµ˜-
calculus) such that ⊢ p : ⊥ | .
4. Classical call-by-need
Let us start this section with a story, borrowed from [17], illustratingdemand-driven com-
putation and memoization of intermediate results, two key features of the call-by-need
evaluation strategy that distinguish it from the call-by-name and call-by-value evaluation
strategies:
A famous functional programmer once was asked to give an overview talk.
He began with : “This talk is about lazy functional programming and call by
need.” and paused. Then, quizzically looking at the audience, he quipped:
“Are there any questions?” There were some, and so he continued: “Now
listen very carefully, I shall say this only once.”
The call-by-name evaluation strategy indeed passes arguments to functions without
evaluating them, postponing their evaluation to each place where the argument is needed,
re-evaluating the argument several times if needed. It has in common with the call-by-
value evaluation strategy that all places where a same argument is used share the same
value. Nevertheless, it observationally behaves like the call-by-name evaluation strategy,
in the sense that a given computation eventually evaluates to a value if and only if it
evaluates to the same value (up to inner reduction) along the call-by-name evaluation16.
The call-by-name, call-by-value and call-by-need evaluation strategies can be turned into
equational theories. For call-by-name and call-by-value, this was done by Plotkin [62]
through continuation-passing style semantics characterizing these theories. For the call-by-
need evaluation strategy, a continuation-passing style semantics was proposed in the 90s
by Okasaki, Lee and Tarditi [59]. However, this semantics does not ensure normalization
of simply-typed call-by-need evaluation, as shown in [3], thus failing to ensure a property
which holds in the simply-typed call-by-name and call-by-value cases.
The semantics of calculi with control can also be reconstructed from an analysis of the
duality between programs and their evaluation contexts, and the duality between the let
construct (which binds programs) and a control operator such as Parigot’s µ (which binds
evaluation contexts). As explained in Section 3, such an analysis can be done in the context
16In particular, in a setting with non-terminating computations, it is not observationally equivalent to
the call-by-value evaluation: if the evaluation of a useless argument loops in the call-by-value evaluation,
the whole computation loops (e.g. in (λ .I)Ω), which is not the case of call-by-name and call-by-need
evaluations.
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of the λµµ˜-calculus [15, 26]. To attack the problem, Ariola et al. [5] first proposed the λlv-
calculus, a call-by-need variant of Curien-Herbelin’s λµµ˜-calculus [15]. Thanks to Danvy’s
methodology of semantics artifacts, they then refined the reduction system until to a get a
calculus with context-free reduction rules, from which they derived an untyped continuation-
passing style translation [3]. This calculus, named the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, relies on the use
of an explicit environment to store substitutions. By pushing one step further Danvy’s
methodology, we finally showed with Herbelin how to obtain a realizability interpretation
a` la Krivine for this framework [55]. The main idea, in contrast to usual models of Krivine
realizability [40], is that realizers are defined as pairs of a term and a substitution. The
adequacy of the interpretation directly provided us with a proof of normalization, and we
shall follow the same methodology in Section 6 to prove the normalization of dLPAω.
We shall now recap the different aforementionned steps leading to the correct definition
of a classical call-by-need sequent calculus.
4.1. The λlv-calculus: call-by-need with control. Recall from Section 3 that the re-
duction rules of the λµµ˜-calculus are given by:
〈p||µ˜a.c〉 → c[p/a] p ∈ V
〈µα.c||e〉 → c[e/α] e ∈ E
〈λa.p||q · e〉 → 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉
where the set of terms V and the set of evaluation contexts E parameterize the evaluation
strategy: the call-by-name evaluation strategy amounts to the case where E , Co-values
while call-by-value dually corresponds to V , Values. For the call-by-need case, intuitively,
we would like to set V , Values (we only substitute evaluated terms of which we share the
value) and E , Co-values (a term is only reduced if it is in front of a co-value). However,
such a definition is clearly not enough since any command of the shape 〈µα.c||µ˜a.c′〉 would
be blocked. We thus need to understand how the computation is driven forward, that is to
say when we need to reduce terms.
Observe that applicative contexts17 q · E eagerly demand a value. Such contexts are
called forcing contexts, and denoted by F . When a variable a is in front of a forcing context,
that is in 〈a||F 〉, the variable a is said to be needed or demanded. This allows us to identify
meta-contexts C which are nesting of commands of the form 〈p||e〉 for which neither p is in
V (meaning it is some µα.c) nor e in E (meaning it is an instance of some µ˜a.c which is not
a forcing context). These contexts, defined by the following grammar:
Meta-contexts C[ ] ::= [ ] | 〈µα.c||µ˜a.C[ ]〉
are such that in a µ˜-binding of the form µ˜a.C[〈a||F 〉], a is needed and a value is thus expected.
These contexts, called demanding contexts, are evaluation contexts whose evaluation is
blocked on the evaluation of a, therefore requiring the evaluation of what is bound to a. In
this case, we say that the bound variable a has been forced.
All this suggests another refinement of the syntax, introducing a division between weak
co-values (resp. weak values), also called catchable contexts (since they are the one caught
by a µα binder), and strong co-values (resp. strong values), which are precisely the forcing
17Note that we need to restrict the shape of applicative contexts: the general form q · e is not necessarily
a valid application, since for example in 〈µα.c||q · µ˜a〈b||α〉〉, the context p · µ˜a〈b||α〉 forces the execution of c
even though its value is not needed. Applicative contexts are thus considered of the restricted shape q · E.
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contexts. Formally, the syntax (to which we add constants k and co-constants κ) is defined
by18:
Strong values v ::= λa.p | k
Weak values V ::= v | a
Proofs p ::= V | µα.c
Forcing contexts F ::= p ·E | κ
Catchable contexts E ::= F | α | µ˜a.C[〈a||F 〉]
Contexts e ::= E | µ˜a.c
We can finally define V , Weak values and E , Catchable contexts. The so-defined
call-by-need calculus is close to the calculus called λlv in Ariola et al [3]
19.
The λlv reduction, written as →lv, denotes thus the compatible reflexive transitive
closure of the rules:
〈V ||µ˜a.c〉 →lv c[V/a]
〈µα.c||E〉 →lv c[E/α]
〈λa.p||q · E〉 →lv 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||E〉〉
Observe that the next reduction is not necessarily at the top of the command, but may
be buried under several bound computations µα.c. For instance, the command 〈µα.c||µ˜a1.〈a1||µ˜a2.〈a2||F 〉〉〉,
where a1 is not needed, reduces to 〈µα.c||µ˜a1.〈a1||F 〉〉, which now demands a1.
The λlv-calculus can easily be equipped with a type system made of the usual rules of
the classical sequent calculus [15], and adopting the convention that constants k and co-
constants κ come with a signature S which assigns them a type. We delay the introduction
of such a type system for our next object of study, the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus.
4.2. The λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus. Since the call-by-need evaluation strategy imposes to share the
evaluation of arguments across all the places where thay are need, abstract machines im-
plementing it require a form of global memory [65, 14, 46, 1]. In order to obtain such an
abstract machine from the λlv -calculus, Ariola et al. first define the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, which
is reformulation of the former using explicit environments. We call stores these environ-
ments, which we denote by τ . Stores consists of a list of bindings of the shape [a := p],
where a is a term variable and p a term, and of bindings of the shape [α := e] where α is
a context variable and e a context. For instance, in the closure cτ [a := p]τ ′, the variable a
is bound to p in c and τ ′. Besides, the term p might be an unevaluated term (i.e. lazily
stored), so that if a is eagerly demanded at some point during the execution of this closure,
p will be reduced in order to obtain a value. In the case where p indeed produces a value
V , the store will be updated with the binding [a := V ]. However, a binding of this shape
(with a value) is fixed for the rest of the execution. As such, our so-called stores somewhat
behave like lazy explicit substitutions or mutable environments 20.
The lazy evaluation of terms allows us to reduce a command 〈µα.c||µ˜a.c′〉 to the com-
mand c′ together with the binding [a := µα.c]. In this case, the term µα.c is left unevaluated
(“frozen”) in the store, until possibly reaching a command in which the variable a is needed.
18In the definition, we implicitly assume µ˜a.c to only cover the cases which are not of the form µ˜a.C[〈a||F 〉].
19The difference lies in the fact that we add constants to preserve the duality.
20To draw the comparison between our structures and the usual notions of stores and environments, two
things should be observed. First, the usual notion of store refers to a structure of list that is fully mutable,
in the sense that the cells can be updated at any time and thus values might be replaced. Second, the usual
notion of environment designates a structure in which variables are bounded to closures made of a term and
an environment. In particular, terms and environments are duplicated, i.e. sharing is not allowed. Such a
structure resemble to a tree whose nodes are decorated by terms, as opposed to a machinery allowing sharing
(like ours) whose the underlying structure is broadly a directed acyclic graphs.
A CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF OF DEPENDENT CHOICE IN CLASSICAL ARITHMETIC 29
(Let)
(Catch)
(Lookupα)
(Lookupa)
(Restore)
(Beta)
〈p||µ˜a.c〉τ → cτ [a := p]
〈µα.c||E〉τ → cτ [α := E]
〈V ||α〉τ [α := E]τ ′ → 〈V ||E〉τ [α := E]τ ′
〈a||F 〉τ [a := p]τ ′ → 〈p||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′〉τ
〈V ||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′〉τ → 〈V ||F 〉τ [a := V ]τ ′
〈λa.p||u ·E〉τ → 〈u||µ˜a.〈p||E〉〉τ
Figure 4. Reduction rules of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus
When evaluation reaches a command of the form 〈a||F 〉τ [a := µα.c]τ ′, the binding is opened
and the term is evaluated in front of the context µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′:
〈a||F 〉τ [a := µα.c]τ ′ → 〈µα.c||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′〉τ
The reader can think of the previous rule as the “defrosting” operation of the frozen term
µα.c: this term is evaluated in the prefix of the store τ which predates it, in front of the
context µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′ where the µ˜[a] binder is waiting for an (unfrozen) value. This context
keeps trace of the suffix of the store τ ′ that was after the binding for a. This way, if a value
V is indeed furnished for the binder µ˜[a], the original command 〈a||F 〉 is evaluated in the
updated full store:
〈V ||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′〉τ → 〈V ||F 〉τ [a := V ]τ ′
The brackets are used to express the fact that the variable a is forced at top-level (unlike
contexts of the shape µ˜a.C[〈a||F 〉] in the λlv-calculus). The reduction system resembles the
one of an abstract machine. Especially, it allows us to keep the standard redex at the top
of a command and avoids searching through the meta-context for work to be done.
Note that our approach slightly differ from [3] in that we split values into two categories:
strong values (v) and weak values (V ). The strong values correspond to values strictly
speaking. The weak values include the variables which force the evaluation of terms to which
they refer into shared strong value. Their evaluation may require capturing a continuation.
The syntax of the language is given by:
Strong values v ::= λa.p | k
Weak values V ::= v | a
Proofs p ::= V | µα.c
Forcing contexts F ::= κ | p ·E
Catchable contexts E ::= F | α | µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ
Evaluation contexts e ::= E | µ˜a.c
Closures l ::= cτ
Commands c ::= 〈p||e〉
Stores τ ::= ε | τ [a := p] | τ [α := E]
The reduction, written →, is the compatible reflexive transitive closure of the rules given
in Figure 4.
The different syntactic categories can again be understood as the different levels of
alternation in a context-free abstract machine: the priority is first given to contexts at
level e (lazy storage of terms), then to terms at level p (evaluation of µα into values), then
back to contexts at level E and so on until level v. These different categories are thus
directly reflected in the definition of the context-free abstract machine (that we will present
in Section 4.3) and of the realizability interpretation but also in the type system we define.
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(k : X) ∈ S
Γ ⊢v k : X
(k)
Γ, a : A ⊢p p : B
Γ ⊢v λa.p : A→ B
(→r)
(a : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢V a : A
(a)
Γ ⊢v v : A
Γ ⊢V v : A
(↑V )
(κ : A) ∈ S
Γ ⊢F κ : A
⊥⊥
(κ)
Γ ⊢p p : A Γ ⊢E E : B
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢F p · E : (A→ B)
⊥⊥
(→l)
(α : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢E α : A
⊥⊥
(α)
Γ ⊢F F : A
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢E F : A
⊥⊥
(↑E)
Γ ⊢V V : A
Γ ⊢p V : A
(↑t)
Γ, α : A⊥⊥ ⊢c c
Γ ⊢p µα.c : A
(µ)
Γ ⊢E E : A
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢e E : A
⊥⊥
(↑e)
Γ, a : A ⊢c c
Γ ⊢e µ˜a.c : A
⊥⊥
(µ˜)
Γ, a : A,Γ′ ⊢F F : A
⊥⊥ Γ ⊢τ τ : Γ
′
Γ ⊢E µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ : A
⊥⊥
(µ˜[])
Γ ⊢p p : A Γ ⊢e e : A
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢c 〈t||e〉
(c)
Γ,Γ′ ⊢c c Γ ⊢τ τ : Γ
′
Γ ⊢l cτ
(l)
Γ ⊢τ ε : ε
(ε)
Γ ⊢τ τ : Γ
′ Γ,Γ′ ⊢p p : A
Γ ⊢τ τ [a := p] : Γ
′, a : A
(τt)
Γ ⊢τ τ : Γ
′ Γ,Γ′ ⊢E E : A
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢τ τ [α := E] : Γ
′, α : A⊥⊥
(τE)
Figure 5. Typing rules of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus
We indeed consider nine kinds of (one-sided21) sequents, one for typing each of the nine
syntactic categories. We write them with an annotation on the ⊢ sign, using one of the
letters v, V , p, F , E, e, l, c, τ . Sequents typing values and terms are asserting a type, with
the type written on the right; sequents typing contexts are expecting a type A with the
type written A⊥⊥; sequents typing commands and closures are black boxes neither asserting
nor expecting a type; sequents typing substitutions are instantiating a typing context. In
other words, we have the following nine kinds of sequents:
Γ ⊢l l
Γ ⊢c c
Γ ⊢τ τ : Γ
′
Γ ⊢p p : A
Γ ⊢V V : A
Γ ⊢v v : A
Γ ⊢e e : A
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢E E : A
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢F F : A
⊥⊥
where types and typing contexts are defined by:
A,B ::= X | A→ B Γ ::= ε | Γ, a : A | Γ, α : A⊥⊥
The typing rules are given on Figure 5 where we assume that a variable a (resp. co-variable
α) only occurs once in a context Γ (we implicitly assume the possibility of renaming variables
by α-conversion). We also adopt the convention that constants k and co-constants κ come
with a signature S which assigns them a type. Regarding the type system introduced earlier
for the λµµ˜-calculus, the main novelties are the rules (l), (τt) and (τE) to handle stores,
and the rule (µ˜[]) for the new binder µ˜[a].cτ .
This type system enjoys the property of subject reduction:
Theorem 4.1 (Subject reduction). If Γ ⊢l cτ and cτ → c
′τ ′ then Γ ⊢l c
′τ ′.
Proof. By induction on typing derivations, see [52] for the complete proof.
21To this end, observe that we write A⊥⊥ for a type A that would have been in the context ∆ in two-sided
sequents. While this is only used to compact notations, this will become crucial when using dependent types
in the next sections.
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e
p
E
V
F
v
〈p||µ˜a.c〉eτ → ceτ [a := p]
〈p||E〉eτ → 〈p||E〉pτ
〈µα.c||E〉pτ → ceτ [α := E]
〈V ||E〉pτ → 〈V ||E〉Eτ
〈V ||α〉Eτ [α := E]τ
′ → 〈V ||E〉Eτ [α := E]τ
′
〈V ||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′〉Eτ → 〈V ||F 〉V τ [a := V ]τ
′
〈V ||F 〉Eτ → 〈V ||F 〉V τ
〈a||F 〉V τ [a := p]τ
′ → 〈p||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′〉τ
〈v||E〉V τ → 〈v||F 〉V τ
〈v||u ·E〉F τ → 〈v||e ·E〉vτ
〈λa.p||q ·E〉vτ → 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||E〉〉eτ
Figure 6. Context-free abstract machine for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus
4.3. Abstract machine in context-free form. Reduction rules of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus
can again be refined in order to finally obtain small-step reduction rules of a context-free
abstract machine [3]. This essentially consists in annotating again commands with the level
of syntax we are examining (ce, cp, . . . ), and in defining a new set of reduction rules which
separates computational steps (corresponding to big-step reductions), and administrative
steps, which organize the descent in the syntax. In order, a command first put the focus
on the context at level e, then on the term at level p, and so on following the hierarchy
e, p,E, V, F, v. This results again in an abstract machine in context-free form, since each
step only analyzes one component of the command, the “active” term or context, and is
parametric in the other “passive” component. In essence, for each phase of the machine,
either the term or the context is fully in control and independent, regardless of what the
other half happens to be.
We recall the resulting abstract machine from [3] in Figure 6. These rules directly lead
to the definition of the CPS in [3] that we shall type in the next sections. Furthermore, the
realizability interpretation a` la Krivine (that we are about to present in the coming section)
is deeply based upon this set of rules. Indeed, remember that a realizer is precisely a term
which is going to behave well in front of any opponent in the opposed falsity value. We
shall thus take advantage of the context-free rules where, at each level, the reduction step
is defined independently of the passive component.
4.4. Realizability interpretation. We shall now see how to adapt the realizability inter-
pretation for the λµµ˜-calculus to this setting, and in particular to handle stores. As for
the λµµ˜-calculus, we are guided by the small-step abstract-machine. First of all, given a
formula A we now define its interpretation at each typing level o (of e, t, E, V, F, v) a set
|A|o (resp. ‖A‖o) of proof terms (resp. contexts) in the corresponding syntactic category.
Second, we generalize the usual notion of closed term to the notion of closed proof-in-store.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that we are no longer interested in closed terms and
substitutions to close opened terms, but rather in terms that are closed when considered
in the current store. This is based on the simple observation that a store is nothing more
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than a shared substitution whose content might evolve along the execution. Last, we adapt
the notion of pole ⊥⊥ to be sets of closures, which ask to be closed by anti-evaluation and
store extension. In particular, the set of normalizing closures defines a valid pole.
We begin with a bunch of definitions related to stores. These notions will be re-used
later when defining the interpretation for dLPAω.
Definition 4.2 (Closed store). We extend the notion of free variable to stores:
FV (ε) , ∅
FV (τ [a := p]) , FV (τ) ∪ {y ∈ FV (t) : y /∈ dom(τ)}
FV (τ [α := E]) , FV (τ) ∪ {β ∈ FV (E) : β /∈ dom(τ)}
so that we can define a closed store to be a store τ such that FV (τ) = ∅.
Definition 4.3 (Compatible stores). We say that two stores τ and τ ′ are independent and
note τ#τ ′ when dom(τ) ∩ dom(τ ′) = ∅. We say that they are compatible and note τ ⋄ τ ′
whenever for all variables a (resp. co-variables α) present in both stores: x ∈ dom(τ) ∩ dom(τ ′);
the corresponding terms (resp. contexts) in τ and τ ′ coincide: formally τ = τ0[a := p]τ1
and τ ′ = τ ′0[a := p]τ
′
1. Finally, we say that τ
′ is an extension of τ and note τ ⊳ τ ′ whenever
dom(τ) ⊆ dom(τ ′) and τ ⋄ τ ′.
Definition 4.4 (Compatible union). We denote by ττ ′ the compatible union join(τ, τ ′) of
closed stores τ and τ ′, defined by:
join(τ0[a := p]τ1, τ
′
0[a := p]τ
′
1) , τ0τ
′
0[a := p]join(τ1, τ
′
1)
join(τ, τ ′) , ττ ′
join(ε, τ) , τ
join(τ, ε) , τ
(if τ0#τ
′
0)
(if τ#τ ′)
The following lemma (which follows easily from the previous definition) states the main
property we will use about union of compatible stores.
Lemma 4.5. If τ and τ ′ are two compatible stores, then τ ⊳ ττ ′ and τ ′ ⊳ ττ ′. Besides, if
τ is of the form τ0[a := p]τ1, then ττ ′ is of the form τ0[a := p]τ1 with τ0 ⊳ τ0 and τ1 ⊳ τ1.
As we explained, we will not consider closed terms in the usual sense. Indeed, while it
is frequent in the proofs of normalization (e.g. by realizability or reducibility) of a calculus
to consider only closed terms and to perform substitutions to maintain the closure of terms,
this only makes sense if it corresponds to the computational behavior of the calculus. For
instance, to prove the normalization of λa.p in typed call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus, one would
consider a substitution ρ that is suitable with respect to the typing context Γ, then a context
u · e of type A→ B, and evaluates :
〈λa.pρ||q · e〉 → 〈pρ[q/a]||e〉
Then we would observe that pρ[q/a] = pρ[a:=q] and deduce that ρ[a := q] is suitable for
realizing Γ, a : A, which would allow us to conclude by induction.
However, in the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus we do not perform global substitution when reducing a
command, but rather add a new binding [a := p] in the store:
〈λa.p||q ·E〉τ → 〈p||E〉τ [a := q]
Therefore, the natural notion of closed term invokes the closure under a store, which might
evolve during the rest of the execution (this is to contrast with a substitution).
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Definition 4.6 (Terms-in-store). We call closed proof-in-store (resp. closed context-in-
store, closed closures) the combination of a proof p (resp. context e, command c) with a
closed store τ such that FV (t) ⊆ dom(τ). We use the notation (p|τ) to denote such a pair.
We should note that in particular, if p is a closed term, then (p|τ) is a proof-in-store
for any closed store τ . The notion of closed proof-in-store is thus a generalization of the
notion of closed terms, and we will (ab)use of this terminology in the sequel. We denote
the sets of closed closures by C0, and will identify (c|τ) and the closure cτ when c is closed
in τ . Observe that if cτ is a closure in C0 and τ
′ is a store extending τ , then cτ ′ is also in
C0. We are now ready to define the notion of pole, and verify that the set of normalizing
closures is indeed a valid pole.
Definition 4.7 (Pole). A subset ⊥⊥ ⊆ C0 is said to be saturated or closed by anti-reduction
whenever for all (c|τ), (c′|τ ′) ∈ C0, if c
′τ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥ and cτ → c′τ ′ then cτ ∈ ⊥⊥. It is said to be
closed by store extension if whenever cτ ∈ ⊥⊥, for any store τ ′ extending τ : τ ⊳ τ ′, cτ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥.
A pole is defined as any subset of C0 that is closed by anti-reduction and store extension.
Proposition 4.8. The set ⊥⊥⇓ = {cτ ∈ C0 : cτ normalizes } is a pole.
Proof. As we only considered closures in C0, both conditions (closure by anti-reduction and
store extension) are clearly satisfied:
• if cτ → c′τ ′ and c′τ ′ normalizes, then cτ normalizes too;
• if c is closed in τ and cτ normalizes, if τ ⊳ τ ′ then cτ ′ will reduce as cτ does (since
c is closed under τ , it can only use terms in τ ′ that already were in τ) and thus will
normalize.
Definition 4.9 (Orthogonality). Given a pole ⊥⊥, we say that a proof-in-store (p|τ) is
orthogonal to a context-in-store (e|τ ′) and write (p|τ)⊥⊥(e|τ ′) if τ and τ ′ are compatible and
〈p||e〉ττ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥.
Remark 4.10. The reader familiar with Krivine’s forcing machine [41] might recognize his
definition of orthogonality between terms of the shape (t, p) and stacks of the shape (π, q),
where p and q are forcing conditions:
(t, p)⊥⊥(π, q)⇔ (t ⋆ π, p ∧ q) ∈ ⊥⊥
(The meet of forcing conditions is indeed a refinement containing somewhat the “union” of
information contained in each, just like the union of two compatible stores.)
We can now relate closed terms and contexts by orthogonality with respect to a given
pole. This allows us to define for any formula A the sets |A|v , |A|V , |A|p (resp. ‖A‖F ,‖A‖E ,
‖A‖e) of realizers (or reducibility candidates) at level v, V , p (resp F , E, e) for the formula
A. It is to be observed that realizers are here closed CPS.
Definition 4.11 (Realizers). Given a fixed pole ⊥⊥, we set:
‖A‖e = {(e|τ) : ∀tτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (p|τ ′) ∈ |A|p ⇒ (p|τ
′)⊥⊥(e|τ)}
|A|p = {(p|τ) : ∀Eτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (E|τ ′) ∈ ‖A‖E ⇒ (p|τ)⊥⊥(E|τ
′)}
‖A‖E = {(E|τ) : ∀V τ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (V |τ ′) ∈ |A|V ⇒ (V |τ
′)⊥⊥(E|τ)}
|A|V = {(V |τ) : ∀Fτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (F |τ ′) ∈ ‖A‖F ⇒ (V |τ)⊥⊥(F |τ
′)}
‖A‖F = {(F |τ) : ∀vτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (v|τ ′) ∈ |A|v ⇒ (v|τ
′)⊥⊥(F |τ)}
|A→ B|v = {(λx.t|τ) : ∀uτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (u|τ ′) ∈ |A|p ⇒ (p|ττ ′[a := u]) ∈ |B|p}
|X|v = {(k|τ) : ⊢ k : X}
34 E´TIENNE MIQUEY
Remark 4.12. We draw the reader attention to the fact that we should actually write
|A|⊥⊥v , ‖A‖
⊥⊥
F , etc... and τ ⊥⊥ Γ, because the corresponding definitions are parameterized
by a pole ⊥⊥. As it is common in Krivine’s classical realizability, we ease the notations by
removing the annotation ⊥⊥ whenever there is no ambiguity on the pole.
If the definition of the different sets might seem complex at first sight, we insist on the
fact that they naturally follow from the abstract machine in context-free form where the
term and the context (in a command) behave independently of each other. Intuitively, a
realizer at a given level is precisely a term which is going to behave well (be in the pole)
in front of any opponent chosen in the previous level (in the hierarchy v, F, V ,etc...). The
definition of the different sets |A|v, ‖A‖F , |A|V , etc... directly stems from this intuition.
In comparison with the usual definition of Krivine’s classical realizability, we only con-
sidered orthogonal sets restricted to some syntactical subcategories. However, the definition
still satisfies the usual monotonicity properties of bi-orthogonal sets:
Proposition 4.13. For any type A and any given pole ⊥⊥, we have the following inclusions:
(1) |A|v ⊆ |A|V ⊆ |A|p;
(2) ‖A‖F ⊆ ‖A‖E ⊆ ‖A‖e.
Proof. See [55].
We now extend the notion of realizers to stores, by stating that a store τ realizes
a context Γ if it binds all the variables a and α in Γ to a realizer of the corresponding
formula.
Definition 4.14. Given a closed store τ and a fixed pole ⊥⊥, we say that τ realizes Γ, which
we write22 τ  Γ, if:
(1) for any (a : A) ∈ Γ, τ ≡ τ0[a := p]τ1 and (p|τ0) ∈ |A|p
(2) for any (α : A⊥⊥) ∈ Γ, τ ≡ τ0[α := E]τ1 and (E|τ0) ∈ ‖A‖E
We are now equipped to prove the adequacy of the type system for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus
with respect to the realizability interpretation.
Theorem 4.15 (Adequacy). The typing rules of Figure 5 for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus without
co-constants are adequate with any pole. In other words, if Γ is a typing context, ⊥⊥ a pole
and τ a store such that τ  Γ, then the following holds:
(1) If v is a strong value such that Γ ⊢v v : A, then (v|τ) ∈ |A|v.
(2) If F is a forcing context such that Γ ⊢F F : A
⊥⊥, then (F |τ) ∈ ‖A‖F .
(3) If V is a weak value such that Γ ⊢V V : A, then (V |τ) ∈ |A|V .
(4) If E is a catchable context such that Γ ⊢E E : A
⊥⊥, then (E|τ) ∈ ‖A‖F .
(5) If p is a term such that Γ ⊢p p : A, then (p|τ) ∈ |A|p.
(6) If e is a context such that Γ ⊢e e : A
⊥⊥, then (e|τ) ∈ ‖A‖e.
(7) If c is a command such that Γ ⊢c c, then cτ ∈ ⊥⊥.
(8) If τ ′ is a store such that Γ ⊢τ τ
′ : Γ′, then ττ ′  Γ,Γ′.
(9) If cτ ′ is a closure such that Γ ⊢l cτ
′, then cττ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥.
Proof. By induction on typing rules. Most of the case are similar to the proof of adequacy
for the call-by-name λµµ˜-calculus, hence we only give a few key cases. See [52, Chapter 6]
for a complete proof.
22Once again, we should formally write τ ⊥⊥Γ but we will omit the annotation by ⊥⊥ as often as possible.
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• Case (→l). Assume that
Γ ⊢p q : A Γ ⊢E E : B
⊥⊥
Γ ⊢F q · E : (A→ B)
⊥⊥
(→l)
and let ⊥⊥ be a pole and τ a store such that τ  Γ. Let (λa.p|τ ′) be a closed term in the
set |A→ B|v such that τ ⋄ τ
′, then we have:
〈λa.p||q ·E〉ττ ′ → 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||E〉〉ττ ′ → 〈p||E〉ττ ′[a := q]
By definition of |A→ B|v, this closure is in the pole, and we can conclude by anti-reduction.
• Case (a). Assume that
(a : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢V a : A
(a)
and let ⊥⊥ be a pole and τ a store such that τ  Γ. As (a : A) ∈ Γ, we know that τ is of
the form τ0[a := p]τ1 with (p|τ0) ∈ |A|p. Let (F |τ
′) be in ‖A‖F , with τ ⋄ τ
′. By Lemma 7.5,
we know that ττ ′ is of the form τ0[a := p]τ1. Hence we have:
〈a||F 〉τ0[a := p]τ1 → 〈p||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ1〉τ0
and it suffices by anti-reduction to show that the last closure is in the pole ⊥⊥. By induction
hypothesis, we know that (p|τ0) ∈ |A|t thus we only need to show that it is in front of a
catchable context in ‖A‖E . This corresponds exactly to the next case that we shall prove
now.
• Case (µ˜[]). Assume that
Γ, a : A,Γ′ ⊢F F : A Γ, a : A ⊢ τ
′ : Γ′
Γ ⊢E µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ
′ : A
(µ˜[])
and let ⊥⊥ be a pole and τ a store such that τ  Γ. Let (V |τ0) be a closed term in |A|V
such that τ0 ⋄ τ . We have that :
〈V ||µ˜[a].〈a||F 〉τ ′〉τ0τ → 〈V ||F 〉τ0τ [a := V ]τ
′
By induction hypothesis, we obtain τ [x := V ]τ ′  Γ, x : A,Γ′. Up to α-conversion in F and
τ ′, so that the variables in τ ′ are disjoint from those in τ0. Therefore, we have that τ0τ  Γ
and then τ ′′ , τ0τ [a := V ]τ
′  Γ, a : A,Γ′. By induction hypothesis again, we obtain that
(F |τ ′′) ∈ ‖A‖F (this was an assumption in the previous case) and as (V |τ0) ∈ |A|V , we
finally get that (V |τ0)⊥⊥(F |τ
′′) and conclude again by anti-reduction.
In particular, we can now prove the normalization of typed closures. As we already saw
in Proposition 4.8, the set ⊥⊥⇓ of normalizing closure is a valid pole, so that it only remains
to prove that any typing rule for co-constants is adequate with ⊥⊥⇓.
Lemma 4.16. Any typing rule for co-constants is adequate with the pole ⊥⊥⇓, i.e. if Γ is a
typing context, and τ is a store such that τ  Γ, if κ is a co-constant such that Γ ⊢F κ : A
⊥⊥,
then (κ|τ) ∈ ‖A‖F .
Proof. This lemma directly stems from the observation that for any store τ and any closed
strong value (v|τ ′) ∈ |A|v , 〈v||κ〉ττ ′ does not reduce and thus belongs to the pole ⊥⊥⇓.
As a consequence, we get:
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Theorem 4.17. If cτ is a closure of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus such that ⊢l cτ is derivable, then
cτ normalizes.
This concludes our study of classical call-by-need, and we shall use the same method-
ology to derive a proof of normalization for dLPAω in Section 6. We shall now turn to our
second preliminary problem, namely the definition of a sequent calculus with dependent
types.
5. A classical sequent calculus with dependent types
We shall now turn to the second problem prior to the definition of dLPAω: the definition of
classical sequent calculus with dependent types. In addition of being a necessary step in our
process, this question was also of great interest in itself. Indeed, not only are we interested
in the definition of such calculus, but also we are considering the possibility of using it in
order to define a dependently typed continuation-passing style translation. The latter was
actually regarded as impossible23 since an article by Barthe and Uustalu on the subject [8].
Nonetheless, such a translation would provide us with a way of soundly compiling a calculus
with dependent types and a form of classical logic into a usual type theory. Regarding the
translation as a syntactic model, it would thus enable to give a way of soundly extending
a type theory (for instance, those underlying the foundations of proof assistants, e.g. CIC
for Coq) with a form of computational classical logic.
Yet, in addition to the problem of safely combining control operators and dependent
types [27], the presentation of a dependently typed language under the form of a sequent
calculus is a challenge in itself. In [54], we introduced such a system, called dLtˆp, which is
a call-by-value sequent calculus with classical control and dependent types. In comparison
with usual type systems, we decorate typing derivations with a list of dependencies to ensure
subject reduction. We managed to prove the soundness of the calculus by means of a CPS
translation taking the dependencies into account. The very definition of the translation con-
strained us to use delimited continuations in the calculus when reducing dependently typed
terms. At the same time, this unveiled the need for the syntactic restriction of dependencies
to the negative-elimination-free fragment as in dPAω [29]. Additionally, we showed how to
relate our calculus to a similar system by Lepigre [47], whose consistency is proved by means
of a realizability interpretation. In Section 6, we will use the same techniques, namely a list
of dependencies and delimited continuations, to ensure the soundness of dLPAω, and we
will follow Lepigre’s interpretation of dependent types for the definition of our realizability
model. Let us then recall here the main intuitions leading to the definition of dLtˆp in [54].
5.1. Herbelin’s paradox. The first step in order to soundly mix dependent types and
control operators is to understand the difficulty in doing so, and in particular Herbelin’s
paradox [27]. Let us briefly recap his argument here. Consider a minimal logic of Σ-types
and equality, whose formulas, terms (only representing natural number) and proofs are
23 To quote their paper, they indeed say: “We investigate CPS translatability of typed λ-calculi with
inductive and coinductive types. [...] These translations also work in the presence of control operators [...]
No translation is possible along the same lines for small Σ-types and sum types with dependent case.”
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defined as follows:
Formulas A,B ::= t = u | ∃xN.A
Terms t, u ::= n | wit p
Proofs p, q ::= refl | subst p q | (t, p) | prf p
(n ∈ N)
Let us explain the different proof terms by presenting their typing rules. First, the pair
(t, p) is as expected a proof for an existential formula ∃xN.A (or Σ(x : N).A) where t is a
witness for x and p is a certificate for A[t/x]. This implies that both formulas and proofs
are dependent on terms, which is usual in mathematics. What is less usual in mathematics
is that, as in Martin-Lo¨f type theory, dependent types also allow for terms (and thus for
formulas) to be dependent on proofs, by means of the constructions wit p and prf p. The
corresponding typing rules are given by:
Γ ⊢ p : A(t) Γ ⊢ t : N
Γ ⊢ (t, p) : ∃xNA
(∃I )
Γ ⊢ (t, p) : ∃xN.A
Γ ⊢ prf p : A[wit p/x]
(prf ) Γ ⊢ t : ∃x
N.A
Γ ⊢ wit t : N
(wit )
n ∈ N
Γ ⊢ n : N
Then, refl is a proof term for equality, and subst p q allows to use a proof of an
equality t = u to convert a formula A(t) into A(u):
t→ u
Γ ⊢ refl : t = u
(=r)
Γ ⊢ p : t = u Γ ⊢ q : B[t]
Γ ⊢ subst p q : B[u]
(subst)
The reduction rules for this language, which are safe with respect to typing, are then:
wit (t, p)→ t prf (t, p)→ p subst refl p→ p
Starting from this (sound) minimal language, Herbelin showed that its classical ex-
tension with the control operators call/cck and throw k permits to derive a proof of
0 = 1 [27]. The call/cck operator, which is a binder for the variable k, is intended to
catch its surrounding evaluation context. On the contrary, throw k (in which k is bound)
discards the current context and restores the context captured by call/cck. The addition
to the type system of the typing rules for these operators:
Γ, k : ¬A ⊢ p : A
Γ ⊢ call/cck p : A
Γ, k : ¬A ⊢ p : A
Γ, k : ¬A ⊢ throw k p : B
allows the definition of the following proof:
p0 , call/cck (0, throw k (1, refl)) : ∃x
N.x = 1
Intuitively such a proof catches the context, give 0 as witness (which is incorrect), and a
certificate that will backtrack and give 1 as witness (which is correct) with a proof of the
equality.
If besides, the following reduction rules24, are added:
wit (call/cck p) → call/cck(wit (p[k(wit { })/k]))
call/cck t → t (k /∈ FV (t))
then we can formally derive a proof of 1 = 0. Indeed, the seek of a witness by the term
wit p0 will reduce to call/cck 0, which itself reduces to 0. The proof term refl is thus a
24We do not want to enter into the details of the reduction rules etc., but rather focus on the intuition
of the causes of the problem. For a detailed proof, please refer to [27, Section 2].
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proof of wit p0 = 0, and we obtain indeed a proof of 1 = 0:
⊢ p0 : ∃x
N.x = 1
⊢ prf p0 : wit p0 = 1
(prf )
wit p0 → 0
⊢ refl : wit p0 = 0
(=r)
⊢ subst (prf p0) refl : 1 = 0
(subst)
The bottom line of this example is that the same proof p0 is behaving differently in
different contexts thanks to control operators, causing inconsistencies between the witness
and its certificate. The easiest and usual approach to prevent this is to impose a restriction
to values (which are already reduced) for proofs appearing inside dependent types and
within the operators wit and prf, together with a call-by-value discipline. In particular, in
the present example this would prevent us from writing wit p0 and prf p0.
5.2. A naive sequent calculus with dependent types. Here again, rather than directly
trying to define a continuation-passing style we first pay attention to the possibility of
extending the λµµ˜-calculus with a form of dependent types. Let us momentarily assume
that we naively add a dependent product Πa : A.B[a] to the λµµ˜-calculus type system while
restricting dependencies to values (in order to prevent Herbelin’s paradox from occurring).
In other words, we authorize functions λa.p to inhabit the type Πa : A.B[a] if p is of typed
B[a] under the assumption that a : A and, dually, stacks q · e if q is a value of type A and
e a context of type B[q]. Assuming that we have such terms at hands, we can thus get the
following derivation:
Πp
Γ, a : A ⊢ p : B[a] | ∆
Γ ⊢ λa.p : Πa : A.B[a] | ∆
(→r)
Πq
Γ ⊢ q : A | ∆
Πe
Γ | e : B[q] ⊢ ∆ q ∈ V
Γ | q · e : Πa : A.B[a] ⊢ ∆
(→l)
〈λa.p||q · e〉 : (Γ ⊢ ∆)
(Cut)
The first difficulties arise when trying to prove subject reduction. Indeed, the previous
command should reduce (following a call-by-value discipline as we eventually would like to
have for dLPAω) as follows:
〈λa.p||q · e〉 → 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉
On the right-hand side, we see that p, whose type is B[a], is now cut with e whose type
is B[q]. Consequently, we are not able to derive a typing judgment25 for this command
anymore:
Πq
Γ ⊢ q : A | ∆
Γ, a : A ⊢ p :
✟
✟B[a] | ∆ Γ, a : A | e :
✟
✟B[q] ⊢ ∆
〈p||e〉 : (Γ, a : A ⊢ ∆)
Mismatch
Γ | µ˜a.〈p||e〉 : A ⊢ ∆
(µ˜)
〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉 : (Γ ⊢ ∆)
(Cut)
Our intuition is that in the full command, a has been linked to q at a previous level of the
typing judgment. In particular, the command is still safe, since the head-reduction imposes
that the command 〈p||e〉 will not be executed before the substitution of a by q26 is performed
and by then the problem would have been solved. Roughly speaking, this phenomenon can
25Observe that the problem here arises independently of the value restriction or not (that is whether we
consider that q is a value or not), and is peculiar to the sequent calculus presentation).
26Note that even if we were not restricting ourselves to values, this would still hold: if at some point the
command 〈p||e〉 is executed, it is necessarily after that q has produced a value to substitute for a.
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be seen as a desynchronization of the typing process with respect to computation. The
synchronization can be re-established by making explicit a list of dependencies in the typing
rules, which links µ˜ variables (here a) to the associate proof term on the left-hand side of
the command (here q):
Πq....
Γ ⊢ q : A | ∆
Γ, a : A ⊢ p : B[a] | ∆ Γ, a : A | e : B[q] ⊢ ∆; {·|p}{a|q}
〈p||e〉 : Γ, a : A ⊢ ∆; {a|q}
(Cut)
Γ | µ˜a.〈p||e〉 : A ⊢ ∆; {.|q}
(µ˜)
〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉 : (Γ ⊢ ∆); ε
(Cut)
We spare the reader from the formal definition of the corresponding type system27, the
main idea lying in the use of list of dependencies when typing commands. In particular,
this is enough to extend the λµµ˜-calculus with dependent types (restricted to values) and
prove that the resulting calculus satisfies subject reduction, is normalizing and consistent
as a logic.
5.3. A dependently typed continuation-passing style. Nonetheless, in addition to
the fact that the value restriction is unsatisfactory (it is too restrictive), a problem still
subsists: such a calculus remains incompatible with the definition of a continuation-passing
style translation. Indeed, considering the naive translation of the very same command,
assuming that a type A is translated into ¬¬A28, we get:
J〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉K = JqK Jµ˜a.〈p||e〉K = JqK︸︷︷︸
¬¬A
(λa. JpK︸︷︷︸
¬¬B[a]
JeK︸︷︷︸
¬B[q]
)
We are thus facing the same problem when trying to type the translation of the command
〈p||e〉. This does not come as a surprise, insofar as we observed a desynchronization between
the computation and the typing process which we only have compensated within the type
system. In order to obtain a well-typed continuation-passing style translation, we thus
need to understand how to tackle we need to tackle the problem through the operational
semantics.
To this end, we follow the idea that the correctness is guaranteed by the head-reduction
strategy, preventing 〈p||e〉 from reducing before the substitution of a was made. We would
like to ensure the same thing happens in the target language (that will also be equipped
with a head-reduction strategy), namely that JpK cannot be applied to JeK before JqK has
furnished a value to substitute for a. This would correspond informally to the term:
(JqK(λa.JpK))JeK
Assuming that q eventually produces a value V , the previous term would indeed reduce as
follows:
(JqK(λa.JpK))JeK → ((λa.JpK) JV K) JeK → JpK[JV K/a] JeK
Since JpK[JV K/a] now has a type convertible to ¬¬B[q], the term that is produced in the
end is well-typed29. We are now facing three questions about the term (JqK(λa.JpK))JeK: (1)
27See [54] for further details.
28Recall the translation given for the call-by-name calculus in Section 3.4.
29 Readers should now be familiar with realizability may observe that intuitively such a term defines an
appropriate realizer, since it eventually terminates on a correct term Jp[q/a]K JeK.
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Would any term q be compatible with such a reduction? (2) Is this term typable? (3) Does
it matches the translation of a term in the source calculus?
Regarding the first question, we observe that if q, instead of producing a value, was a
classical proof throwing the current continuation away (for instance µα.c where α /∈ FV (c)),
this would lead to the following unsafe reduction:
(λα.JcK(λa.JpK))JeK → JcK JeK.
Indeed, through such a translation, µα would only be able to catch the local continuation,
and the term ends in JcKJeK instead of JcK. We thus need to restrict ourselves at least
to proof terms that could not throw the current continuation. Syntactically, these are
proof terms that can be expressed (up to α-conversion) with only one continuation variable
⋆ and without applicative context of the shape q · e. In other words, this corresponds
exactly to Herbelin’s restriction to the fragment of negative-elimanation-free (nef) proofs
(see Section 2.2).
The second question concerns the typability of the term (JqK(λa.JpK))JeK, which is clearly
not possible using the naive translation ¬¬A for the JqK. Nonetheless, the whole term can
be typed by turning the type A→ ⊥ of the continuation that JqK is waiting for into a (depen-
dent) type Πa : A.R[a] parameterized by R. This way, we can have JqK : ∀R.(Πa : A.R[a]→
R[q]) instead of JqK : ((A→ ⊥)→ ⊥), and for R[a] := (B(a)→ ⊥)→ ⊥, the whole term is
well-typed30. It only remains to wonder if any translated term JqK can be given such a type,
and, fortunately, this is the case for all nef terms. Indeed, nef proofs are precisely terms
which, through the translation, can only use once the continuation. They hence satisfy some
kind of parametricity equation JqK k = k (JqKλx.x) [70] and can be given a parametric (and
dependent) return type (generalizing Friedman A-translation [22]). We prefer not enter into
the details of the complete continuation-passing style translation and refer the interested
reader to [54].
Last, the term (JqK(λa.JpK))JeK suggests the use of delimited continuations31 to tem-
porarily encapsulate the evaluation of q when reducing such a command:
〈λa.p||q · e〉  〈µtˆp.〈q||µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉.
Intuitively, a term µtˆp.c momentarily moves the top-level focus to c and freezes its own
evaluation context until c reduces to a command of the shape 〈p||tˆp〉:
〈µtˆp.〈p||tˆp〉||e〉 −→ 〈p||e〉 | 〈µtˆp.c||e〉 −→ 〈µtˆp.c′||e〉 (if c→ c′)
Once more, the command 〈µtˆp.〈q||µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉 is safe under the guarantee that q will not
throw away the continuation µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉, and will mimic the aforedescribed reduction:
〈µtˆp.〈q||µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉  〈µtˆp.〈V ||µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉  〈µtˆp.〈p[V/a]||tˆp〉||e〉  〈p[V/a]||e〉.
It is now easy to define the translation of delimited continuations so that our modified
reduction systems semantics matches the expected translation:
Jµtˆp.cKp , λk.JcKtˆpk J〈p||tˆp〉Ktˆp , JpKp
In addition to providing an operational semantics that is now compatible with a continuation-
passing style translation, delimited continuations bring us a finer control on the use of the
30This is precisely where lies the difference with Barthe and Uustalu’s work, who implicitly assume the
return type to be fixed to ⊥ [8].
31We stick here to the presentations of delimited continuations in [31, 4], where tˆp is used to denote the
top-level delimiter.
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Proofs p ::= · · · | µtˆp.ctˆp
Delimited ctˆp ::= 〈pN ||etˆp〉 | 〈p||tˆp〉
continuations etˆp ::= µ˜a.ctˆp
NEF pN ::= V | (t, pN ) | µ⋆.cN
| prf pN | subst pN qN
cN ::= 〈pN ||eN 〉
eN ::= ⋆ | µ˜a.cN
(a) Language
c : (Γ ⊢d ∆, tˆp : A; ε)
Γ ⊢ µtˆp.c : A | ∆
tˆpI
Γ ⊢ p : A | ∆ Γ | e : A ⊢d ∆, tˆp : B;σ{·|p}
〈p||e〉 : Γ ⊢d ∆, tˆp : B;σ
B ∈ Aσ
Γ | tˆp : A ⊢d ∆, tˆp : B;σ{·|p}
tˆpE
c : (Γ, a : A ⊢d ∆, tˆp : B;σ{a|p})
Γ | µ˜a.c : A ⊢d ∆, tˆp : B;σ{·|p}
(b) Typing rules
Figure 7. dLtˆp: extending dL with delimited continuations (excerpt)
list of dependencies in typing derivations. Indeed, the places where a desynchronization
needs to be compensated correspond exactly to commands within delimited continuations.
Even more, the only type that needs to be adjusted with the list of dependencies is the one
of tˆp. This allows us to distinguish between two typing mode, a regular mode with sequents
without list of dependencies, and a dependent one, which is activated when going beyond a
µtˆp and whose sequents we denote by Γ ⊢d p : A | ∆;σ (where σ is a list of dependencies).
The main novelties of this extended syntax, which we summarize in Figure 7, are thus: (1)
the fragment of nef proofs, (2) the use of delimited continuations (3) a distinction between
a regular and a dependent typing modes.
As we shall explain in Section 7.1, similar phenomena will occur in dLPAω with the
dependent types ∀xT .A and ∃xT .A (remember that we consider a stratified presentation
with terms and proofs). While the former can be solved with the exact same ideas, the
latter will require the introduction of the dual notion of co-delimited continuations, just
as the general dependent sum Σx : T .A would have. Let us briefly go through the same
process to highlight the corresponding intuitions. Consider now a command formed by a
pair (t, p) of type Σx : T .A and a context e:
Γ ⊢ t : T | ∆ Γ ⊢ p : A[t] | ∆
Γ ⊢ (t, p) : Σx : T .A | ∆
Πe
Γ | e : Σx : T .A ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ 〈(t, p)||e〉 | ∆
This situation is exactly dual to the case of a stack q · e above32, hence it does not come as
a surprise that the command it naturally reduces to:
〈(t, p)||e〉 → 〈t||µ˜x.〈p||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉
32In fact, they could even be identified in a polarized version of the calculus inspired from Munch-
Maccagnoni’s system L [56], observing that (Πa : A.B)⊥⊥ = Σa : A.B⊥⊥. In other words, (t, p) and q · e are
both a pair whose second component depends on the first one.
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can not be typed without using a list of dependencies. Indeed, the pair (x, a) that is now
put in front of e require to remember a link between x and t to be typed:
Γ, x : T, a : A[t] ⊢ x : T | ∆ Γ, x : T, a :✟✟A[t] ⊢ a :✟✟A[x] | ∆
Γ, x : T, a : A[t] ⊢ (x, a) : Σx : T .A | ∆
Mismatch
Similarly, if the former can be solved within the type system with the simple addition of
a list of dependencies, the naive continuation-passing style translation of the pair is again
ill-typed:
J(t, p)Kp k , JtKt (λx. JpKp︸︷︷︸
¬¬A[t]
(λa.k (x, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
¬A[x]
)
Following the intuition that JpK should not be applied to its continuation before JtK has
reduced and provided a value to substitute for x, we can twist this term into:
J(t, p)Kp k , JpKp (JtKt (λxa.k (x, a))
This translated term is now well-typed provided that JtK can be given the parametric depen-
dent type ∀R.Πx : T .R[x]→ R[t] (which is possible for any nef term t, and in particular for
any term t in dPAω—remember that terms are objects of the arithmetic in finite types and
do not have access to control operators). Once again, such a translation can be obtained
by extending the original operational semantics with co-delimited continuations:
〈(t, p)||e〉 → 〈p||µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉〉
where p is somehow frozen to put the focus on the command 〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉. It
should now be clear to the reader why, when defining a small-step reduction system that
explicit the evaluation of dLPAω terms in Section 7.1, we will introduce this notion of
co-delimited continuations.
5.4. Realizability interpretation. Last but not least, we shall say a few words about the
realizability interpretation of dLtˆp. This interpretation takes advantage of a recent paper
in which Lepigre presented a classical system allowing the use of dependent types with a
semantic value restriction [47],. In practice, the type system of his calculus does not contain
a dependent product Πa : A.B strictly speaking, but it contains a predicate a ∈ A allowing
the decomposition of the dependent product into:
∀a.((a ∈ A)→ B)
as it is usual in Krivine’s classical realizability [40]. In his system, the relativization a ∈ A
is restricted to values, so that we can only type V : V ∈ A:
Γ ⊢val V : A
Γ ⊢val V : V ∈ A
∃i
However, typing judgments are defined up to observational equivalence, so that if t is
observationally equivalent to V , one can derive the judgment t : t ∈ A.
Interestingly, as highlighted through the continuation-passing style translation33, any
nef proof p : A is observationally equivalent to some value p+, so that we can derive
p : (p ∈ A) from p+ : (p+ ∈ A). The nef fragment is thus compatible with the semantical
value restriction. The converse is obviously false, observational equivalence allowing us to
33More precisely, this is exactly the counterpart of the usual parametricity equation evoked earlier. See
[54, Lemma 4.1].
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type realizers that would be untyped otherwise34. As a matter of fact, in [54] we defined
an embedding from dLtˆp into Lepigre’s calculus that not only preserves typing, but also to
transfer normalization and correctness properties along this translation. Additionally, this
embedding has the benefits of providing us with an adequate realizability interpretation
for dLtˆp our calculus. We shall also mention that the translation from dLtˆp to Lepigre’s
calculus could not have been defined without the use of delimited continuations. Actually
we would have encountered a problem very similar to the one for the continuation-passing
style translation. Moreover, the translation of delimited continuations is informative in that
it somehow decompiles them in order to simulate the corresponding reductions in a natural
deduction fashion. We refer to [54, Section 5] the reader interested into further details.
In the current paper, we will follow Lepigre’s realizability interpretation regarding de-
pendent types. We shall thus introduce a predicate p ∈ A whose interpretation will be
defined for proof terms p observationally equivalent to a value.
6. A sequent calculus with dependent types for classical arithmetic
Drawing on the calculi we introduced in the last sections, we shall now present dLPAω, our
sequent calculus counterpart of Herbelin’s dPAω. This calculus provides us with dependent
types restricted to the nef fragment, for which dLPAω is an extension of dLtˆp. In addition to
the language of dLtˆp, dLPA
ω has terms for classical arithmetic in finite types (PAω). More
importantly, it includes a lazily evaluated co-fixpoint operator. To this end, the calculus
uses a shared store, as in the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus.
We first present the language of dLPAω with its type system and its reduction rules. We
prove that the calculus verifies the property of subject reduction and that it is as expressive
as dPAω. In particular, the proof terms for ACN and DC of dPA
ω can be directly defined in
dLPAω. We then apply once again the methodology of Danvy’s semantic artifacts to derive
a small-step calculus (Section 7.1), from which we deduce a realizability interpretation
(Section 7.2), which relies on a combination of the corresponding ones developed for the
λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus and dLtˆp. This interpretation will lead us to the main result of this paper:
the normalization of dLPAω.
Nonetheless, we should say before starting this section that we already have a guardrail
for the normalization. Informally, we could argue that authorizing infinite stores in the
λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus would not alter its normalization. Indeed, from the point of view of existing
programs (which are finite and typed in finite contexts), they are computing with a finite
knowledge of the memory (and it is easy to see that through the realizability interpretation,
terms are compatible with store extensions [55]). Note that in the store, we could theo-
retically replace any co-fixpoint that produces a stream by the (fully developed) stream in
question. Due to the presence of backtracks in co-fixpoints, the store would contain all the
possible streams (possibly an infinite number of it) produced when reducing co-fixpoints.
In this setting, if a term were to perform an infinite number of reductions steps, it would
necessarily have to explore an infinite number of cells in the pre-computed memory, inde-
pendently from its production. This should not be possible.
This argument is actually quite close from Herbelin’s original proof sketch, which this
work precisely aims at replacing with a formal proof. These unprecise explanations should
34In particular, Lepigre’s semantical restriction is so permissive that it is not decidable, while it is easy
to decide whether a proof term of dLtˆp is in nef.
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be taken more as spoilers of the final result than as proof sketches. We shall now present
formally dLPAω and prove its normalization, which will then not come as a surprise.
Most of the proofs in this section will resemble a lot to the corresponding ones in the
previous sections. Yet, as dLPAω gathers all the expressive power and features of the λ[lvτ⋆]-
calculus and dLtˆp, the different proofs also combined all the tools and tricks used in each
case. We will hence try to avoid repetitions and only highlight the most interesting parts as
much as possible.
6.1. Syntax. The language of dLPAω is based on the syntax of dLtˆp [54], extended with
the expressive power of dPAω [29] and with explicit stores as in the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus [3]. We
stick to the stratified presentation of dependent types, that is to say that we syntactically
distinguish terms—that represent mathematical objects—from proof terms—that represent
mathematical proofs. In particular, types and formulas are separated as well, matching the
syntax of dPAω’s formulas. Types are defined as finite types with the set of natural numbers
as the sole ground type, while formulas are inductively built on atomic equalities of terms,
by means of conjunctions, disjunctions, first-order quantifications, dependent products and
co-inductive formulas:
Types T,U ::= N | T → U
Formulas A,B ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | t = u | A ∧B | A ∨B | ∃xT .A | ∀xT .A | Πa : A.B | νtx,fA
The syntax of terms is identical to the one in dPAω, including functions λx.t and
applications tu, as well as a recursion operator rectxy[t0 | tS ], so that terms represent objects
in arithmetic of finite types. As for proof terms (and contexts, commands), they are now
defined with all the expressiveness of dPAω. Each constructor in the syntax of formulas is
reflected by a constructor in the syntax of proofs and by the dual co-proof (i.e. destructor)
in the syntax of evaluation contexts. Amongst other things, the syntax includes pairs (t, p)
where t is a term and p a proof, which inhabit the dependent sum type ∃xT.A; dual co-pairs
µ˜(x, a).c which bind the (term and proof) variables x and a in the command c; functions
λx.p inhabiting the type ∀xT.A together with their dual, stacks t · e where e is a context
whose type might be dependent in t; functions λa.p which inhabit the dependent product
type Πa : A.B, and, dually, stacks q ·e, where e is a context whose type might be dependent
in q; a proof term refl which is the proof of atomic equalities t = t and a destructor µ˜=.c
which allows us to type the command c modulo an equality of terms; operators fixtax[p0 | pS ]
and cofixtbx[p], as in dPA
ω, for inductive and coinductive reasoning; delimited continuations
through proofs µtˆp.ctp and the context tˆp; a distinguished context [] of type ⊥, which allows
us to reason ex-falso.
As in dLtˆp, the syntax of nef proofs, contexts and commands is defined as a restriction
of the previous syntax. Technically, they are defined (modulo α-conversion) with only one
distinguished context variable ⋆ (and consequently only one binder µ⋆.c), and without stacks
of the shape t · e or q · e to avoid applications (recall that one can understand nef proofs
as the proofs that cannot drop their continuation). The commands ctˆp within delimited
continuations are defined as commands of the shape 〈p||tˆp〉 or formed by a nef proof and a
context of the shape µ˜a.ctˆpτ , µ˜[a1.ctˆp|a2.c
′
tˆp
], µ˜(a1, a2).ctˆp or µ˜(x, a).ctˆp.
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Closures l ::= cτ
Commands c ::= 〈p||e〉
Proof terms p, q ::= a | ιi(p) | (p, q) | (t, p) | λx.p | λa.p | refl
| fixtax[p0 | pS ] | cofix
t
bx[p] | µα.c | µtˆp.ctˆp
Proof values V ::= a | ιi(V ) | (V, V ) | (Vt, V ) | λx.p | λa.p | refl
Terms t, u ::= x | 0 | S(t) | rectxy[t0 | tS ] | λx.t | t u | wit p
Terms values Vt ::= x | S
n(0) | λx.t
Stores τ ::= ε | τ [a := pτ ] | τ [α := e]
Storables pτ ::= V | fix
Vt
ax[p0 | pS ] | cofix
Vt
bx[p]
Contexts e ::= f | α | µ˜a.cτ
Forcing
contexts
f ::= [] | µ˜[a1.c1 | a2.c2] | µ˜(a1, a2).c | µ˜(x, a).c | t · e | p · e | µ˜=.c
Delimited ctˆp ::= 〈pN ||etˆp〉 | 〈p||tˆp〉
continuations etˆp ::= µ˜a.ctˆpτ | µ˜[a1.ctˆp | a2.c
′
tˆp
] | µ˜(a1, a2).ctˆp | µ˜(x, a).ctˆp
cN ::= 〈pN ||eN 〉
NEF pN , qN ::= a | ιi(pN ) | (pN , qN ) | (t, pN ) | λx.p | λa.p | refl
| fixtax[pN | qN ] | cofix
t
bx[pN ] | µ⋆.cN | µtˆp.ctˆp
eN ::= ⋆ | µ˜[a1.cN | a2.c
′
N ] | µ˜a.cNτ | µ˜(a1, a2).cN | µ˜(x, a).cN
Figure 8. The language of dLPAω
We adopt a call-by-value evaluation strategy except for fixpoint operators35, which are
evaluated in a lazy way. To this purpose, we use stores in the spirit of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus,
which are again defined as lists of bindings of the shape [a := p] where p is now a value or
a (co-)fixpoint, and of bindings of the shape [α := e] where e is any context. We assume
that each variable occurs at most once in a store τ , we thus reason up to α-reduction and
we assume the capability of generating fresh names. Apart from evaluation contexts of the
shape µ˜a.c and co-variables α, all the contexts are forcing contexts which eagerly require a
value to be reduced and trigger the evaluation of lazily stored terms. The resulting language
is given in Figure 8.
6.2. Reduction rules. The reduction system of dLPAω is given in Figure 9. The basic
rules are those of the call-by-value λµµ˜-calculus and of dLtˆp. The rules for delimited con-
tinuations are exactly the same as in dLtˆp, except that we have to prevent tˆp from being
caught and stored by a proof µα.c. We thus distinguish two rules for commands of the
shape 〈µα.c||e〉, depending on whether e is of the shape etˆp or not. In the former case, we
perform the substitution [etˆp/α], which is linear since µα.c is necessarily nef. We should
35To highlight the duality between inductive and coinductive fixpoints, we evaluate both in a lazy way.
Even though this is not indispensable for inductive fixpoints, we find this approach more natural in that
we can treat both in a similar way in the small-step reduction system and thus through the realizability
interpretation.
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Basic rules
〈λx.p||Vt · e〉τ → 〈p[Vt/x]||e〉τ
〈λa.p||q · e〉τ → 〈µtˆp.〈q||µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉τ (q ∈ nef)
〈λa.p||q · e〉τ → 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉τ (q /∈ nef)
〈µα.c||e〉τ → cτ [α := e] (e 6= etˆp)
〈V ||µ˜a.cτ ′〉τ → cτ [a := V ]τ ′
Elimination rules
〈ιi(V )||µ˜[a1.c1 | a2.c2]〉τ → ciτ [ai := V ]
〈(V1, V2)||µ˜(a1, a2).c〉τ → cτ [a1 := V1][a2 := V2]
〈(Vt, V )||µ˜(x, a).c〉τ → (c[t/x])τ [a := V ]
〈refl||µ˜=.c〉τ → cτ
Delimited continuations
〈µtˆp.c||e〉τ → 〈µtˆp.c||e〉τ ′ (if cτ → cτ ′)
〈µα.c||etˆp〉τ → c[etˆp/α]τ
〈µtˆp.〈p||tˆp〉||e〉τ → 〈p||e〉τ
Call-by-value (where a, a1, a2 are fresh)
〈ιi(p)||e〉τ → 〈p||µ˜a.〈ιi(a)||e〉〉τ
〈(p1, p2)||e〉τ → 〈p1||µ˜a1.〈p2||µ˜a2.〈(a1, a2)||e〉〉〉τ
〈(Vt, p)||e〉τ → 〈p||µ˜a.〈(Vt, a)||e〉〉τ
Laziness (where a is fresh)
〈cofixVtbx[p]||e〉τ → 〈a||e〉τ [a := cofix
Vt
bx[p]]
〈fixVtbx[p0 | pS ]||e〉τ → 〈a||e〉τ [a := fix
Vt
bx[p0 | pS ]]
Lookup (where b′ is fresh)
〈V ||α〉τ [α := e]τ ′ → 〈V ||e〉τ [α := e]τ ′
〈a||f〉τ [a := V ]τ ′ → 〈V ||a〉τ [a := V ]τ ′
〈a||f〉τ [a := fix0bx[p0 | pS ]]τ
′ → 〈p0||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ
′〉τ
〈a||f〉τ [a := fix
S(t)
bx [p0 | pS ]]τ
′ → 〈pS [t/x][b
′/b]||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′〉τ [b′ := fixtbx[p0 | pS ]]
〈a||f〉τ [a := cofixVtbx[p]]τ
′ → 〈p[Vt/x][b
′/b]||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′〉τ [b′ := λy.cofixybx[p]]
Terms
T [t]τ → T [t′]τ (if t −→β t
′)
T [wit p]τ −→β T [t] (∀α, 〈p||α〉τ → 〈(t, p
′)||α〉τ)
(λx.t)Vt −→β t[Vt/x]
rec0xy[t0 | tS ] −→β t0
rec
S(u)
xy [t0 | tS ] −→β tS[u/x][rec
u
xy[t0 | tS ]/y]
where:
Ct[ ] ::= 〈([ ], p)||e〉 | 〈fix
[ ]
ax[p0 | pS ]||e〉 | 〈cofix
[ ]
bx[p]||e〉 | 〈λx.p||[ ] · e〉
T [ ] ::= Ct[ ] | T [[ ]u] | T [rec
[ ]
xy[t0 | tS ]]
Figure 9. Reduction rules of dLPAω
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also mention in passing that we abuse the syntax in every other rules, since e should actually
refer to e or etp (or the reduction of delimited continuations would be stuck). Elimination
rules correspond to commands where the proof is a constructor (say of pairs) applied to
values, and where the context is the matching destructor. Call-by-value rules correspond to
(ς) rule of Wadler’s sequent calculus [71]. The next rules express the fact that (co-)fixpoints
are lazily stored, and reduced only if their value is eagerly demanded by a forcing context.
Observe that in that case, the unfolding of (co-)fixpoints is entirely done within the store.
Last, terms are reduced according to the usual β-reduction, with the operator rec comput-
ing with the usual recursion rules. It is worth noting that the stratified presentation allows
to define the reduction of terms as external: within proofs and contexts, terms are reduced
in place. Consequently, as in dLtˆp the very same happen for nef proofs embedded within
terms. Computationally speaking, this corresponds indeed to the intuition that terms are
reduced on an external device.
6.3. Typing rules. As often in Martin-Lo¨f’s intensional type theory, formulas are con-
sidered up to equational theory on terms. We denote by A ≡ B the reflexive-transitive-
symmetric closure of the relation ⊲ induced by the reduction of terms and nef proofs as
follows:
A[t] ⊲ A[t′] whenever t→β t
′
A[p] ⊲ A[q] whenever ∀α (〈p||α〉 → 〈q||α〉)
in addition to the reduction rules for equality and for coinductive formulas:
0 = S(t) ⊲ ⊥
S(t) = 0 ⊲ ⊥
S(t) = S(u) ⊲ t = u
νtfxA ⊲ A[t/x][ν
y
fxA/f(y) = 0]
We work with one-sided sequents where typing contexts are defined by:
Γ,Γ′ ::= ε | Γ, x : T | Γ, a : A | Γ, α : A⊥⊥ | Γ, tˆp : A⊥⊥.
using the notation α : A⊥⊥ for an assumption of the refutation of A. This allows us to mix
hypotheses over terms, proofs and contexts while keeping track of the order in which they
are added (which is necessary because of the dependencies). We assume that a variable
occurs at most once in a typing context.
We define nine syntactic kinds of typing judgments:
• six in regular mode, that we write Γ ⊢σ J :
(1) Γ ⊢σ t : T for terms,
(2) Γ ⊢σ p : A for proofs,
(3) Γ ⊢σ e : A⊥⊥ for contexts,
(4) Γ ⊢σ c for commands,
(5) Γ ⊢σ cτ for closures,
(6) Γ ⊢σ τ ′ : (Γ′;σ′) for stores;
• three more for the dependent mode, that we write Γ ⊢d J ;σ:
(7) Γ ⊢d e : A
⊥⊥;σ for typing contexts,
(8) Γ ⊢d c;σ for typing commands,
(9) Γ ⊢d cτ ;σ for typing closures.
In each case, σ is a list of dependencies—we explain the presence of a list of dependencies
in each case thereafter—, which are defined from the following grammar:
σ ::= ε | σ{p|q}
The substitution on formulas according to a list of dependencies σ is defined by:
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Regular mode
Γ ⊢σ p : A Γ ⊢σ e : B⊥⊥ σ(A) = σ(B)
Γ ⊢σ 〈p||e〉
(Cut)
Γ,Γ′ ⊢σσ
′
c Γ ⊢σ τ : (Γ′;σ′)
Γ ⊢ cτ
(l)
Γ ⊢σ [] : ⊥⊥⊥
⊥
Γ ⊢σ p : A A ≡ B
Γ ⊢σ p : B
(≡r)
Γ ⊢σ e : A⊥⊥ A ≡ B
Γ ⊢σ e : B⊥⊥
(≡l)
Γ ⊢σ τ : (Γ′;σ′) Γ,Γ′ ⊢σσ
′
p : A
Γ ⊢σ τ [a := p] : (Γ′, a : A;σ′{a|p})
(τp)
(a : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢σ a : A
(Axr)
(α : A⊥⊥) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢σ α : A⊥⊥
(Axl)
Γ ⊢σ τ : (Γ′;σ′) Γ,Γ′ ⊢σσ
′
α : A⊥⊥
Γ ⊢σ τ [α := e] : (Γ′, α : A⊥⊥;σ′)
(τe)
Γ, α : A⊥⊥ ⊢σ c
Γ ⊢σ µα.c : A
(µ)
Γ, a : A ⊢σ cτ
Γ ⊢σ µ˜a.cτ : A⊥⊥
(µ˜)
Γ ⊢σ p1 : A Γ ⊢
σ p2 : B
Γ ⊢σ (p1, p2) : A ∧B
(∧r)
Γ, a1 : A1, a2 : A2 ⊢
σ c
Γ ⊢σ µ˜(a1, a2).c : (A1 ∧A2)
⊥⊥
(∧l)
Γ ⊢σ p : Ai
Γ ⊢σ ιi(p) : A1 ∨A2
(∨r)
Γ, a1 : A1 ⊢
σ c1 Γ, a2 : A2 ⊢
σ c2
Γ ⊢σ µ˜[a1.c1 | a2.c2] : (A1 ∨A2)
⊥⊥
(∨l)
Γ ⊢σ p : A[t/x] Γ ⊢σ t : T
Γ ⊢σ (t, p) : ∃xT .A
(∃r)
Γ, x : T, a : A ⊢σ c
Γ ⊢σ µ˜(x, a).c : (∃xT .A)⊥⊥
(∃l)
Γ, x : T ⊢σ p : A
Γ ⊢σ λx.p : ∀xT .A
(∀r)
Γ ⊢σ t : T Γ ⊢σ e : A[t/x]⊥⊥
Γ ⊢σ t · e : (∀xT .A)⊥⊥
(∀l)
Γ, a : A ⊢σ p : B
Γ ⊢σ λa.p : Πa : A.B
(→r)
Γ ⊢σ q : A Γ ⊢σ e : B[q/a]⊥⊥ if q /∈ nef then a /∈ A
Γ ⊢σ q · e : (Πa : A.B)⊥⊥
(→l)
Γ ⊢σ t : N
Γ ⊢σ refl : t = t
(=r)
Γ ⊢σ p : A Γ ⊢σ e : A[u/t]
Γ ⊢σ µ˜=.〈p||e〉 : (t = u)⊥⊥
(=l)
Γ ⊢σ t : N Γ ⊢σ p0 : A[0/x] Γ, x : T, a : A ⊢
σ pS : A[S(x)/x]
Γ ⊢σ fixtax[p0 | pS ] : A[t/x]
(fix)
Γ ⊢σ t : T Γ, f : T → N, x : T, b : ∀yT.f(y) = 0 ⊢σ p : A f positive in A
Γ ⊢σ cofixtbx[p] : ν
t
fxA
(cofix)
Figure 10. Type system for dLPAω - Regular mode
ε(A) , {A} σ{p|q}(A) ,
{
σ(A[q/p]) if q ∈ nef
σ(A) otherwise
Because the language of proof terms include constructors for pairs, injections, etc, the
notation A[q/p] does not refer to usual substitutions properly speaking: p can be a pattern
(for instance (a1, a2)) and not only a variable.
We shall attract the reader’s attention to the fact that all typing judgments include a
list of dependencies. Indeed, as in the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, when a proof or a context is caught
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Dependent mode
Γ, tˆp : A⊥⊥ ⊢d ctˆp;σ
Γ ⊢σ µtˆp.ctˆp : A
(µtˆp)
Γ,Γ′ ⊢σ p : A Γ, tˆp : B⊥⊥,Γ′ ⊢d e : A
⊥⊥;σ{·|p}
Γ, tˆp : B⊥⊥,Γ′ ⊢d 〈p||e〉;σ
(Cutd)
Γ,Γ′ ⊢d ctˆp;σσ
′ Γ ⊢σ τ : (Γ′;σ′)
Γ ⊢d ctˆpτ ;σ
(ld)
σ(A) = σ(B)
Γ, tˆp : A⊥⊥,Γ′ ⊢d tˆp : B
⊥⊥;σ{·|p}
(tˆp)
Γ, ai : Ai ⊢d c
i
tˆp
;σ{ιi(ai)|pN}) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ⊢d µ˜[a1.c
1
tˆp
| a2.c
2
tˆp
] : (A1 ∨A2)
⊥⊥;σ{·|pN}
(∨d
l
)
Γ, a : A ⊢d ctˆpτ
′;σ{a|pN}
Γ ⊢d µ˜a.ctˆpτ
′ : A⊥⊥;σ{·|pN}
(µ˜d)
Γ, a1 : A1, a2 : A2 ⊢d ctˆp;σ{(a1, a2)|pN}
Γ ⊢d µ˜(a1, a2).ctˆp : (A1 ∧A2)
⊥⊥;σ{·|pN}
(∧d
l
)
Γ, x : T, a : A ⊢d ctˆp;σ{(x, a)|pN }
Γ ⊢d µ˜(x, a).ctˆp : (∃x
TA)⊥⊥;σ{·|pN}
(∃d
l
)
Terms
Γ ⊢σ 0 : N
(0)
Γ ⊢σ t : N
Γ ⊢σ S(t) : N
(S)
(x : T ) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢σ x : T
(Axt)
Γ, x : U ⊢σ t : T
Γ ⊢σ λx.t : U → T
(λ)
Γ ⊢σ t : U → T Γ ⊢σ u : U
Γ ⊢σ t u : T
(@)
Γ ⊢σ t : N Γ ⊢σ t0 : U Γ, x : N, y : U ⊢
σ tS : U
Γ ⊢σ rectxy[t0 | tS ] : U
(rec)
Γ ⊢σ p : ∃xT.A p nef
Γ ⊢σ wit p : T
(wit )
Figure 10. Type system for dLPAω - Dependent mode and terms
by a binder, say V and µ˜a, the substitution [V/a] is not performed but rather put in the
store: τ [a := V ]. Now, consider for instance the reduction of a dependent function λa.p (of
type Πa : A.B) applied to a stack V · e:
〈λa.p||V · e〉τ → 〈µtˆp.〈V ||µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉τ
→ 〈µtˆp.〈p||tˆp〉||e〉τ [a := V ]→ 〈p||e〉τ [a := V ]
Since p still contains the variable a, whence his type is still B[a], whereas the type of e is
B[V ]. We thus need to compensate the missing substitution36.
We are mostly left with two choices. Either we mimic the substitution in the type
system, which would amount to the following typing rule:
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ τ(c) Γ ⊢ τ : Γ′
Γ ⊢ cτ
where:
τ [α := e](c) , τ(c)
τ [a := p](c) , τ(c) (p /∈ nef)
τ [a := pN ](c) , τ(c[pN/a]) (p ∈ nef)
Or we type stores in the spirit of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, and we carry along the derivations all
the bindings liable to be used in types, which constitutes again a list of dependencies.
The former solution has the advantage of solving the problem before typing the com-
mand, but it has the flaw of performing computations which would not occur in the reduction
36On the contrary, the reduced command in dLtˆp would have been 〈p[V/a]||e〉, which is typable with the
(Cut) rule over the formula B[V/a].
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system. For instance, the substitution τ(c) could duplicate co-fixpoints (and their typing
derivations), which would never happen in the calculus. That is the reason why we favor the
other solution, which is closer to the calculus in our opinion. Yet, it has the drawback that
it forces us to carry a list of dependencies even in regular mode. Since this list is fixed (it
does not evolve in the derivation except when stores occur), we differentiate the denotation
of regular typing judgments, written Γ ⊢σ J , from the one of judgments in dependent mode,
which we write Γ ⊢d J ;σ to highlight that σ grows along derivations. The type system we
obtain is given in Figure 10.
6.4. Subject reduction. We shall now prove that typing is preserved along reduction.
As for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, the proof is simplified by the fact that substitutions are not
performed (except for terms), which keeps us from proving the safety of the corresponding
substitutions. Yet, we first need to prove some technical lemmas about dependencies. To
this aim, we define a relation σ ⇛ σ′ between lists of dependencies, which expresses the
fact that any typing derivation obtained with σ could be obtained as well as with σ′:
σ ⇛ σ′ , σ(A) = σ(B)⇒ σ′(A) = σ′(B) (for any A,B)
We first show that the cases which we encounter in the proof of subject reduction satisfy
this relation:
Lemma 6.1 (Dependencies implication). The following holds for any σ, σ′, σ′′:
(1) σσ′′ ⇛ σσ′σ′
(2) σ{(a1, a2)|(V1, V2)}⇛ σ{a1|V1}{a2|V2}
(3) σ{ιi(a)|ιi(V )}⇛ σ{a|V }
(4) σ{(x, a)|(t, V )}⇛ σ{a|V }{x|t}
(5) σ{·|(p1, p2)}⇛ σ{a1|p1}{a2|p2}{·|(a1, a2)}
(6) σ{·|ιi(p)}⇛ σ{a|p}{·|ιi(a)}
(7) σ{·|(t, p)}⇛ σ{a|p}{·|(t, a)}
where the fourth item abuse the definition of list of dependencies to include a substitution
of terms.
Proof. All the properties are trivial from the definition of the substitution σ(A).
We can now prove that the relation ⇛ indeed matches the expected intuition:
Proposition 6.2 (Dependencies weakening). If σ, σ′ are two lists of dependencies such
that σ ⇛ σ′, then any derivation using σ can be done using σ′ instead. In other words, the
following rules are admissible:
Γ ⊢σ J
Γ ⊢σ
′
J
(w)
Γ ⊢d J ;σ
Γ ⊢d J ;σ
′ (w
d)
for any judgment J among p : A,c,e : A⊥⊥, t : T .
Proof. Simple induction on the typing derivations. The rules (tˆp) and (Cut) where the list
of dependencies is used exactly match the definition of ⇛. Every other case is direct using
the first item of Lemma 6.1.
To simplify the proof of subject reduction, we prove that the concatenation of stores is
typable:
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Lemma 6.3. The following rule is admissible:
Γ ⊢σ τ0 : (Γ0;σ0) Γ,Γ0 ⊢
σσ0 τ1 : (Γ1;σ1)
Γ ⊢σ τ0τ1 : (Γ0,Γ1;σ0, σ1)
(ττ ′)
Proof. By induction on the structure of τ1.
As explained, we only need to prove that term substitution is safe:
Lemma 6.4 (Safe term substitution). If Γ ⊢σ t : T then for any conclusion J for typing
proofs, contexts, terms, etc; the following holds:
(1) If Γ, x : T,Γ′ ⊢σ J then Γ,Γ′[t/x] ⊢σ[t/x] J [t/x].
(2) If Γ, x : T,Γ′ ⊢d J ;σ then Γ,Γ
′[t/x] ⊢d J [t/x];σ[t/x].
Proof. By induction on typing rules.
We can prove the safety of reduction with respect to typing:
Theorem 6.5 (Subject reduction). For any context Γ and any closures cτ and c′τ ′ such
that cτ → c′τ ′, we have:
(1) If Γ ⊢ cτ then Γ ⊢ c′τ ′. (2) If Γ ⊢d cτ ; ε then Γ ⊢d c
′τ ′; ε.
Proof. The proof follows the usual proof of subject reduction, by induction on the typing
derivation and the reduction cτ → c′τ ′. Since there is no substitution but for terms (proof
terms and contexts being stored), there is no need for auxiliary lemmas about the safety of
substitution. We sketch it by examining all the rules from Figure 10 from top to bottom.
• The cases for reductions of λ are identical to the cases proven in the previous chapter
for dLtˆp.
• The rules for reducing µ and µ˜ are almost the same except that elements are stored,
which makes it even easier. For instance in the case of µ˜, the reduction rule is:
〈V ||µ˜a.cτ1〉τ0 → cτ0[a := V ]τ1
A typing derivation in regular mode for the command on the left-hand side is of the shape:
ΠV
Γ,Γ0 ⊢
σσ0 V : A
Πc
Γ,Γ0, a : A,Γ1 ⊢
σσ0σ1 c
Πτ1
Γ,Γ0, a : A ⊢
σσ0 τ1 : (Γ1;σ1)
Γ,Γ0, a : A ⊢
σσ0 cτ1
(l)
Γ,Γ0 ⊢
σσ0 µ˜a.cτ1 : A
⊥⊥
(µ˜)
Γ,Γ0 ⊢
σσ0 〈V ||µ˜a.cτ1〉
(Cut)
Πτ0
Γ ⊢σ τ0 : (Γ0;σ0)
Γ ⊢σ 〈V ||µ˜a.cτ1〉τ0
(l)
Thus we can type the command on the right-hand side:
Πc
Γτ ⊢
σσ0σ1 c
Γτ ⊢
σσ0{a|V }σ1 c
(w)
Πτ0
Γ ⊢σ τ0 : (Γ0;σ0)
ΠV
Γ,Γ0 ⊢
σσ0 V : A
Γ ⊢σ τ0[a := V ] : (Γ0, a : A;σ0, {a|V })
(τp)
Πτ1
Γ,Γ0, a : A ⊢
σσ0 τ1 : (Γ1;σ1)
Γ ⊢σ τ0[a := V ]τ1 : (Γ0, a : A,Γ1;σ0{a|V }σ1)
(ττ ′)
Γ ⊢σ cτ0[a := V ]τ1
(l)
where Γτ , Γ,Γ0, a : A,Γ1. As for the dependent mode, the binding {a|p} within the list
of dependencies is compensated when typing the store as shown in the last derivation.
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• Similarly, elimination rules for contexts µ˜[a1.c1|a2.c2], µ˜(a1, a2).c, µ˜(x, a).c or µ˜=.c are
easy to check, using Lemma 6.1 and the rule (τp) in dependent mode to prove the safety
with respect to dependencies.
• The cases for delimited continuations are identical to the corresponding cases for dLtˆp.
• The cases for the so-called “call-by-value” rules opening constructors are straightfor-
ward, using again Lemma 6.1 in dependent mode to prove the consistency with respect to
the list of dependencies.
• The cases for the lazy rules are trivial.
• The first case in the “lookup” section is trivial. The three lefts correspond to the usual
unfolding of inductive and co-inductive fixpoints. We only sketch the latter in regular mode.
The reduction rule is:
〈a||f〉τ0[a := cofix
t
bx[p]]τ1 → 〈p[t/x][b
′/b]||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ1〉τ0[b
′ := λy.cofixybx[p]]
The crucial part of the derivation for the left-hand side command is the derivation for the
cofix in the store:
Πτ0
Γ ⊢σ τ0 : (Γ0;σ0)
Πt
Γ ⊢σσ0 t : T
Πp
Γ,Γ0, f : T → N, x : T, b : ∀y
T .f(y) = 0 ⊢σσ0 p : A
Γ,Γ0 ⊢
σσ0 cofixtbx[p] : ν
t
fxA
(cofix)
Γ ⊢σ τ0[a := cofix
t
bx[p]] : (Γ0, a : ν
t
fxA;σ0)
(τp)
Then, using this derivation, we can type the store of the right-hand side command:
Πτ0
Γ ⊢σ τ0 : (Γ0;σ0)
Γ,Γ0, y : T ⊢
σσ0 y : T
Πp
Γ,Γ0, f : T → N, x : T, b : ∀y
T .f(y) = 0 ⊢σσ0 p : A
Γ,Γ0, y : T ⊢
σσ0 cofix
y
bx[p] : ν
y
fxA
(cofix)
Γ,Γ0 ⊢
σσ0 λy.cofixybx[p] : ∀y.ν
t
fxA
(∀r)
Γ ⊢σ τ0[b
′ := λy.cofixybx[p]] : Γ0, b
′ : −∀y.νyfxA
(τp)
It only remains to type (we avoid the rest of the derivation, which is less interesting) the
proof p[t/x] with this new store to ensure us that the reduction is safe (since the variable a
will still be of type νtfxA when typing the rest of the command):
Πp
Γ,Γ0, b : ∀y.ν
y
fxA ⊢
σ p[t/x] : A[t/x][νyfxA/f(y) = 0] ν
t
fxA ≡ A[t/x][ν
y
fxA/f(y) = 0]
Γ,Γ0, b : ∀y.ν
y
fxA ⊢
σ p[t/x] : νtfxA
(≡r)
• The cases for reductions of terms are easy. Since terms are reduced in place within
proofs, the only things to check is that the reduction of wit preserves types (which is trivial)
and that the β-reduction verifies the subject reduction (which is a well-known fact).
A CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF OF DEPENDENT CHOICE IN CLASSICAL ARITHMETIC 53
Γ ⊢ p : ∃xT .A Γ, x : T, a : A ⊢ q : B[(x, a)/•] p /∈ nef⇒ • /∈ B
Γ ⊢ dest p as (x, a) in q : B[p/•]
(dest)
Γ ⊢ p : A1 ∨A2 Γ, ai : Ai ⊢ q : B[ιi(a)i/•] for i = 1, 2 p /∈ nef⇒ • /∈ B
Γ ⊢ case p of [a1.p1 | a2.p2] : B[p/•]
(case)
Γ ⊢ p : A1 ∧A2 Γ, a1 : A1, a2 : A2 ⊢ q : B[(a1, a2)/•] p /∈ nef⇒ • /∈ B
Γ ⊢ split p as (a1, a2) in q : B[p/•]
(split)
Γ ⊢ p : A1 ∧A2
Γ ⊢ πi(p) : Ai
(∧iE)
Γ, a : A ⊢ q : B[a/•] p /∈ nef ⇒ • /∈ B
Γ ⊢ let a = p in q : B[p/•]
(let)
Γ ⊢ p : ∃xT.A(x)
Γ ⊢ prf p : A(wit p)
(prf )
Γ ⊢ p : t = u Γ ⊢ q : B[t]
Γ ⊢ subst p q : B[u]
(subst)
Γ, α : A⊥⊥ ⊢ p : A
Γ ⊢ catchα p : A
(catch)
Γ, α : A⊥⊥ ⊢ p : A
Γ, α : A⊥⊥ ⊢ throw α p : B
(throw)
Γ ⊢ p : ⊥
Γ ⊢ exfalso p : B
(⊥)
Figure 11. Typing rules of dPAω
6.5. Natural deduction as macros. We can recover the usual proof terms for elimination
rules in natural deduction systems by defining them as macros in our language. In particular,
this provides us with an embedding of dPAω proof terms into dLPAω syntax. The definitions
are straightforward and follow the same intuition than for defining the application in the
λµµ˜-calculus (see Remark 3.2): we consider the expected reduction rule in an abstract
machine (for instance 〈throw e p||e′〉 → 〈p||e〉) and define the macro by solving the induced
equation (in that case, throw e p , µβ.〈p||e〉). Observe that we use delimited continuations
to define let . . . in and the constructors over nef proofs which might be dependently typed:
let a = p in q , µαp.〈p||µ˜a.〈q||αp〉〉
split p as (a1, a2) in q , µαp.〈p||µ˜(a1, a2).〈q||αp〉〉
case p of [a1.p1 | a2.p2] , µαp.〈p||µ˜[a1.〈p1||αp〉|a2.〈p2||αp〉]〉
dest p as (a, x) in q , µαp.〈p||µ˜(x, a).〈q||αp〉〉
prf p , µtˆp.〈p||µ˜(x, a).〈a||tˆp〉〉
subst p q , µα.〈p||µ˜=.〈q||α〉〉
exfalso p , µα.〈p||[]〉
catchα p , µα.〈p||α〉
throw α p , µ .〈p||α〉
where αp = tˆp if p is nef and αp = α otherwise. It is then easy to check that the macros
match the expected typing rules from dPAω’s type system [29].
Proposition 6.6 (Natural deduction). The typing rules from dPAω, given in Figure 11,
are admissible.
Proof. Straightforward derivations, as an example we give here the two cases for the macros
subst p q and prf p (in natural deduction) that are admissible in dLPAω. Recall that we
have the following typing rules in dLPAω:
Γ, x : T, a : A ⊢σ c
Γ ⊢σ µ˜(x, a).c : (∃xT .A)⊥⊥
(∃l)
Γ ⊢σ p : A Γ ⊢σ e : A[u/t]
Γ ⊢σ µ˜=.〈p||e〉 : (t = u)⊥⊥
(=l)
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and that we defined prf p and subst p q as syntactic sugar:
prf p , µtˆp.〈p||µ˜(x, a).〈a||tˆp〉〉 subst p q , µα.〈p||µ˜=.〈q||α〉〉.
Observe that prf p is now only definable if p is a nef proof term. For any p ∈ nef and any
variables a, α, we can prove the admissibility of the (prf )-rule:
Γ ⊢σ p : ∃xT.A | ∆
a : A(x) ⊢σ a : A(x)
a : A(x) ⊢σ a : A(wit (x, a))
(≡r)
σ{(x, a)|p}(A(wit p)) = σ{(x, a)|p}(A(wit (x, a)))
Γ | tˆp : A(wit (x, a)) ⊢d tˆp : A(wit p) | ∆;σ
(tˆp)
〈a||α〉 : Γ, x : T, a : A(x) ⊢d ∆, tˆp : A(wit p);σ{(x, a)|p}
(Cut)
Γ | µ˜(x, a).〈a||tˆp〉 : ∃xT.A ⊢d ∆, tˆp : A(wit p);σ{·|p}
〈p||µ˜(x, a).〈a||α〉〉 : Γ ⊢d ∆, tˆp : A(wit p);σ{·|p}
(Cut)
Γ ⊢σ µtˆp.〈p||µ˜(x, a).〈a||tˆp〉〉 : A(wit p) | ∆
Similarly, we can prove that the (subst)-rule is admissible:
Γ ⊢σ p : t = u | ∆
Γ ⊢σ q : B[t] | ∆;σ Γ | α : B[u] ⊢σ α : B[u] | ∆
(Axl)
Γ | µ˜=.〈q||α〉 : t = u ⊢σ ∆, α : B[u]
(=l)
〈p||µ˜=.〈q||α〉〉 : Γ ⊢σ ∆, α : B[u]
(Cut)
Γ ⊢σ µα.〈p||µ˜=.〈q||α〉〉 : B[u] | ∆
(µ)
One can even check that the reduction rules in dLPAω for these proofs almost mimic
the ones of dPAω. To be more precise, the rules of dLPAω do not allow to simulate each
rule of dPAω, due to the head-reduction strategy amongst other things. Nonetheless, up to
a few details the reduction of a command in dLPAω follows one particular reduction path
of the corresponding proof in dPAω, or in other words, one reduction strategy.
Noteworthily, through the embedding of dPAω the same proof terms are suitable for
the axioms of countable and dependent choices [29]. We do not state it here, but following
the approach of [29], we could also extend dLPAω to obtain a proof for the axiom of bar
induction.
Theorem 6.7 (Countable choice [29]). We have:
ACN := λH.let a = cofix
0
bn[(Hn, b(S(n))]
in (λn. wit (nthn a), λn. prf (nthn a)
: ∀xN∃yTP (x, y)→ ∃fN→T∀xNP (x, f(x))
where nthn a := π1(fix
n
x,c[a |π2(c)]).
Proof. The complete typing derivation of the proof term for ACN from Herbelin’s paper [29]
is given in Figure 12.
Theorem 6.8 (Dependent choice [29]). We have:
DC := λH.λx0. let a = (x0, cofix
0
bn[dn])fsix
in (λn. wit (nthn a), (refl, λn.π1(prf (prf (nthn a)))))
: ∀xT.∃yT.P (x, y)→
∀xT0.∃f ∈ T
N.(f(0) = x0 ∧ ∀n
N.P (f(n), f(S(n))))
where dn := dest Hn as (y, c) in (y, (c, b y)))
and nthn a := fix
n
x,d[a | (wit (prf d), π2(prf (prf (d))))].
Proof. Left to the reader.
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Notations:
• ntht p , π1(fix
t
sx[p |π2(s)])
• An∞ , ν
n
fx[A(x) ∧ f(S(x)) = 0]
• strt∞H , cofix
t
bn[(Hn, b(S(n))]
• A(x) , ∃yT .P (x, y)
Typing derivation for nth (Πnth):
n : N ⊢ n : N
(Axn)
a : A0∞ ⊢ a : A
0
∞
(Axr)
s : Am∞ ⊢ s : A
S(m)
∞
(Axr)
Am∞ ≡ A(m) ∧ A
S(m)
∞
m : N, s : Am∞ ⊢ s : A(m) ∧ A
S(m)
∞
(≡r)
m : N, s : Am∞ ⊢ π2(s) : A
S(m)
∞
(∧2E)
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ fix
t
sx[a |π2(s)] : A
n
∞
(fix)
An∞ ≡ A(n) ∧ A
S(n)
∞
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ fix
t
sx[a |π2(s)] : A(n) ∧ A
S(n)
∞
(≡r)
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ π1(fix
t
sx[a |π2(s)]) : A(n)
(∧1E)
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ nthn a : A(n)
(def)
Typing derivation for str0∞ (Πstr∞ ):
⊢ 0 : N
H : ∀xN∃yTP (x, y) ⊢ H : ∀xN∃yTP (x, y)
(Axr)
n : N ⊢ n : N
(Axr)
H : ∀xN∃yTP (x, y), n : N ⊢ Hn : ∃yT .P (n, y)
(∀r)
H : ∀xN∃yTP (x, y), n : N, b : ∀zN .f(z) = 0 ⊢ (Hn, b(S(n)) : ∃yT .P (n, y) ∧ f(S(n)) = 0
H : ∀xN∃yTP (x, y) ⊢ cofix0bn[(Hn, b(S(n))] : ν
0
fx∃y
T .P (x, y) ∧ f(S(x)) = 0
H : ∀xN∃yTP (x, y) ⊢ str0∞H : A
0
∞
(def)
Typing derivation for ACN:
Πnth
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ nthn a : A(n)
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ nthn a : ∃y
T.P (n, y)
(def)
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ wit (nthn a) : T
(wit )
a : A0∞ ⊢ λn. wit (nthn a) : N→ T
Πnth
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ nthn a : A(n)
a : A0∞, n : N ⊢ nthn a : ∃y
T.P (n, y)
(def)
a : A0∞, x : N ⊢ prf (nthn a) : P (x, wit (nthx a))
(≡r)
a : A0∞, x : N ⊢ prf (nthn a) : P (x, λn. wit (nthn a)x)
(≡r)
a : A0∞ ⊢ λn. prf (nthn a) : ∀x
N.P (x, (λn. wit (nthn a))x)
(∀r)
a : A0∞ ⊢ (λn. wit (nthn a), λn. prf (nthn a) : ∃f
N→T.∀xN.P (x, f(x))
(∃r)
H : ∀xN∃yTP (x, y) ⊢ let a = str0∞H in (λn. wit (nthn a), λn. prf (nthn a) : ∃f
N→T.∀xN.P (x, f(x))
(let)
⊢ λH. let a = str0∞H in (λn. wit (nthn a), λn. prf (nthn a) : ∀x
N.∃yT.P (x, y)→ ∃fN→T.∀xN.P (x, f(x))
(→r)
where we omit the conversion P (x, (λn. wit (nthn a))x) ≡ P (x, wit (nthx a)) on the
right-hand side derivation.
Figure 12. Proof of the axiom of countable choice in dLPAω
7. Normalization and consistency of dLPAω
We shall now present our realizability interpretation for dLPAω, which will eventually allow
us to prove its normalization and consistency. Once more, we will follow Danvy’s methodol-
ogy of semantic artifacts [17, 3] to first define a small-step calculus (or context-free abstract
machine). The resulting realizability interpretation will be similar in its structure to the
one presented in Section 4 for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus.
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7.1. Small-step calculus. We start by decomposing the reduction system of dLPAω into
small-step reduction rules, that we denote by  s. This requires a refinement and an ex-
tension of the syntax, that we shall now present. To keep us from boring the reader stiff
with new (huge) tables for the syntax, typing rules and so forth, we will introduce them
step by step. We hope it will help the reader to convince herself of the necessity and of the
somewhat naturality of these extensions.
7.1.1. Values. First of all, we need to refine the syntax to distinguish between strong and
weak values in the syntax of proof terms. As in the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, this refinement is
induced by the computational behavior of the calculus: weak values are the ones which are
stored by µ˜ binders, but which are not values enough to be eliminated in front of a forcing
context, that is to say variables. Indeed, if we observe the reduction system, we see that
in front of a forcing context f , a variable leads a search through the store for a “stronger”
value, which could incidentally provoke the evaluation of some fixpoints. On the other hand,
strong values are the ones which can be reduced in front of the matching forcing context,
that is to say functions, refl, pairs of values, injections or dependent pairs:
Weak values V ::= a | v
Strong values v ::= ιi(V ) | (V, V ) | (Vt, V ) | λx.p | λa.p | refl
This allows us to distinguish commands of the shape 〈v||f〉τ , where the forcing context (and
next the strong value) are examined to determine whether the command reduces or not;
from commands of the shape 〈a||f〉τ where the focus is put on the variable a, which leads
to a lookup for the associated proof in the store.
7.1.2. Terms. Next, we need to explicit the reduction of terms. To this purpose, we include a
machinery to evaluate terms in a way which resemble the evaluation of proofs. In particular,
we define new commands which we write 〈t||π〉 where t is a term and π is a context for
terms (or co-term). Co-terms are either of the shape µ˜x.c or stacks of the shape u ·π. These
constructions are the usual ones of the λµµ˜-calculus (which are also the ones for proofs).
We also extend the definitions of commands with delimited continuations to include the
corresponding commands for terms:
Commands
Co-terms
c ::= 〈p||e〉 | 〈t||π〉
π ::= t · π | µ˜x.c
ctˆp ::= · · · | 〈t||πtˆp〉
πtˆp ::= t · πtˆp | µ˜x.ctˆp
We give typing rules for these new constructions, which are the usual rules for typing
contexts in the λµµ˜-calculus:
Γ ⊢ t : T Γ ⊢ π : U⊥⊥
Γ ⊢ t · π : (T → U)⊥⊥
(→l)
c : (Γ, x : T )
Γ ⊢ µ˜x.c : T⊥⊥
(µ˜x) Γ ⊢
σ t : T Γ ⊢σ π : T⊥⊥
Γ ⊢σ 〈t||π〉
(cutt)
It is worth noting that the syntax as well as the typing and reduction rules for terms
now match exactly the ones for proofs37. In other words, with these definitions, we could
abandon the stratified presentation without any trouble, since reduction rules for terms will
naturally collapse to the ones for proofs.
37Except for substitutions of terms, which we could store as well.
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Commands
〈p||e〉cτ  s 〈p||e〉p
〈t||π〉cτ  s 〈t||π〉t
Delimited continuations
(for any ι, o) 〈µtˆp.cτ ′′||e〉pτ  s 〈µtˆp.c
′τ ′′||e〉pτ
′ (if cιτ  s c
′
oτ
′)
〈µtˆp.〈p||tˆp〉||e〉pτ  s 〈p||e〉pτ
(for any ι, o) 〈V ||µ˜tˇp.c〉eτ  s 〈V ||µ˜tˇp.c
′〉eτ
′ (if cιτ  s c
′
oτ
′)
〈V ||µ˜tˇp.〈tˇp||e〉〉eτ  s 〈V ||e〉eτ
Proofs (where a, y are fresh)
(e 6= etˆp) 〈µα.c||e〉pτ  s cc τ [α := e]
〈µα.c||etˆp〉pτ  s cc[etˆp/α] τ
〈(p1, p2)||e〉pτ  s 〈p1||µ˜a1.〈p2||µ˜a2.〈(a1, a2)||e〉〉〉pτ
〈ιi(p)||e〉pτ  s 〈p||µ˜a.〈ιi(a)||e〉〉pτ
〈(t, p)||e〉pτ  s 〈p||µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉〉pτ
〈fixtbx[p | q]||e〉pτ  s 〈µtˆp.〈t||µ˜y.〈a||tˆp〉[a := fix
y
bx[p | q]]〉||e〉pτ
〈cofixtbx[p]||e〉pτ  s 〈µtˆp.〈t||µ˜y.〈a||tˆp〉〉[a := cofix
y
bx[p]]||e〉pτ
〈V ||e〉pτ  s 〈V ||e〉e
Contexts
〈V ||α〉eτ [α := e]τ
′  s 〈V ||e〉eτ [α := e]τ
′
〈V ||µ˜a.cτ ′〉eτ  s ccτ [a := V ]τ
′
〈V ||f〉eτ  s 〈V ||f〉V τ
Figure 13. Small-step reduction rules (1/2)
7.1.3. Co-delimited continuations. Finally, in order to maintain typability when reducing
dependent pairs of the strong existential type, we need to add what we call co-delimited
continuations. As observed in Section 5.3, the CPS translation of pairs (t, p) in dLtˆp is
not the expected one, reflecting the need for a special reduction rule (remember that the
usual reduction rule for opening pairs, following the global call-by-value evaluation strategy,
was causing subject reduction to fail). To remediate this, we instead use a rule where t is
reduced within a context where a is not linked to p but to a co-reset tˇp (dually to reset tˆp),
whose type can be changed from A[x] to A[t] thanks to a list of dependencies:
〈(t, p)||e〉pτ  s 〈p||µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉〉pτ
We thus equip the language with new contexts µ˜tˇp.ctˇp, which we call co-shifts and where
ctˇp is a command whose last cut is of the shape 〈tˇp||e〉. This corresponds formally to the
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Values (where b′ is fresh)
〈a||f〉V τ [a := V ]τ
′  s 〈V ||f〉V τ [a := V ]τ
′
〈v||f〉V τ  s 〈v||f〉fτ
〈a||f〉V τ [a = fix
0
bx[p0 | pS ]]τ
′  s 〈p0||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ
′〉pτ
〈a||f〉vτ [a = fix
S(t)
bx [p0 | pS ]]τ
′  s 〈pS[t/x][b
′/b]||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′〉pτ [b
′ := fixtbx[p0 | pS ]]]
〈a||f〉V τ [a = cofix
t
bx[p]]τ
′  s 〈p[t/x][b
′/b]||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′〉pτ [b
′ := λy.cofixybx[p]]
Forcing contexts
〈λx.p||t · e〉fτ  s 〈µtˆp.〈t||µ˜x.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉pτ
(q ∈ nef) 〈λa.p||q · e〉fτ  s 〈µtˆp.〈q||µ˜a.〈p||tˆp〉〉||e〉pτ
(q /∈ nef) 〈λa.p||q · e〉fτ  s 〈q||µ˜a.〈p||e〉〉pτ
〈ιi(V )||µ˜[a1.c
1 | a2.c
2]〉fτ  s c
i
cτ [ai := V ]
〈(V1, V2)||µ˜(a1, a2).c〉fτ  s ccτ [a1 := V1][a2 := V2]
〈(Vt, V )||µ˜(x, a).c〉fτ  s (c[Vt/x])cτ [a := V ]
〈refl||µ˜=.c〉fτ  s ccτ
Terms (where x, a are fresh)
〈tu||π〉tτ  s 〈t||u · π〉tτ
〈S(t)||π〉tτ  s 〈t||µ˜x.〈S(x)||π〉〉t
〈wit p||π〉tτ  s 〈p||µ˜(x, a).〈x||π〉〉pτ
〈rectxy[t0 | tS ]||π〉tτ  s 〈t||µ˜z.〈rec
z
xy[t0 | tS ]||π〉〉tτ (t /∈ Vt)
〈rec0xy[t0 | tS ]||π〉tτ  s 〈t0||π〉tτ
〈rec
S(Vt)
xy [t0 | tS ]||π〉tτ  s 〈tS[Vt/x][rec
Vt
xy[t0 | tS ]/y]||π〉tτ
〈Vt||π〉tτ  s 〈Vt||π〉πτ
〈λx.t||u · π〉πτ  s 〈u||µ˜x.〈t||π〉〉tτ
〈Vt||µ˜x.ct〉πτ  s (ctτ)[Vt/x]
〈Vt||µ˜x.c〉πτ  s (cpτ)[Vt/x]
Figure 13. Small-step reduction rules (2/2)
following syntactic sets, which are dual to the ones introduced for delimited continuations:
Contexts
Co-delimited
continuations
NEF
e ::= · · · | µ˜tˇp.ctˇp
ctˇp ::= 〈pN ||etˇp〉 | 〈t||πtˇp〉 | 〈tˇp||e〉
etˇp ::= µ˜a.ctˇp | µ˜[a1.ctˇp | a2.c
′
tˇp
] | µ˜(a1, a2).ctˇp | µ˜(x, a).ctˇp
πtˇp ::= t · πtˇp | µ˜x.ctˇp
eN ::= · · · | µ˜tˇp.ctˇp
This might seem to be a heavy addition to the language, but we insist on the fact that
these artifacts are merely the dual constructions of delimited continuations introduced in
dLtˆp, with a very similar intuition. In particular, it might be helpful for the reader to think
of the fact that we introduced delimited continuations for type safety of the evaluation of
dependent products in Πa : A.B (which naturally extends to the case ∀xT.A). Therefore, to
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maintain type safety of dependent sums in ∃xT.A, we need to introduce the dual construc-
tions of co-delimited continuations. We also give typing rules to these constructions, which
are dual to the typing rules for delimited-continuations:
Γ, tˇp : A ⊢d ctˇp;σ
Γ ⊢σ µ˜tˇp.ctˇp : A
⊥⊥
(µ˜tˇp)
Γ,Γ′ ⊢σ e : A⊥⊥ σ(A) = σ(B)
Γ, tˇp : B,Γ′ ⊢d 〈tˇp||e〉;σ
(tˇp)
Note that we also need to extend the definition of list of dependencies to include bindings
of the shape {x|t} for terms, and that we have to give the corresponding typing rules to
type commands of terms in dependent mode:
c : (Γ, x : T ;σ{x|t})
Γ ⊢d µ˜x.c : T
⊥⊥;σ{·|t}
(µ˜dx)
Πt Γ, tˇp : B,Γ
′ ⊢d π : A
⊥⊥;σ{·|t}
Γ, tˇp : B,Γ′ ⊢d 〈t||π〉;σ
(Cutdt )
where Πt , Γ,Γ
′ ⊢σ t : T .
The small-step reduction system we obtained is given in Figure 13. We write cιτ  s c
′
oτ
′
for the reduction rules, where the annotation ι, p on commands are indices (i.e. c, p, e, V, f, t, π, Vt)
indicating which part of the command is in control. As in the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, we observe
an alternation of steps descending from p to f for proofs and from t to Vt for terms. The
descent for proofs can be divided in two main phases. During the first phase, from p to e
we observe the call-by-value process, which extracts values from proofs, opening recursively
the constructors and computing values. In the second phase, the core computation takes
place from V to f , with the destruction of constructors and the application of function to
their arguments. The laziness corresponds precisely to skipping the first phase, waiting to
possibly reach the second phase before actually going through the first one.
Proposition 7.1 (Subject reduction). The small-step reduction  s satisfies subject reduc-
tion.
Proof. The proof is again a tedious induction on the reduction s. There is almost nothing
new in comparison with the cases for the big-step reduction rules: the cases for reduction
of terms are straightforward, as well as the administrative reductions changing the focus on
a command. We only give the case for the reduction of pairs (t, p). The reduction rule is:
〈(t, p)||e〉pτ  s 〈p||µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉〉pτ
Consider a typing derivation for the command on the left-hand side, which is of the shape
(we omit the rule (l) and the store for conciseness):
Πt
Γ ⊢σ t : T
Πp
Γ ⊢σ p : A[t/x]
Γ ⊢σ (t, p) : ∃xT.A
(∃r)
Πe
Γ ⊢σ e : (∃xT.A)⊥⊥
Γ ⊢σ 〈(t, p)||e〉
(Cut)
60 E´TIENNE MIQUEY
Then we can type the command on the right-hand side with the following derivation:
Πp
Π′t
Π(x, a)
Γ ⊢σ (x, a) : ∃xT.A
Πe
Γ ⊢σ e : (∃xT.A)⊥⊥
Γ, x : T, a : A[x] ⊢σ 〈(x, a)||e〉 : A[x]⊥⊥
(Cut)
Γ, x : T ⊢σ µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉 : A[x]⊥⊥
(µ˜)
A[t] = ({x|t})(A[x])
Γ, tˇp : A[t], x : T ⊢d 〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉;σ{x|t}
(Cutd)
Γ, tˇp : A[t/x] ⊢d µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉 : T ;σ{·|t}
(µ˜x)
Γ, tˇp : A[t] ⊢ 〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉;σ
(Cutd)
Γ ⊢σ µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉 : A[t]⊥⊥
(µ˜tˇp)
Γ ⊢σ 〈p||µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉〉p
(Cut)
where Π(x,a) is as expected.
It is also direct to check that the small-step reduction system simulates the big-step
one, and in particular that it preserves the normalization :
Proposition 7.2. If a closure cτ normalizes for the reduction  s, then it also normalizes
for the reduction →.
Proof. By contraposition, one proves that if a command cτ produces an infinite number
of steps for the reduction →, then it does not normalize for  s either. This is proved
by showing by induction on the reduction → that each step, except for the contextual
reduction of terms, is reflected in at least on for the reduction  s. The rules for term
reductions require a separate treatment, which is really not interesting at this point. We
claim that the reduction of terms, which are usual simply-typed λ-terms, is known to be
normalizing anyway and does not deserve that we spend another page proving it in this
particular setting.
7.2. A realizability interpretation of dLPAω. We shall now present the realizability
interpretation of dLPAω, which will finally give us a proof of its normalization. Here again,
the interpretation combines ideas of the interpretations for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus [55] and for
dLtˆp through its embedding in Lepigre’s calculus (see Section 5.4). Namely, as for the
λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, formulas will be interpreted by sets of proofs-in-store of the shape (p|τ),
and the orthogonality will be defined between proofs-in-store (p|τ) and contexts-in-store
(e|τ ′) such that the stores τ and τ ′ are compatible. On the other hand, we will follow
Lepigre’s decomposition of dependent types into a quantification bounded by a predicate
a ∈ A whose interpretation is defined modulo observational equivalence.
We recall the main definitions necessary to the realizability interpretation:
Definition 7.3 (Proofs-in-store). We call closed proof-in-store (resp. closed context-in-
store, closed term-in-store, etc) the combination of a proof p (resp. context e, term t, etc)
with a closed store τ such that FV (p) ⊆ dom(τ). We use the notation (p|τ) to denote such
a pair. In addition, we denote by Λp (resp. Λe, etc.) the set of all proofs and by Λ
τ
p (resp.
Λτe , etc.) the set of all proofs-in-store. We denote the sets of closed closures by C0, and we
identify (c|τ) with the closure cτ when c is closed in τ .
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We recall the definition of compatible stores (Definition 4.3) in this context, which
allows us to define an orthogonality relation between proofs- and contexts-in-store.
Definition 7.4 (Compatible stores and union). Let τ and τ ′ be stores, we say that:
• they are independent and note τ#τ ′ if dom(τ) ∩ dom(τ ′) = ∅.
• they are compatible and note τ ⋄τ ′ if for all variables a (resp. co-variables α) present
in both stores: a ∈ dom(τ) ∩ dom(τ ′); the corresponding proofs (resp. contexts) in
τ and τ ′ coincide.
• τ ′ is an extension of τ and we write τ ⊳ τ ′ whenever τ ⋄ τ ′ and dom(τ) ⊆ dom(τ ′).
• ττ ′ is the compatible union of compatible closed stores τ and τ ′. It is defined as
ττ ′ , join(τ, τ ′), which itself given by:
join(τ0[a := p]τ1, τ
′
0[a := p]τ
′
1) , τ0τ
′
0[a := p]join(τ1, τ
′
1)
join(τ0[α := e]τ1, τ
′
0[α := e]τ
′
1) , τ0τ
′
0[α := e]join(τ1, τ
′
1)
join(τ0, τ
′
0) , τ0τ
′
0
where τ0#τ
′
0.
The next lemma (which follows from the previous definition) states the main property
we will use about union of compatible stores.
Lemma 7.5. If τ and τ ′ are two compatible stores, then τ ⊳ ττ ′ and τ ′ ⊳ ττ ′. Besides, if
τ is of the form τ0[x := t]τ1, then ττ ′ is of the form τ0[x := t]τ1 with τ0 ⊳ τ0 and τ1 ⊳ τ1.
We can now define the notion of pole, which has to satisfy an extra condition due to
the presence of delimited continuations
Definition 7.6 (Pole). A subset ⊥⊥ ∈ C0 is said to be saturated or closed by anti-reduction
whenever for all (c|τ), (c′|τ ′) ∈ C0, we have:
(c′τ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥) ∧ (cτ → c′τ ′) ⇒ (cτ ∈ ⊥⊥)
It is said to be closed by store extension if whenever cτ is in ⊥⊥, for any store τ ′ extending
τ , cτ ′ is also in ⊥⊥:
(cτ ∈ ⊥⊥) ∧ (τ ⊳ τ ′) ⇒ (cτ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥)
It is said to be closed under delimited continuations if whenever c[e/tˆp]τ (resp. c[V/tˇp]τ) is
in ⊥⊥, then 〈µtˆp.c||e〉τ (resp .〈V ||µ˜tˇp.c〉τ) belongs to ⊥⊥:
(c[e/tˆp]τ ∈ ⊥⊥) ⇒ (〈µtˆp.c||e〉τ ∈ ⊥⊥)
(c[V/tˇp]τ ∈ ⊥⊥) ⇒ (〈V ||µ˜tˇp.c〉τ ∈ ⊥⊥)
A pole is defined as any subset of C0 that is closed by anti-reduction, by store extension and
under delimited continuations.
Proposition 7.7. The set ⊥⊥⇓ = {cτ ∈ C0 : cτ normalizes } is a pole.
Proof. The first two conditions are already verified for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus [55]. The third
one is straightforward, since if a closure 〈µtˆp.c||e〉τ is not normalizing, it is easy to verify
that c[e/tˆp] is not normalizing either. Roughly, there is only two possible reduction steps for
a command 〈µtˆp.c||e〉τ : either it reduces to 〈µtˆp.c′||e〉τ ′, in which case c[e/tˆp]τ also reduces
to a closure which is almost (c′τ ′)[e/tˆp]; or c is of the shape 〈p||tˆp〉 and it reduces to c[e/tˆp]τ .
In both cases, if 〈µtˆp.c||e〉τ can reduce, so can c[e/tˆp]τ . The same reasoning allows us to
show that if c[V/tˇp]τ normalizes, then so does 〈V ||µ˜tˇp.c〉τ for any value V .
We finally recall the definition of the orthogonality relation w.r.t. a pole, which is
identical to the one for the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus:
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Definition 7.8 (Orthogonality). Given a pole ⊥⊥, we say that a proof-in-store (p|τ) is
orthogonal to a context-in-store (e|τ ′) and write (p|τ)⊥⊥(e|τ ′) if τ and τ ′ are compatible and
〈p||e〉ττ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥. The orthogonality between terms and co-terms is defined identically.
We are now equipped to define the realizability interpretation of dLPAω. Firstly, in
order to simplify the treatment of coinductive formulas, we extend the language of formulas
with second-order variables X,Y, . . . and we replace νtfxA by ν
t
XxA[X(y)/f(y) = 0]. The
typing rule for co-fixpoint operators then becomes:
Γ ⊢σ t : T Γ, x : T, b : ∀yT.X(y) ⊢σ p : A X /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ⊢σ cofixtbx[p] : ν
t
XxA
(cofix)
where X has to be positive in A.
Secondly, as in the interpretation of dLtˆp through Lepigre’s calculus, we introduce two
new predicates, p ∈ A for nef proofs and t ∈ T for terms. This allows us to decompose the
dependent products and sums into:
∀xT.A , ∀x.(x ∈ T → A)
∃xT.A , ∃x.(x ∈ T → A)
Πa : A.B , A→ B (a /∈ FV (B))
Πa : A.B , ∀a.(a ∈ A→ B) (otherwise)
This corresponds to the language of formulas and types defined by:
Types
Formulas
T,U ::= N | T → U | t ∈ T
A,B ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | X(t) | t = u | A ∧B | A ∨B
| ∀x.A | ∃x.A | ∀a.A | νtXxA | a ∈ A
and to the following inference rules:
Γ ⊢σ v : A a /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ⊢σ v : ∀a.A
(∀ar )
Γ ⊢σ e : A[q/a] q nef
Γ ⊢σ e : (∀a.A)⊥⊥
(∀a
l
)
Γ ⊢σ v : A x /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ⊢σ v : ∀x.A
(∀xr )
Γ ⊢σ e : A[t/x]
Γ ⊢σ e : (∀x.A)⊥⊥
(∀x
l
)
Γ ⊢σ v : A[t/x]
Γ ⊢σ v : ∃x.A
(∃xr )
Γ ⊢σ e : A x /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ⊢σ e : (∃x.A)⊥⊥
(∃x
l
)
Γ ⊢σ p : A p nef
Γ ⊢σ p : p ∈ A
(∈pr)
Γ ⊢σ e : A⊥⊥
Γ ⊢σ e : (q ∈ A)⊥⊥
(∈p
l
)
Γ ⊢σ t : T
Γ ⊢σ t : t ∈ T
(∈tr)
Γ ⊢σ π : T⊥⊥
Γ ⊢σ π : (t ∈ T )⊥⊥
(∈t
l
)
These rules are exactly the same as in Lepigre’s calculus [47] up to our stratified presentation
in a sequent calculus fashion, and modulo our syntactic restriction to nef proofs instead of
his semantical restriction. It is a straightforward verification to check that the typability is
maintained through the decomposition of dependent products and sums.
Another similarity with Lepigre’s realizability model is that truth/falsity values will
be closed under observational equivalence of proofs and terms. To this purpose, for each
store τ we introduce the relation ≡τ , which we define as the reflexive-transitive-symmetric
closure of the relation ⊲τ :
t ⊲τ t
′ whenever ∃τ ′,∀π, (〈t||π〉τ → 〈t′||π〉τ ′
p ⊲τ q whenever ∃τ
′,∀f (〈p||f〉τ → 〈q||f〉τ ′)
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All this being settled, it only remains to determine how to interpret coinductive formulas.
While it would be natural to try to interpret them by fixpoints in the semantics, this poses
difficulties for the proof of adequacy. We discuss this matter in Section 8, but as for now,
we will give a simpler interpretation. We stick to the intuition that since cofix operators
are lazily evaluated, they actually are realizers of every finite approximation of the (possibly
infinite) coinductive formula. Consider for instance the case of a stream:
str0∞p , cofix
0
bx[(px, b(S(x)))]
of type ν0XxA(x)∧X(S(x)). Such stream will produce on demand any tuple (p0, (p1, ...(pn,)...))
where  denotes the fact that it could be any term, in particular strn+1∞ p. Therefore, str
0
∞p
should be a successful defender of the formula
(A(0) ∧ (A(1) ∧ ...(A(n) ∧ ⊤)...)
Since cofix operators only reduce when they are bound to a variable in front of a forcing
context, it suggests interpreting the coinductive formula ν0XxA(x) ∧X(S(x)) at level f as
the union of all the opponents to a finite approximation.
To this end, given a coinductive formula ν0XxA where X is positive in A, we define its
finite approximations by:
F 0A,t , ⊤ F
n+1
A,t , A[t/x][F
n
A,y/X(y)]
Since X is positive in A, we have for any integer n and any term t that ‖FnA,t‖f ⊆ ‖F
n+1
A,t ‖f .
We can finally define the interpretation of coinductive formulas by:
‖νtXxA‖f ,
⋃
n∈N
‖FnA,t‖f
The realizability interpretation of closed formulas and types is defined in Figure 14
by induction on the structure of formulas at level f , and by orthogonality at levels V, e, p.
When S is a subset of P(Λτp) (resp. P(Λ
τ
e ),P(Λ
τ
t ),P(Λ
τ
π)), we use the notation S
⊥⊥f (resp.
S⊥⊥V , etc.) to denote its orthogonal set restricted to Λτf :
S⊥⊥f , {(f |τ) ∈ Λτf : ∀(p|τ
′) ∈ S, τ ⋄ τ ′ ⇒ 〈p||f〉ττ ′ ∈ ⊥⊥}
At level f , closed formulas are interpreted by sets of strong forcing contexts-in-store
(f |τ). As explained earlier, these sets are besides closed under the relation ≡τ along their
component τ , we thus denote them by P(Λτf )/≡τ . Second-order variables X,Y, . . . are then
interpreted by functions from the set of terms Λt to P(Λ
τ
f )/≡τ and as is usual in Krivine
realizability [40], for each such function F we add a predicate symbol F˙ in the language.
7.3. Adequacy of the interpretation. We shall now prove the adequacy of the interpre-
tation with respect to the type system. To this end, we need to recall a few definitions
and lemmas. Since stores only contain proof terms, we need to define valuations for term
variables in order to close formulas38. These valuations are defined by the usual grammar:
ρ ::= ε | ρ[x 7→ Vt] | ρ[X 7→ F˙ ]
We denote by (p|τ)ρ (resp. pρ, Aρ) the proof-in-store (p|τ) where all the variables x ∈ dom(ρ)
(resp. X ∈ dom(ρ)) have been substituted by the corresponding term ρ(x) (resp. falsity
value ρ(x)).
38Alternatively, we could have modified the small-step reduction rules to include substitutions of terms.
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‖⊥‖f , Λ
τ
f
‖⊤‖f , ∅
‖F˙ (t)‖f , F (t)
‖t = u‖f ,
{
{(µ˜=.c|τ) : cτ ∈ ⊥⊥} if t ≡τ u
Λτf otherwise
‖p ∈ A‖f , {(V |τ) ∈ |A|V : V ≡τ p}
⊥⊥f
‖T → B‖f , {(Vt · e|τ) : (Vt|τ) ∈ |t ∈ T |Vt ∧ (e|τ) ∈ ‖B‖e}
‖A→ B‖f , {(V · e|τ) : (V |τ) ∈ |A|V ∧ (e|τ) ∈ ‖B‖e}
‖T ∧A‖f , {(µ˜(x, a).c|τ) : ∀τ
′, Vt ∈ |T |
τ ′
Vt
, V ∈ |A|τ
′
V , τ ⋄ τ
′ ⇒ c[Vt/x]ττ ′[a := V ] ∈ ⊥⊥}
‖A1 ∧A2‖f , {(µ˜(a1, a2).c|τ) : ∀τ
′, Vi ∈ |Ai|
τ ′
V , τ ⋄ τ
′ ⇒ cττ ′[a1 := V1][a2 := V2] ∈ ⊥⊥}
‖A1 ∨A2‖f , {(µ˜[a1.c1|a2.c2]|τ) : ∀τ
′, V ∈ |Ai|
τ ′
V , τ ⋄ τ
′ ⇒ cττ ′[ai := V ] ∈ ⊥⊥}
‖∃x.A‖f ,
⋂
t∈Λt
‖A[t/x]‖f
‖∀x.A‖f , (
⋂
t∈Λt
‖A[t/x]‖⊥⊥vf )
⊥⊥f
‖∀a.A‖f , (
⋂
t∈Λp
‖A[p/a]‖⊥⊥vf )
⊥⊥f
‖νtfxA‖f ,
⋃
n∈N ‖F
n
A,t‖f
|A|V , ‖A‖
⊥⊥V
f = {(V |τ) : ∀fτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (f |τ ′) ∈ ‖A‖f ⇒ (V |τ)⊥⊥(F |τ
′)}
‖A‖e , |A|
⊥⊥e
V = {(E|τ) : ∀V τ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (V |τ ′) ∈ |A|V ⇒ (V |τ
′)⊥⊥(E|τ)}
|A|p , ‖A‖
⊥⊥p
e = {(p|τ) : ∀Eτ ′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (E|τ ′) ∈ ‖A‖E ⇒ (t|τ)⊥⊥(E|τ
′)}
|N|Vt , {(S
n(0)|τ), n ∈ N}
|t ∈ T |Vt , {(Vt|τ) ∈ |T |Vt : Vt ≡τ t}
|T → U |Vt , {(λx.t|τ) : ∀Vtτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (Vt|τ
′) ∈ |T |Vt ⇒ (t[Vt/x]|ττ
′) ∈ |U |t}
|T |π , |A|
⊥⊥pi
Vt
= {(F |τ) : ∀vτ ′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (v|τ ′) ∈ |A|v ⇒ (v|τ
′)⊥⊥(F |τ)}
|T |t , |A|
⊥⊥t
π = {(V |τ) : ∀Fτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (F |τ ′) ∈ ‖A‖F ⇒ (V |τ)⊥⊥(F |τ
′)}
where:
• p ∈ Sτ (resp. e,V ,etc.) denotes (p|τ) ∈ S (resp. (e|τ), (V |τ), etc.),
• F is a function from Λt to P(Λ
τ
f )/≡τ .
Figure 14. Realizability interpretation for dLPAω
Definition 7.9. Given a closed store τ , a valuation ρ and a fixed pole ⊥⊥, we say that the
pair (τ, ρ) realizes Γ, which we write39 (τ, ρ)  Γ, if:
(1) for any (a : A) ∈ Γ, (a|τ)ρ ∈ |Aρ|V ,
(2) for any (α : A⊥⊥ρ ) ∈ Γ, (α|τ)ρ ∈ ‖Aρ‖e,
(3) for any {a|p} ∈ σ, a ≡τ p,
(4) for any (x : T ) ∈ Γ, x ∈ dom(ρ) and (ρ(x)|τ) ∈ |Tρ|Vt .
39Once again, we should formally write (τ, ρ) ⊥⊥ Γ but we will omit the annotation by ⊥⊥ as often as
possible.
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We recall two key properties of the interpretation, whose proofs are similar to the proofs
for the corresponding statements in the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus [55]:
Lemma 7.10 (Store weakening). Let τ and τ ′ be two stores such that τ ⊳ τ ′, let Γ be a
typing context, let ⊥⊥ be a pole and ρ a valuation. The following statements hold:
(1) ττ ′ = τ ′
(2) If (p|τ)ρ ∈ |Aρ|p for some closed proof-in-store (p|τ)ρ and formula A, then (p|τ
′)ρ ∈
|Aρ|p. The same holds for each level e,E, V, f, t, π, Vt of the interpretation.
(3) If (τ, ρ)  Γ then (τ ′, ρ)  Γ.
Proposition 7.11 (Monotonicity). For any closed formula A, any type T and any given
pole ⊥⊥, we have the following inclusions:
|A|V ⊆ |A|p ‖A‖f ⊆ ‖A‖e |T |Vt ⊆ |T |t
We can check that the interpretation is indeed defined up to the relations ≡τ :
Proposition 7.12. For any store τ and any valuation ρ, the component along τ of the
truth and falsity values defined in Figure 14 are closed under the relation ≡τ :
(1) if (f |τ)ρ ∈ ‖Aρ‖f and Aρ ≡τ Bρ, then (f |τ)ρ ∈ ‖Bρ‖f ,
(2) if (Vt|τ)ρ ∈ |Aρ|Vt and Aρ ≡τ Bρ, then (Vt|τ)ρ ∈ |Bρ|v.
The same applies with |Aρ|p, ‖Aρ‖e, etc.
Proof. By induction on the structure of Aρ and the different levels of interpretation. The
different base cases (p ∈ Aρ, t ∈ T , t = u) are direct since their components along τ are
defined modulo ≡τ , the other cases are trivial inductions.
We can now prove the main property of our interpretation:
Proposition 7.13 (Adequacy). The typing rules are adequate with respect to the realizabil-
ity interpretation. In other words, if Γ is a typing context, ⊥⊥ a pole, ρ a valuation and τ
a store such that (τ, ρ)  Γ;σ, then the following hold:
(1) If v is a strong value s.t. Γ ⊢σ v : A or Γ ⊢d v : A;σ, then (v|τ)ρ ∈ |Aρ|V .
(2) If f is a forcing context s.t. Γ ⊢σ f : A⊥⊥ or Γ ⊢d f : A
⊥⊥;σ, then (f |τ)ρ ∈ ‖Aρ‖f .
(3) If V is a weak value s.t. Γ ⊢σ V : A or Γ ⊢d V : A;σ, then (V |τ)ρ ∈ |Aρ|V .
(4) If e is a context s.t. Γ ⊢σ e : A⊥⊥ or Γ ⊢d e : A
⊥⊥;σ, then (e|τ)ρ ∈ ‖Aρ‖e.
(5) If p is a proof term s.t. Γ ⊢σ p : A or Γ ⊢d p : A;σ, then (p|τ)ρ ∈ |Aρ|p.
(6) If Vt is a term value s.t. Γ ⊢
σ Vt : T , then (Vt|τ)ρ ∈ |Tρ|Vt .
(7) If π is a term context s.t. Γ ⊢σ π : T , then (π|τ)ρ ∈ |Tρ|π.
(8) If t is a term s.t. Γ ⊢σ t : T , then (t|τ)ρ ∈ |Tρ|t.
(9) If τ ′ is a store s.t. Γ ⊢σ τ ′ : (Γ′; )σ′, then (ττ ′, ρ)  (Γ,Γ′;σσ′).
(10) If c is a command s.t. Γ ⊢σ c or Γ ⊢d c;σ, then (cτ)ρ ∈ ⊥⊥.
(11) If cτ ′ is a closure s.t. Γ ⊢σ cτ ′ or Γ ⊢d cτ
′;σ, then (cττ ′)ρ ∈ ⊥⊥.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the typing derivation such as given in the system
extended with the small-step reduction  s. Most of the cases correspond to the proof
of adequacy for the interpretation of the λ[lvτ⋆]-calculus, so that we only give the most
interesting cases. To lighten the notations, we omit the annotation by the valuation ρ
whenever it is possible.
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• Case (∃r). We recall the typing rule through the decomposition of dependent sums:
Γ ⊢σ t : u ∈ T Γ ⊢σ p : A[u/x]
Γ ⊢σ (t, p) : (u ∈ T ∧A[u])
By induction hypothesis, we obtain that (t|τ) ∈ |u ∈ T |t and (p|τ) ∈ |A[u]|p. Consider thus
any context-in-store (e|τ ′) ∈ ‖u ∈ T ∧A[u]‖e such that τ and τ
′ are compatible, and let us
denote by τ0 the union ττ ′. We have:
〈(t, p)||e〉pτ0  s 〈p||µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉〉pτ0
so that by anti-reduction, we need to show that µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉 ∈ ‖A[u]‖e.
Let us then consider a value-in-store (V |τ ′0) ∈ |A[u]|V such that τ0 and τ
′
0 are compatible,
and let us denote by τ1 the union τ0τ ′0. By closure under delimited continuations, to
show that 〈V ||µ˜tˇp.〈t||µ˜x.〈tˇp||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉〉pτ1 is in the pole it is enough to show that the
closure 〈t||µ˜x.〈V ||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉τ1 is in ⊥⊥,. Thus it suffices to show that the coterm-in-store
(µ˜x.〈V ||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉|τ1) is in |u ∈ T |π.
Consider a term value-in-store (Vt|τ
′
1) ∈ |u ∈ T |Vt , such that τ1 and τ
′
1 are compatible,
and let us denote by τ2 the union τ1τ ′1. We have:
〈Vt||µ˜x.〈V ||µ˜a.〈(x, a)||e〉〉〉τ2  s 〈V ||µ˜a.〈(Vt, a)||e〉〉τ2  s 〈(Vt, a)||e〉τ2[a := V ]
It is now easy to check that ((Vt, a)|τ2[a := V ]) ∈ |u ∈ T ∧ A[u]|V and to conclude, using
Lemma 7.10 to get (e|τ2[a := V ]) ∈ ‖u ∈ T ∧A[u]‖e, that this closure is finally in the pole.
• Case (≡r),(≡l). These cases are direct consequences of Proposition 7.12 since if A,B are
two formulas such that A ≡ B, in particular A ≡τ B and thus |A|v = |B|v.
• Case (=r),(=l). The case for refl is trivial, while it is trivial to show that (µ˜=.〈p||e〉|τ)
is in ‖t = u‖f if (p|τ) ∈ |A[t]|p and (e|τ) ∈ ‖A[u]‖e. Indeed, either t ≡τ u and thus
A[t] ≡τ A[u] (Proposition 7.12, or t 6≡τ u and ‖t = u‖f = Λ
τ
f .
• Case (∀xr ). This case is standard in a call-by-value language with value restriction. We
recall the typing rule:
Γ ⊢σ v : A x /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ⊢σ v : ∀x.A
(∀xr )
The induction hypothesis gives us that (v|τ)ρ is in |Aρ|V for any valuation ρ[x 7→ t]. Then
for any t, we have (v|τ)ρ ∈ ‖Aρ[t/x]‖
⊥⊥v
f so that (v|τ)ρ ∈ (
⋂
t∈Λt
‖A[t/x]‖⊥⊥vf ). There-
fore, if (f |τ ′)ρ belongs to ‖∀x.Aρ‖f = (
⋂
t∈Λt
‖A[t/x]‖⊥⊥vf )
⊥⊥f , we have by definition that
(v|τ)ρ⊥⊥(f |τ
′)ρ.
• Case (fix). We recall the typing rule:
Γ ⊢σ t : N Γ ⊢σ p0 : A[0/x] Γ, x : T, a : A ⊢
σ pS : A[S(x)/x]
Γ ⊢σ fixtax[p0 | pS ] : A[t/x]
(fix)
We want to show that (fixtax[p0 | pS ]|τ) ∈ |A[t]|p, let us then consider (e|τ
′) ∈ ‖A[t]‖e such
that τ and τ ′ are compatible, and let us denote by τ0 the union ττ ′. By induction hypothesis,
we have40 t ∈ |t ∈ N|t and we have:
〈fixtbx[p0 | pS]||e〉pτ0  s 〈µtˆp.〈t||µ˜y.〈a||tˆp〉[a := fix
y
bx[p0 | pS ]]〉||e〉pτ0
40Recall that any term t of type T can be given the type t ∈ T .
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so that by anti-reduction and closure under delimited continuations, it is enough to show
that the coterm-in-store (µ˜y.〈a||e〉[a := fixybx[p0 | pS ]]|τ0) is in |t ∈ N|π. Let us then consider
(Vt|τ
′
0) ∈ |t ∈ N|Vt such that τ0 and τ
′
0 are compatible, and let us denote by τ1 the union
τ0τ ′0. By definition, Vt = S
n(0) for some n ∈ N and t ≡τ1 S
n(0), and we have:
〈Sn(0)||µ˜y.〈a||e〉[a := fixybx[p0 | pS ]]〉τ1  s 〈a||e〉τ1[a := fix
Sn(0)
bx [p0 | pS ]]
We conclude by showing by induction on the natural numbers that for any n ∈ N , the value-
in-store (a|τ1[a := fix
Sn(0)
bx [p0 | pS ]]) is in |A[S
n(0)]|V . Let us consider (f |τ
′
1) ∈ ‖A[S
n(0)]‖f
such that the store τ1[a := fix
Sn(0)
bx [p0 | pS ]] and τ
′
1 are compatible, and let us denote by
τ2[a := fix
Sn(0)
bx [p0 | pS ]]τ
′
2 their union.
• If n = 0, we have:
〈a||f〉τ2[a := fix
0
bx[p0 | pS ]]τ
′
2  s 〈p0||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ
′
2〉τ2
We conclude by anti-reduction and the induction hypothesis for p0, since it is easy
to show that (µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′2|τ2) ∈ ‖A[0]‖e.
• If n = S(m), we have:
〈a||f〉τ2[a := fix
S(Sm(0))
bx [p0 | pS ]]τ
′
2  s 〈pS [S
m(0)/x][b′/b]||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′2〉pτ2[b
′ := fix
Sm(0)
bx [p0 | pS ]]
Since we have by induction that (b′|τ2[b
′ := fix
Sm(0)
bx [p0 | pS ]]) is in |A[S
m(0)]|V , we
can conclude by anti-reduction, using the induction hypothesis for pS and the fact
that (µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′2|τ2) belongs to ‖A[S(S
m(0))]‖e.
• Case (cofix). We recall the typing rule:
Γ ⊢σ t : T Γ, x : T, b : ∀yT.X(y) ⊢σ p : A X positive in A X /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ⊢σ cofixtbx[p] : ν
t
XxA
(cofix)
We want to show that (cofixtbx[p]|τ) ∈ |ν
t
XxA|p, let us then consider (e|τ
′) ∈ ‖νtXxA‖e
such that τ and τ ′ are compatible, and let us denote by τ0 the union ττ ′. By induction
hypothesis, we have t ∈ |t ∈ T |t and we have:
〈cofixtbx[p]||e〉pτ0  s 〈µtˆp.〈t||µ˜y.〈a||tˆp〉[a := cofix
y
bx[p]]〉||e〉pτ0
so that by anti-reduction and closure under delimited continuations, it is enough to show
that the coterm-in-store (µ˜y.〈a||e〉[a := cofixybx[p]]|τ0) is in |t ∈ N|π. Let us then consider
(Vt|τ
′
0) ∈ |t ∈ T |Vt such that τ0 and τ
′
0 are compatible, and let us denote by τ2 the union
τ0τ ′0. We have:
〈Vt||µ˜y.〈a||e〉[a := cofix
y
bx[p]]〉τ1  s 〈a||e〉τ1[a := cofix
Vt
bx[p]]
It suffices to show now that the value-in store (a|τ1[a := cofix
Vt
bx[p]]) is in |ν
Vt
XxA|V . By
definition, we have:
|νVtXxA|V = (
⋃
n∈N
‖FnA,Vt‖f )
⊥⊥V =
⋂
n∈N
‖FnA,Vt‖
⊥⊥V
f =
⋂
n∈N
|FnA,Vt |V
We conclude by showing by induction on the natural numbers that for any n ∈ N and any
Vt, the value-in-store (a|τ1[a := cofix
Vt
bx[p]]) is in |F
n
A,Vt
|V .
The case n = 0 is trivial since |F 0A,Vt |V = |⊤|V = Λ
τ
V . Let then n be an integer and any
Vt be a term value. Let us consider (f |τ
′
1) ∈ ‖F
n+1
A,Vt
A‖f such that τ1[a := cofix
Vt
bx[p]] and
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τ ′1 are compatible, and let us denote by τ2[a := cofix
Vt
bx[p]]τ
′
2 their union. By definition, we
have:
〈a||f〉τ2[a := cofix
Vt
bx[p]]τ
′
2  s 〈p[Vt/x][b
′/b]||µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′2〉τ2[b
′ := λy.cofixybx[p]]
It is straightforward to check, using the induction hypothesis for n, that (b′|τ2[b
′ := λy.cofixybx[p]])
is in |∀y.y ∈ T → FnA,y|V . Thus we deduce by induction hypothesis for p, denoting by S the
function t 7→ ‖FnA,t‖f , that:
(p[Vt/x][b
′/b]|τ2[b
′ := λy.cofixybx[p]]) ∈ |A[Vt/x][S˙/X]|p = |A[Vt/x][F
n
A,y/X(y)]|p = |F
n+1
A,Vt
|p
It only remains to show that (µ˜a.〈a||f〉τ ′2|τ2) ∈ ‖F
n+1
A,Vt
‖e, which is trivial from the hypothesis
for f .
We can finally deduce that dLPAω is normalizing and sound.
Theorem 7.14 (Normalization). If Γ ⊢σ c, then c is normalizable.
Proof. Direct consequence of Propositions 7.7 and 7.13.
Theorem 7.15 (Consistency). 0dLPAω p : ⊥
Proof. Assume there is such a proof p, by adequacy (p|ε) is in |⊥|p for any pole. Yet, the
set ⊥⊥ , ∅ is a valid pole, and with this pole, |⊥|p = ∅, which is absurd.
8. About the interpretation of coinductive formulas
While our realizability interpretation give us a proof of normalization and soundness for
dLPAω, it has two aspects that we should discuss. First, regarding the small-step reduction
system, one could have expected the lowest level of interpretation to be v instead of f .
Moreover, if we observe our definition, we notice that most of the cases of ‖ · ‖f are in
fact defined by orthogonality to a subset of strong values. Indeed, except for coinductive
formulas, we could indeed have defined instead an interpretation | · |v of formulas at level v
and then the interpretation ‖ · ‖f by orthogonality:
|⊥|v , ∅
|t = u|v ,
{
refl if t ≡ u
∅ otherwise
|p ∈ A|v , {(v|τ) ∈ |A|v : v ≡τ p}
|T → B|v , {(λx.p|τ) : ∀Vtτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (Vt|τ
′) ∈ |T |V ⇒ (p[Vt/x]|ττ ′) ∈ |B|p}
|A→ B|v , {(λa.p|τ) : ∀V τ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (V |τ ′) ∈ |A|V ⇒ (p|ττ ′[a := V ]) ∈ |B|p}
|T ∧A|v , {((Vt, V )|τ) : (Vt|τ) ∈ |T |Vt ∧ (V |τ) ∈ |A2|V }
|A1 ∧A2|v , {((V1, V2)|τ) : (V1|τ) ∈ |A1|V ∧ (V2|τ) ∈ |A2|V }
|A1 ∨A2|v , {(ιi(V )|τ) : (V |τ) ∈ |Ai|V }
|∃x.A|v ,
⋃
t∈Λt
|A[t/x]|v
|∀x.A|v ,
⋂
t∈Λt
|A[t/x]|v
|∀a.A|v ,
⋂
p∈Λp
|A[p/x]|v
‖A‖f , {(f |τ) : ∀vτ
′, τ ⋄ τ ′ ∧ (v|τ ′) ∈ |A|v ⇒ (v|τ
′)⊥⊥(F |τ)}
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If this definition is somewhat more natural, it poses a problem for the definition of
coinductive formulas. Indeed, there is a priori no strong value in the orthogonal of ‖νtfvA‖f ,
which is:
(‖νtfvA‖f )
⊥⊥v = (
⋃
n∈N
‖FnA,t‖f )
⊥⊥v =
⋂
n∈N
(‖FnA,t‖f )
⊥⊥v)
For instance, consider again the case of a stream of type ν0fxA(x) ∧ f(S(x)) = 0, a strong
value in the intersection should be in every |A(0) ∧ (A(1) ∧ . . . (A(n) ∧ ⊤) . . . )|v, which is
not possible due to the finiteness of terms41. Thus, the definition |νtfvA|v ,
⋂
n∈N |F
n
A,t|v
would give |νtfxA|v = ∅ = |⊥|v.
Interestingly, and this is the second aspect that we shall discuss here, we could have
defined instead the truth value of coinductive formulas directly by :
|νtfxA|v , |A[t/x][ν
y
fxA/f(y) = 0]|v
Let us sketch the proof that such a definition is well-founded. We consider the language
of formulas without coinductive formulas and extended with formulas of the shape X(t)
where X,Y, ... are parameters. At level v, closed formulas are interpreted by sets of strong
values-in-store (v|τ), and as we already observed, these sets are besides closed under the
relation ≡τ along their component τ . If A(x) is a formula whose only free variable is x,
the function which associates to each term t the set |A(t)|v is thus a function from Λt to
P(Λτv)/≡τ , let us denote the set of these functions by L .
Proposition 8.1. The set L is a complete lattice with respect to the order ≤L defined by:
F ≤L G , ∀t ∈ Λt.F (t) ⊆ G(t)
Proof. Trivial since the order on functions is defined pointwise and the co-domain P(Λτv) is
itself a complete lattice.
We define valuations, which we write ρ, as functions mapping each parameter X to
a function ρ(X) ∈ L . We then define the interpretations |A|ρv, ‖A‖
ρ
f , ... of formulas with
parameters exactly as above with the additional rule42:
|X(t)|ρv , {(v|τ) ∈ ρ(X)(t)}
Let us fix a formula A which has one free variable x and a parameter X such that
sub-formulas of the shape X t only occur in positive positions in A.
Lemma 8.2. Let B(x) is a formula without parameters whose only free variable is x, and
let ρ be a valuation which maps X to the function t 7→ |B(t)|v. Then |A|
ρ
v = |A[B(t)/X(t)]|v
Proof. By induction on the structure of A, all cases are trivial, and this is true for the basic
case A ≡ X(t):
|X(t)|ρv = ρ(X)(t) = |B(t)|v
41Yet, it might possible to consider interpretation with infinite proof terms, the proof of adequacy for
proofs and contexts (which are finite) will still work exactly the same. However, another problem will arise
for the adequacy of the cofix operator. Indeed, with the interpretation above, we would obtain the inclusion:
⋃
n∈N
(‖FnA,t‖f ) ⊂ (
⋂
n∈N
|FnA,t|t)
⊥⊥f = ‖νtfxA‖f
which is strict in general. By orthogonality, this gives us that |νtfxA|V ⊆
⋃
n∈N
(‖FnA,t‖f ))
⊥⊥V , while the
proof of adequacy only proves that (a|τ [a := cofixtb[x]p]) belongs to the latter set.
42Observe that this rule is exactly the same as in the previous section (see Figure 14).
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Let us now define ϕA as the following function:
ϕA :
{
L → L
F 7→ t 7→ |A[t/x]|
[X 7→F ]
v
Proposition 8.3. The function ϕA is monotone.
Proof. By induction on the structure of A, where X can only occur in positive positions.
The case |X(t)|v is trivial, and it is easy to check that truth values are monotonic with
respect to the interpretation of formulas in positive positions, while falsity values are anti-
monotonic.
We can thus apply Knaster-Tarski theorem to ϕA, and we denote by gfp(ϕA) its greatest
fixpoint. We can now define:
|νtXxA|v , gfp(ϕA)(t)
This definition satisfies the expected equality:
Proposition 8.4. We have:
|νtXxA|v = |A[t/x][ν
y
XxA/X(y)]|v
Proof. Observe first that by definition, the formula B(z) = |νzXxA|v satisfies the hypotheses
of Lemma 8.2 and that gfp(ϕA) = t 7→ B(t). Then we can deduce :
|νtXxA|v = gfp(ϕA)(t) = ϕA(gfp(ϕA))(t) = |A[t/x]|
[X 7→gfp(ϕA)]
v
= |A[t/x][νyXxA/X(y)]|v
Back to the original language, it only remains to define |νtfxA|v as the set |ν
t
XxA[X(y)/f(y) =
0]|v that we just defined. This concludes our proof that the interpretation of coinductive
formulas through the equation in Proposition 8.4 is well-founded.
We could also have done the same reasoning with the interpretation from the previous
section, by defining L as the set of functions from Λt to P(Λ
τ
f )≡τ . The function ϕA, which
is again monotonic, is then:
ϕA :
{
L → L
F 7→ t 7→ |A[t/x]|
[X 7→F ]
v
We recognize here the definition of the formula FnA,t. Defining f
0 as the function t 7→ ‖⊤‖f
and fn+1 , ϕA(f
n) we have:
∀n ∈ N, ‖FnA,t‖f = f
n(t) = ϕnA(f
0)(t)
However, in both cases (defining primitively the interpretation at level v or f), this
definition does not allow us to prove43 the adequacy of the (cofix) rule. In the case of an
interpretation defined at level f , the best that we can do is to show that for any n ∈ N, fn
is a post-fixpoint since for any term t, we have:
fn(t) = ‖FnA,t‖f ⊆ ‖F
n+1
A,t ‖f = f
n+1(t) = ϕA(f
n)(t)
43To be honest, we should rather say that we could not manage to find a proof, and that we would
welcome any suggestion from insightful readers.
A CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF OF DEPENDENT CHOICE IN CLASSICAL ARITHMETIC 71
With ‖νtfxA‖f defined as the greatest fixpoint of ϕA, for any term t and any n ∈ N we have
the inclusion fn(t) ⊆ gfp(ϕA)(t) = ‖ν
t
fxA‖f and thus:⋃
n∈N
‖FnA,t‖f =
⋃
n∈N
fn(t) ⊆ ‖νtfxA‖f
By orthogonality, we get:
|νtfxA|V ⊆
⋂
n∈N
|FnA,t|V
and thus our proof of adequacy from the last section is not enough to conclude that
cofixtbx[p] ∈ |ν
t
fxA|p. For this, we would need to prove that the inclusion is an equal-
ity. An alternative to this would be to show that the function t 7→
⋃
n∈N ‖F
n
A,t‖f is a
fixpoint for ϕA. In that case, we could stick to this definition and happily conclude that it
satisfies the equation:
‖νtXxA‖f = ‖A[t/x][ν
y
XxA/X(y)]‖f
This would be the case if the function ϕA was Scott-continuous on L (which is a dcpo),
since we could then apply Kleene fixed-point theorem44 to prove that t 7→
⋃
n∈N ‖F
n
A,t‖f
is the stationary limit of ϕnA(f0). However, ϕA is not Scott-continuous
45 (the definition of
falsity values involves double-orthogonal sets which do not preserve supremums), and this
does not apply.
9. Conclusion and perspectives
9.1. Conclusion. At the end of the day, we met our main objective, namely proving the
soundness and the normalization of a language which includes proof terms for dependent
and countable choice in a classical setting. This language, which we called dLPAω, provides
us with the same computational features as dPAω but in a sequent calculus fashion. These
computational features allow dLPAω to internalize the realizability approach of [9, 19] as
a direct proofs-as-programs interpretation: both proof terms for countable and dependent
choices furnish a lazy witness for the ideal choice function which is evaluated on demand.
This interpretation is in line with the slogan that with new programing principles—here
the lazy evaluation and the co-inductive objects—come new reasoning principles—here the
axioms ACN and DC.
Interestingly, in our search for a proof of normalization for dLPAω, we developed novel
tools to study these side effects and dependent types in presence of classical logic. On the
one hand, we set out in [54] the difficulties related to the definition of a sequent calculus
with dependent types. On the other hand, building on [55], we developed a variant of
Krivine realizability adapted to a lazy calculus where delayed substitutions are stored in an
explicit environment. The sound combination of both frameworks led us to the definition
of dLPAω together with its realizability interpretation.
44In fact, Cousot and Cousot proved a constructive version of Kleene fixed-point theorem which states
that without any continuity requirement, the transfinite sequence (ϕαA(f
0))α∈On is stationary [13]. Yet, we
doubt that the gain of the desired equality is worth a transfinite definition of the realizability interpretation.
45In fact, this is nonetheless a good news about our interpretation. Indeed, it is well-know that the
more “regular” a model is, the less interesting it is. For instance, Streicher showed that the realizability
model induced by Scott domains (using it as a realizability structure) was not only a forcing model by also
equivalent to the ground model.
72 E´TIENNE MIQUEY
9.2. Krivine’s interpretations of dependent choice. The computational content we
give to the axiom of dependent choice is pretty different of Krivine’s usual realizer of the
same [39]. Indeed, our proof uses dependent types to get witnesses of existential formulas,
and we represent choice functions through the lazily evaluated stream of their values. A
similar idea can also be found in NuPrl BITT type theory, where choice sequences are used in
place of functions [12]. In turn, Krivine realizes a statement which is logically equivalent to
the axiom of dependent choice thanks to the instruction quote, which injectively associates
a natural number to each closed λc-term. In a more recent work [44], Krivine proposes a
realizability model which has a bar-recursor and where the axiom of dependent choice is
realized using the bar-recursion. This realizability model satisfies the continuum hypothesis
and many more properties, in particular the real numbers have the same properties as in
the ground model. However, the very structure of this model, where Λ is of cardinal ℵ1 (in
particular infinite streams of integer are terms), makes it incompatible with quote.
It is clear that the three approaches are different in terms of programming languages.
Nonetheless, it could be interesting to compare them from the point of view of the realizabil-
ity models they give rise to. In particular, our analysis of the interpretation of co-inductive
formulas may suggest that the interest of lazy co-fixpoints is precisely to approximate the
limit situation where Λ has infinite objects.
9.3. Reduction of the consistency of classical arithmetic in finite types with
dependent choice to the consistency of second-order arithmetic. The standard ap-
proach to the computational content of classical dependent choice in the classical arithmetic
in finite types is via realizability as initiated by Spector [67] in the context of Go¨del’s func-
tional interpretation, and later adapted to the context of modified realizability by Berardi
et al [9]. The aforementioned works of Krivine [39, 44] in the different settings of PA2 and
ZFε also give realizers of dependent choice. In all these approaches, the correctness of the
realizer, which implies consistency of the system, is itself justified by a use at the meta-level
of a principle classically equivalent to dependent choice (dependent choice itself in [39], bar
induction or update induction [10] in the case of [67, 9].).
Our approach is here different, since we directly interpret proofs of dependent choice in
classical arithmetic computationally. Besides, the structure of our realizability interpreta-
tion for dLPAω suggests the definition of a typed CPS to an extension of system F 46, but it
is not clear whether its consistency is itself conservative or not over system F . Ultimately,
we would be interested in a computational reduction of the consistency of dPAω or dLPAω
to the one of PA2, that is to the consistency of second-order arithmetic. While it is well-
known that DC is conservative over second-order arithmetic with full comprehension (see
[66, Theorem VII.6.20]), it would nevertheless be very interesting to have such a direct com-
putational reduction. The converse direction has been recently studied by Valentin Blot,
who presented in [11] a translation of System F into a simply-typed total language with a
variant of bar recursion.
9.4. The axiom of choice. The computational content of the axiom of countable and
dependent choices being understood, it is natural to wonder whether our approach extends
to the full axiom of choice. To that end, the main difficulty seems to be related to the mem-
oization technique we use: in both proof terms for ACN and DC, the choice function ranges
46See [52, Chapitre 8] for further details.
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over the domain of natural numbers, hence it is easy to know whether the computation for
a given n ∈ N has already been performed. In turn, when considering an arbitrary domain
A as is the case for the full axiom of choice AC, if the equality on A is not decidable, we
might not be able to know whether the computation for a ∈ A has already been done or
not. At first sight, our approach seems to extend to any type A with decidable equality, but
handling arbitrary types with undecidable equality would require a more careful treatment
of equality during the memoization process.
On a similar line of work, there exists a wide literature on different form of choices (e.g.,
the axiom of dependent choice, Ko¨nig’s Lemma), as well as on bar induction principles or
the Fan theorem, which can be seen as their contrapositives. Recently, Herbelin and Brede
undertook a systematical classification of these principles, including also the Ultrafilter
Theorem in the picture, aiming at highlighting dualities and studying logical equivalences
in different frameworks (classical, intuitionistic and linear logic) [30]. In that regard, having
a precise understanding of the computational content of each of these principles as well as
on the translations existing between them is an interesting perspective, for which this work
or Blot’s work on bar induction [11] might be the first steps.
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